Afghanistan's Security, Poverty, and Taliban Resurgence

Introduction

The situation in Afghanistan was not improving as had been hoped, despite the massive and expensive American and NATO intervention. The country faced three serious, interconnected crises: (a) the lack of a competent, well-trained military defense force; (b) a lingering legacy of poverty and hopelessness; and (c) the re-emergence of the Taliban, a radical Islamic fighting force that had been ousted from Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, but was returning as a disruptive insurgency. Each of these issues is examined in this paper.

One of the main reasons the United States and NATO pumped billions of dollars in aid and military resources into Afghanistan was to hold off the Taliban while training Afghanistan's own military forces. Initially, the U.S. intervened in response to the bin Laden-led al-Qaeda use of Afghan training grounds to plan and execute the attacks of September 11, 2001 — attacks made possible in part because the Taliban, then the ruling power in Afghanistan, welcomed terrorists into the country. The plan to secure Afghanistan from insurgency, however, was not succeeding as hoped. Afghan security forces were not well enough trained to take over the security of their nation — a conclusion supported by multiple sources reviewed here.

The Afghan National Army: Undertrained and Unprepared

"The time is not right for a transition to Afghan security forces," said Golali Akbari, an elected member of the upper house of Afghanistan's parliament (Wendle, 2011, p. 1). "They are not ready. They are not well trained, and they are not commanded and organized well," Akbari told Time magazine. Her concerns, and those of other Afghan leaders regarding the competency of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, were underscored in March 2011 when a Taliban suicide bomber killed 37 people and wounded 40 others at an army recruitment center in Kunduz (Wendle, 2011).

Journalists reporting for National Public Radio (NPR) accompanied U.S. and NATO forces on patrols alongside Afghan troops. In some instances, U.S. Marines planned and led the patrols and even spoke with villagers through an interpreter while the Afghan forces stood and watched (Bowman, 2012, p. 2). U.S. commanders in Afghanistan described the abilities of Afghan forces as at best "spotty," and clearly not ready to stand up to the Taliban on their own (Bowman, p. 2).

Retired Lt. General Dave Barno — former commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan — authored a white paper calling for more training for Afghan forces. His assessment was direct: Afghan forces were "largely untested — and perhaps far from ready" (Bowman, p. 3).

Beyond their lack of training, a significant percentage of Afghanistan National Police (ANP) personnel were using illegal drugs. An article in the peer-reviewed journal Military Medicine reported that drug abuse had become "increasingly common" among ANP soldiers (Arfsten et al., 2012). The use of cannabis and opiates was described as "rampant," based on drug testing conducted by British and American personnel. In Helmand Province, tests showed that upwards of 60% of ANP troops were using drugs on a regular basis (Arfsten, p. 1).

A separate U.S. State Department report found that between 12% and 41% of ANP recruits at Regional Training Centers tested positive for drug use, with analysts suggesting the true figure was likely higher, as opium does not remain in the system long enough to be consistently detected (Arfsten, p. 1).

A Pentagon report based on previously classified data found that units of the Afghan Local Police had become "deeply entangled" in corruption and criminal activity, including taking bribes and extorting money from citizens. One in five American special operations teams reported that Afghan Local Police personnel used drugs, accepted bribes, raped women in local communities, and engaged in drug trafficking (Cloud et al., 2012, p. 1).

Drug Abuse and Corruption in Afghan Security Forces

An article in the peer-reviewed journal Iranian Studies describes Afghanistan as "one of the most destitute nations in the world," noting a rapid growth of poverty among the urban population (Schutte, 2009, p. 466). The statistics illustrating the extent of poverty and deprivation are stark: a mortality rate of 14.2% for children under the age of five; an illiteracy rate of 40% among males and 72% among females, who are often denied access to education altogether; malnutrition affecting approximately 66% of children in Afghan cities; and a lack of access to safe drinking water for 71% of children in Kabul (Schutte, 466).

Afghanistan was poor when the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, and it remained very poor in the years that followed. While cities expanded outward much as in Western countries, this urban sprawl was not a driver of growth and prosperity but rather a "dumping ground" for a surplus population largely employed in very low-wage jobs (Schutte, 467). Kabul grew from approximately 2 million people in 2001 to 3.5 million in 2005, making it the fastest-growing city in the central and south Asian region — growth that brought with it an increase in poor and vulnerable populations (Schutte, 470). A majority of residents lived in makeshift housing, and employment opportunities for unskilled or illiterate workers were irregular and unreliable (Schutte, 470).

An article in the peer-reviewed Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business reported that Afghanistan lacked adequate governmental infrastructure, educational facilities, and health services. Approximately 8 million people in Afghanistan faced famine, and only 25% of the population had access to clean water (Kataria et al., 2011, p. 392). Poverty in Afghanistan was characterized as a "multidimensional problem" arising from a lack of health and social services, mental disorders resulting from years of ongoing conflict, and both physical and psychological wounds of war (Kataria, 392).

Although the United States — employing a massive air campaign — effectively drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan in late 2001, the radical Islamist group was steadily regaining footholds in the country. BBC journalist Quentin Sommerville reported that the Taliban continued to fight hard even as Americans dismantled and closed their bases. As U.S. forces prepared to withdraw, Afghan security forces were demonstrably unprepared to defend their country against the resurgent insurgency.

Conclusion

Wendle, John. "Are Afghan Security Forces Ready to Take Over?" Time. 2011. Accessed May 14, 2012. http://www.time.com.