This essay examines the complex and often tension-filled relationship between empirical science and public policymaking. Drawing on scholars such as Kingdon, Wildavsky, and Haller and Gerrie, the paper challenges the conventional view that science straightforwardly feeds "empirical truths" into a sequential policy process. It argues that both disciplines are ongoing human endeavors shaped by funding pressures, special interests, and the inherent uncertainty of the scientific method. The paper contends that scientists must communicate uncertainty honestly to policymakers, that policy decisions cannot wait for absolute scientific consensus, and that pure and applied science must not be artificially separated if evidence-based policy is to retain its integrity.
Science has traditionally been presented as the a priori fact-finding, theory-establishing stage one of policymaking. Stage two of this conventional approach has policymakers utilizing the "empirical truths" that science offers in support of policies enacted to solve a policy problem. Yet both policymaking and empirical research are — by their very nature — ongoing human endeavors. Policymakers want the best that science has to offer, when they need it, for decision-making, policymaking, and policy implementation. Science marches to its own tune, with agendas set by dynamics such as funding for research and public and private priorities and pressures (Kingdon, 1984). Increasingly, in a cooling funding environment, the ability to conduct research is often determined by its application — public service adding a positive valence — and the ability to enact policy is dependent on scientific evidence that the policy problem will be robustly and adequately addressed through implementation of the proposed policy.
Haller and Gerrie (2007) argued that "decisions must be made and not postponed until absolute scientific consensus has been reached, and thus, scientific input to contentious policy debates must be solicited in the here and now" (p. 143). According to Haller and Gerrie, the power of science to support evidence-based policy decisions is undermined by the very act of exposing science to the demands and parameters set by policymakers. The researchers further suggest that scientists position themselves as hired guns for particular interest groups rather than as objective consultants to decision-makers.
The issue is not whether science can provide "truth," but whether policymakers agree that there is no efficient frontier for policymaking wherein all policymakers will have perfect and complete information with which to formulate policy (Wildavsky, 1979). It is essential that scientists communicate that there is no perfect solution — no silver bullet, no magic potion — that can be offered up for timely utility in the policymaking stream. It is incumbent on scientists to communicate in such a way that they "identify and further the public interest by discrediting policy options serving only special interests and helping to select among 'science-confident' and 'hedging' options" (William, 2004, n.p.). The two disciplines must agree to acknowledge the degree of uncertainty and skepticism that is the hallmark of empirical science — even when it is applied to policymaking. Uncertainty must not be mistaken for discrediting of the scientific process, nor must it be used to justify inaction (William, 2004).
"Policy decisions cannot await perfect scientific consensus"
"Pure and applied science must not be artificially separated"
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