This paper investigates the strategic role of social media in terrorism discourse, arguing that state actors use platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to shape public perception through an "us versus them" paradigm. Drawing on scholarship examining media representation, false-flag terrorism, and state-sponsored operations, the study proposes an experimental methodology to test how citizens evaluate terrorism claims on social media. The paper concludes that most citizens uncritically accept state-controlled narratives about terrorism without seeking third-party verification, enabling governments to advance geopolitical agendas under the guise of counterterrorism.
The role of social media in terrorism is one that remains unclear for many researchers who recognize both the power of social media to disseminate unverified information widely and quickly and the power of the term "terrorism" to convey an "us versus them" paradigm (Herzberg & Steinberg, 2012; Scanlon, 2005; Britton, 2005; Dombrowsky, 2005). Social media usage helped spread instantaneously around the world images of the death of Gaddafi. It has also helped spread messages of "terrorists," both authentic and inauthentic (Kearns, Conlon, & Young, 2014). Social media is a tool which ultimately can aid in the rapid dissemination of information or misinformation, and thus can help shape public opinion in a unique way.
What is unique about social media is its ability to mix authentic with inauthentic information in such a way that followers face choices of either accepting the information presented as credible or investigating the claims via third-party sources. In this context, it is not surprising that Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) assert that "lies about terrorism can be strategically employed to help a group achieve its desired goal(s) without necessitating that an attack be truthfully claimed" (p. 422). With this in mind, the role of social media becomes a significant strategic tool of groups, organizations, and states wishing to shape public opinion regarding acts of terrorism.
The central research question is: What role do social media play in terrorism? This study hypothesizes that since states sponsor terrorism, much of what passes as "terrorism" on social media is related to false-flag terrorism (Kearns, Conlon, & Young, 2014) or to exercises of entrapment by state agencies. Various news outlets, journalists, scholars, and researchers have reported on both instances (Escobar, 2014; Stone & Kuznick, 2012; Windrem & Brunker, 2015). This study intends to show that social media is a tool utilized by states both to exaggerate and to capitalize on the nature, extent, and threat of terrorism.
Terrorism has been defined by the U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction as the "calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature...through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear" (Sebastian, 2005, p. 67). In this sense, terrorism is not restricted to ethnicity or geographical region: anyone who uses a calculated threat of violence or intimidation to instill fear may be deemed a terrorist. In fact, activist Russell Brand famously labeled American pundit and talk-show host Sean Hannity a terrorist when the latter aggressively accused a guest speaker of supporting Hamas. Likewise, researchers have identified several Western states as being sponsors of terrorist activities (Scott, 2008; Weiner, 2008; Escobar, 2014).
What role social media plays in terrorism depends on how states, groups, and agencies prefer to use it.
The literature review was conducted by selecting appropriate sources using keyword searches in databases such as SAGE, JSTOR, ProQuest, and Questia. Keyword searches were based primarily on suggested phrases from studies with which the researcher had some familiarity. Initial searches using terms such as "social media terrorism" yielded studies such as Amble's (2012) "Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment" and Cho and Wilson's (2008) "Terrorism and Media in Korea." These studies, along with ones by Scanlon (2005) and Britton (2005), suggested other keywords such as "false-flag terrorism," which yielded the Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) study. As more studies were read, additional keywords suggested themselves until a broad and deep literature collection on social media and terrorism was accumulated. Most literature on the subject comprises essays based on studies of relevant research in the field.
Scanlon (2005) discusses how the term "terrorism" is a misleading one precisely because of the way the media uses it, conjuring the idea of an "us versus them" paradigm. Scanlon's essay is part of a discussion on the sociology of terrorism, risk, and social media in a series of essays by Scanlon, Britton, Dombrowsky, and others, who debate these issues among themselves. Scanlon (2005) is struck by "how much of the debate [is]...influenced by awareness of various events and how much of that awareness [is] media related" (p. 13). His main point is that "awareness" of terrorism via social media has allowed the former to take on a special significance that it would not have possessed twenty years earlier, before the rise of social media made information so instantaneous and capable of being sensationalized by all major news networks monitoring and using social media. According to Scanlon, social ideas such as terrorism have been largely influenced by media representation.
Britton (2005) echoes Scanlon's argument, suggesting that media portrayals of terrorism, whether via mainstream or social media, tell a story that is often biased and propagandized: "Some influential segments of society have...the need to conjure up demons or insist on demon definitions, and here I am thinking particularly of the current US Administration and its bizarre rhetoric in its so-called war against terrorism" (Britton, 2005, p. 114). Britton asserts that the U.S. network of media channels, which includes social media, is a powerful state tool used for disseminating information designed to cause receivers to form a negative view of "them" and a positive view of "us." Considering that major corporate networks inundate platforms like Twitter with updates for casual followers, it is naive, as these scholars suggest, to imagine that social media is a platform used only by alternative groups, activists, and the underground. The corporate and political worlds are very familiar with social media and its uses.
Dombrowsky (2005) asserts as much in his essay response to Scanlon and Britton. His main argument is that terms such as terrorism ought to be viewed from a sociological perspective, especially in a post-9/11 world, where media communications lend them a changing, subjective, and almost "mythological significance," which can in turn be exploited by organizations not necessarily concerned with addressing the reality of the situation (p. 84).
The arguments of Scanlon, Britton, and Dombrowsky lay a sociological framework by which the nature of social media's role in terrorism may be understood more deeply in terms of theoretical approaches.
Amble (2012) notes in his essay that social media monitoring "will lend critical advantage to governments" seeking to oppose "global jihadists" (p. 339). Amble's thesis is underscored by the suggestion that the only terrorists who pose any threat to states are "jihadist" Muslims. It is, as Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) show, a vastly naive suggestion. This study alone has pointed out that many researchers view nearly all states as capable of sponsoring terrorism; therefore, for Amble to focus solely on the threat of "jihad" implies that he accepts the mainstream narrative concocted by pundits, whose approach has been questioned and labeled via social media (ironically) as terroristic. Amble (2012) attempts to show that intelligence agencies are using social media to track terrorist groups' activities over the Internet. However, as Windrem and Brunker (2015) have shown, intelligence agencies like the FBI are actually engaged in a process of cultivating terrorists via social media entrapment and then "busting" them, as was recently the case for an Ohio man arrested in Washington, D.C., on charges of threatening to blow up the White House. Amble (2012) attempts to highlight the legitimacy of states using social media to combat terrorism, but what he fails to convey is how states use social media to promote terrorism in their "mission" to "combat" it.
Dean, Bell, and Newman (2012) follow Amble in the same "us versus them" paradigm mentality, noting how state agencies are utilizing Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to track and prevent the actions of terrorists and would-be terrorists. Like Amble, Dean et al. (2012) suggest that terrorists are using social media to unite. What they do not suggest, however, is that state agencies assist in that unification process by cultivating "homegrown" terrorists, assisting in their web productions (Escobar, 2014), funding their activities (Weiner, 2008), and spreading their image far and wide by constantly disseminating their message in both social and mainstream media. Dean et al. (2012) attempt to show the clever way in which state agencies are monitoring social media to keep tabs on terrorist activity. The failure of the study is in the fact that it says nothing more, for state agencies are not only monitoring; they are aiding and abetting.
Herzberg and Steinberg (2012) provide an analysis of several case studies and offer guidance on the legalities of utilizing social media in the prosecution of terrorists. The study focuses on abiding by "international humanitarian law (IHL)" (p. 494) and notes that states are heavily utilizing social media. For instance: "NATO operates YouTube channels in three languages, numerous Twitter accounts and Facebook pages that provide regular updates of its activities in Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere" (Herzberg & Steinberg, 2012, p. 503). With so much exposure, one might wonder if anything is being kept confidential. However, Herzberg and Steinberg see such operations as educative for the general public; they view the war on terror as a legitimate one, in contrast to what Scanlon, Britton, Dombrowsky, and others say about the war. Instead, Herzberg and Steinberg recycle the standard script, asserting that "social media can serve as a useful conduit for monitoring armed conflict and tracking potential violations of IHL" (p. 505). Notably, they do not assert that Western states are some of the biggest violators of IHL in recent memory, as less-biased researchers like Stone and Kuznick (2012) have shown.
Cho and Wilson (2008) show, on the other hand, that Korea (which supports the American war on terror) is more likely to report on terror events "when they (1) take place in Iraq, (2) use crueler modes of action, and (3) are related to Korean national interests, specially supporting the American Administration policy...which the Korean government has supported since its inception" (p. 89). What Cho and Wilson indicate is that the "war on terror" has a great propaganda benefit for nations seeking to shore up support for a foreign policy that is militaristic and imperialistic. Terrorist activity of states other than those which Korea and the West oppose goes unreported, because it does not promote the ideological aim of the nation-state to report on such. The thesis of Cho and Wilson is grounded in the arguments of Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014), which essentially holds that social and mainstream media are tools that governments use to shape public opinion by creating an "us versus them" paradigm. Their study goes deeper into the sub-issues regarding "terrorism" as a concept than any of the studies by Herzberg, Steinberg, Amble, or Dean, Bell, and others.
Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) illustrate how "over half of terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed," which leads them to assert that "there are four lies about terrorism" that are utilized by state media, including social media: "false claiming, false flag, the hot-potato problem, and the lie of omission" (p. 422). Each of these lies is used for strategic state purposes—namely to construct the "us versus them" paradigm, which assists states in building public support for projects of foreign destabilization and imperialism.
Steuter and Wills (2009) support the study of Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) when they provide empirical and qualitative analysis of "the way in which an image of the 'enemy' is constructed and framed in dominant media discourse" in Canadian media (p. 7). Their study suggests that Western states employ the very same terroristic activities via mainstream and social media that they condemn in "enemy" countries. Steuter and Wills argue that the ideological aim of Western states employed in the "war on terror" mimics the policy of the 1984 Orwellian state, which declared that War is Peace. It is a particularly astute observation and one that looks more deeply into the role of social media in terrorism than the superficial studies performed by Herzberg and others.
For the purpose of this study, various media representations serve as the Independent Variable, and the reactions of the public (both passive observers and active journalists) serve as the Dependent Variable. A grounded theory approach will attempt to show that the loud political and social outcry over the threat of "terror" is largely supported by media representations, which, in turn, are recycled and aired repeatedly, inciting more outcries and occasioning further evolution in the political, economic, and social construct of risk. Grounded theory enables the research to focus on the rudimentary relationship between politics, social media, and society and how that relationship determines the ways in which terror is defined.
The experimental method is used in order to manipulate the Independent Variable (IV) to observe how it affects the Dependent Variable (DV). For example, grounded theory may be applied, with media representations of the "risk of terror" representing the IV and subjects' responses representing the DV. One benefit of this method is that it allows for close, precise, and controlled analysis of subject responses to social media representations of terrorism. Some weaknesses, however, may result from the fact that the sample of subjects can hardly be considered representative of the whole: for instance, one group may stem from a university; another sample may be of stay-at-home mothers; religious affiliation would likely serve as a factor. In short, a multitude of sociological elements would have to be considered.
The purpose of this study is to identify the ways in which ordinary citizens judge the role of social media in terrorism. Based on the literature review, the findings of this study will serve to show how effective states are in using social media to construct an "us versus them" paradigm regarding the war on terror.
Students and subjects in a random mall sampling should give their consent before participating in a study. The nature of the experiment should be explained to them so that they are not surprised or shocked by certain IV.
Tests are conducted one at a time or as a group if cameras are available to monitor each one. Reactions are gauged from both physical expressions (body language) and questionnaires. Questions range from "What is your perception of 'terror' as social media defines it for you?" to "How are you influenced by social media and its reporting on terrorism?" Questions could be open-ended, but the lack of choices might lead to few questions being answered; so it could be helpful if subjects are given a group of answers from which to choose.
One anticipated problem is creating an experiment that would trigger responses from subjects, whether gathered from a university or a shopping mall. It would be presumed that subjects would already be familiar with most media representations of terror, thus positing major media outlets as true sources of terror communication, and terrorists like Bin Laden as true sources of terror. Therefore, such an experiment should also incorporate alternative media representations, which would include post-9/11 theories of terror that analyze the role of intelligence agencies or other loosely connected events that represent the 9/11 investigation as incomplete. Such representations of terror would be expected to provoke either negativity or positivity—distrust in the subject or affirmation of facts.
If the experiment were conducted at a university, a room would be needed in which the subjects could be tested and monitored. If subjects are gathered at a public place like a shopping mall (where the sample is somewhat wider and may include professionals, retirees, and students), it would be helpful if a room or trailer were available on the premises. This may require the installation of a tent within the mall itself or perhaps outside in the parking lot.
"Expected outcomes and methodological constraints of the study"
It is concluded that social media plays a role in terrorism that is not suspected by the majority of citizens of states who sponsor the war on terrorism. Because terrorism has become a term used to construct an "us versus them" paradigm, citizens accept terrorism as something that "jihadists" do, not their own states. Thus, they do not think critically about the information disseminated via social media. Instead, they consume it without thinking and thus serve the interests of the states, groups, and agencies utilizing social media to construct the paradigm. The underlying geopolitical motives of the "war on terror" are not discussed openly in public or mainstream media and thus go ignored or unknown by the average citizen. So while researchers have shown that Western states engage in terrorism and false-flag terrorism to further their own geopolitical interests, most citizens of these states accept the notion that they are "fighting" terrorists abroad rather than acting as terrorists abroad. The role of social media, thus, is one by which the proverbial "wool" is pulled over the eyes.
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