This paper examines John Rawls's comprehensive theory of justice as presented in A Theory of Justice and his later work Political Liberalism. It traces the historical context that motivated the theory, then analyzes its core philosophical components: the Original Position, constructivism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism. The paper also contrasts Rawls's conception of moral autonomy with Kant's categorical imperative and legislative will. Finally, it considers the theory's enduring impact on Western political philosophy, including its twin principles of individual liberty and distributive justice, and their contested application in constitutional and international law.
In A Theory of Justice and in his later works, John Rawls presents a comprehensive and influential theory of justice in keeping with the liberal-democratic commitment to the rights and freedoms of individuals in society. The theory holds that individual rights ought to be moderated by various limiting clauses, ensuring that no social or natural contingencies are overlooked. It declares that no inborn advantages of political authority, material wealth, or natural capability should irreversibly or overwhelmingly determine life chances. More specifically, Rawls argues that these morally arbitrary circumstances should not determine the value of political liberties for moral persons.
In 1971, Rawls offered his first articulation of his theory of justice, centering on individual capacities and what he calls the "Original Position," together with a model of social life. This model rests on reasonable assumptions regarding (a) the politically relevant capacities of human beings and (b) the conditions of social life. Rawls's model allows his theory to draw an explicit connection between the values and principles of justice that the theory derives from the model and the presuppositions that underlie it. The discussion that follows examines the theoretical foundations of the theory, its component parts, and its broader outcomes and impact.
The justice system at the time Rawls was writing was largely favorable to a minority who possessed wealth and largely indifferent to the rights of individuals in broader society. Rawls, along with numerous other liberal philosophers, employed this theory as a weapon against inherited privilege, which they believed allowed a minority to oppress a majority both economically and socially. They argued that this arrangement was immoral — not simply because the rights of the majority were being ignored, but because such an arrangement appears to diminish overall well-being by endorsing the satisfaction of a few aristocrats while maximizing misery through the coercion of the many.
Central to any serious engagement with this theory are the definitions and understandings of "social justice" and "human rights" as held by individuals and groups. Unless questions of morality and political education are recognized openly — given that competing conceptions of social justice operate simultaneously in society and in educational institutions — educators and policymakers cannot expect to address the challenges of education and justice effectively.
How one understands this theory depends on one's perspective and on the broader theoretical framework within which one works. The purpose of theory is to provide consistency and stability to debate, and to furnish a model against which philosophical positions may be assessed.
It must be recognized at the outset that the theory is an exceedingly contested one. It is neither timeless nor static, but is contextually shaped, represented, and interpreted — as illustrated by the fact that there are diverse conceptions of "justice" across diverse societies.
Taking a constructivist approach to the theory, Rawls assumes that morality does not exist independently in nature awaiting discovery but must instead be constructed through a deliberative process. The shape of that process, and its more precise features, are derived from this foundational commitment. Rawls does not deduce the process of constructing principles of right and justice from the concept of practical reason alone. Rather, he gives substance to that concept and to the ideas of reasonableness and rationality, which are two of its constituent parts. These decisive factors are specified and explained rather than formally inferred.
Rawls's constructivist procedure is, at each step, tailored to fit the subject at hand and its specific place in the overall sequence. Universal in aspiration, a constructivist liberal doctrine is comprehensive enough to provide principles for all politically relevant questions. Rawls identifies the principles chosen by the parties in the original position as those they would select in trying, to the best of their abilities, to advance the basic interests of those they represent — free and equal citizens in the domestic case, and free and equal peoples in the international case. Crucially, Rawls cannot be characterized as either a universalist or a relativist: he does not simply apply the values of Western culture, nor does he claim that his theory represents a universal and final truth.
Setting the stage for his theory of justice, Rawls departs from utilitarianism and frames his departure as a "distribution problem." According to Rawls, utilitarianism goes wrong when it fails to attend to how welfare is distributed; there is nothing objectionable in itself, he acknowledges, about the utilitarian goal of promoting the common good. The contentment of others cannot compensate for the severe suffering of a few. This is a distributive difficulty: when suffering is concentrated in one place and pleasure is distributed elsewhere, pleasure fails to compensate for pain. Similarly, it is unjust to force one person to pay for another's benefit; justice requires that a person's burden and reward correspond to each other. Utilitarianism cannot rule out a certain type of unjust arrangement because, by focusing on the aggregate quantity of welfare and ignoring how that welfare is distributed, it remains indifferent to discriminatory outcomes. It is the injustice of such arrangements, not merely their inequality, that troubles Rawls. Such an unjust outcome cannot be acceptable within any moral framework. It is therefore no coincidence that Rawls chose to name his theory "Justice as Fairness."
According to Rawls, autonomy is defined as a technical concept in which a choice is made that determines the content of the moral law. Rawls contrasts his constructivism with "rational intuitionism," which holds that moral values are true or false in virtue of an order of principles that is prior to and independent of one's conception of the person. Rawls insists that Kant's idea of "autonomy" rules out any such arrangement. On Rawls's reading, the content of the moral law is not discovered by the constructive process but is created by it.
Evaluating Kant's account of moral autonomy, Kant begins with the idea of a good will as the single unconditionally good thing. He explains that a good will acts from pure practical principles rather than from inclination. For a being with needs, a good will means acting from duty — in accordance with an "ought." Moral duties are categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives, meaning that a will acting from duty is determined by pure practical reason, not by material objectives, and acts out of respect for the moral law. Kant writes:
"Intuitionism, autonomy, and comparison with Kantian ethics"
"Legacy of Rawls on political philosophy and justice"
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