This paper examines Nigeria's decision to postpone its national election from February 14 to March 28, 2015, in response to security threats posed by Boko Haram. It analyzes the competing perspectives of government officials, opposition leaders, and international observers regarding whether postponement serves security interests or weakens democratic institutions. The paper evaluates claims by President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki's military confidence and regional cooperation strategy, opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari's skepticism, and on-the-ground concerns from affected citizens. Central questions include whether postponement represents a justified precaution or a dangerous step backward for Nigerian democracy.
Nigeria's elections committee postponed the national election from February 14 to March 28, 2015, citing growing concerns about violence and security. The postponement decision emerged amid heightened threats from Boko Haram, the extremist militant group operating primarily in the country's northeastern region. Nigeria's security chiefs expressed doubt about their ability to protect voters in the northeast from Boko Haram attacks. These concerns were not abstract: hundreds of schoolgirls had been abducted in the northeast during the previous year, and Boko Haram fighters had launched attacks on villages in neighboring Chad as recently as February.
However, postponement itself became controversial. Some observers and officials questioned whether a delay would actually improve security conditions or instead create further instability. The decision opened deeper questions about the relationship between electoral timing and national security, and whether postponement represented a responsible precaution or a dangerous step away from democratic governance. Boko Haram's escalating violence made the stakes of this debate extraordinarily high, as the group had transitioned from sporadic attacks to coordinated military operations that threatened the state's control over its own territory.
President Goodluck Jonathan's administration and election officials provided specific justifications for the postponement. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) chairman, Attahiru Jega, explained that security chiefs had advised postponement because military troops would be unavailable to provide election security due to ongoing counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram in the north, particularly in Borno State. Jega stated: "If the security of personnel, voters, election observers and election material cannot be guaranteed, the lives of innocent young men and women and the prospect of free, fair and credible elections will be greatly jeopardized."
Nigerian Ambassador Adefuye refuted criticism published in The New York Times by emphasizing that the elections committee, not President Jonathan personally, had made the postponement decision. Adefuye stressed that while Boko Haram posed a serious threat, Nigeria had made progress in counter-insurgency efforts. He argued that it was impractical to simultaneously conduct military operations against Boko Haram and provide adequate security for a national election. This rationale, however, exposed an institutional tension: in Nigeria, the police force—not the military—is constitutionally responsible for election security. The military's operational commitment to counter-insurgency had thus created a situation where the constitutionally designated security force lacked the military backup it apparently required.
Critics noted that the Council of State and other voices within Nigeria had questioned whether convincing evidence for postponement actually existed. The government's case rested on military judgment rather than on established electoral law or precedent, adding uncertainty about the precedent being set for future elections.
Muhammadu Buhari, the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate, directly challenged the government's security narrative. Buhari argued: "The government is not prepared to fight Boko Haram...The government has failed to do its principle duty of protecting life or property of all beings inside its territory, in Nigeria...The government is not serious about curbing the insurgency in the northeast." Rather than accepting the military's assessment of capability, Buhari questioned whether the delay would yield real improvement.
Buhari's political background added weight to his military critique. He had served as a military ruler from 1983 to 1985, having launched a coup against the democratically elected government—a historical fact that underscored the irony that Nigerians were considering an officer with an anti-democratic record precisely because of their desperation to contain the Boko Haram threat. Buhari specifically challenged Sambo Dasuki's confidence in a six-week security turnaround, asking: "If the same military cannot secure 14 local governorates out of 774 in six years, how can they be sure they can secure those 14 in six weeks?"
Buhari's skepticism reflected a broader political reality: his own northeastern base of support stood to benefit from increased voter turnout if security improved, yet he publicly remained unconvinced that the military timeline was credible. This position suggested that Buhari's critique stemmed from genuine doubt rather than purely partisan motive, though his statement also had obvious campaign value.
National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki provided the most detailed defense of the government's confidence in security improvement. Dasuki asserted that "all known Boko Haram camps will be taken out" and declared, "Those dates will not be shifted again...There is no need for it." Dasuki's confidence rested significantly on a new military cooperation framework that had emerged between Nigeria and its neighbors: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
At a meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon, representatives from these nations pledged to deploy 8,700 troops, police, and civilian personnel to conduct joint operations against Boko Haram. Dasuki framed this regional military alliance as potentially decisive. He also contended that heightened security in the northeast could actually benefit the opposition APC, since the region is considered an APC stronghold, thus denying any political motive to the postponement.
The multinational deployment represented an unprecedented commitment to the counter-insurgency campaign. However, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau dismissed the threat posed by this coalition, stating: "We can seize them one by one." This terse response suggested that the militant group viewed even a coordinated regional military effort as manageable, undercutting Dasuki's optimism and lending credence to Buhari's skepticism about the timeline.
"Lived experience and democratic stakes"
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