This paper examines two foundational topics in computer and network security. First, it surveys access control mechanisms, contrasting the mixed results of television-based controls like the V-chip with more flexible internet labeling systems such as PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection) and parental control tools like those offered by AOL. Second, it introduces cryptology and explores two real-world cryptosystem models: formal verification as applied to railway signaling systems, and the human-centered, incremental quality engineering approach used in aviation. The paper discusses the strengths and limitations of each approach and notes that the two models are not mutually exclusive.
Access controls are widely used today across both broadcast media and the internet. Some have met with considerable success, while others have yielded mixed or limited results. Examining specific systems reveals important distinctions in how effectively different controls balance filtering with user freedom.
Although access controls on television, such as the V-chip, have met with mixed responses, richer labeling and selection systems on the internet have proven more adaptable. One notable example is PICS, or Platform for Internet Content Selection, which has "been able to establish Internet conventions for label formats and distribution methods, while dictating neither a labeling vocabulary nor who should pay attention to which labels. It is analogous to specifying where on a package a label should appear, and in what font it should be printed, without specifying what it should say" (Resnick, 1996).
In other words, systems such as AOL Parental Controls enable screening and monitoring without censoring the viewing of other users of the World Wide Web, or even those with different usernames on the same computer system. This flexibility is a significant advantage over more rigid broadcast-based controls.
Cryptology, the science of code and cipher systems, is used by governments, banks, and other organizations to keep information secure (Anderson, 1999). Cryptosystems vary widely in their design philosophy, and examining real-world applications helps illustrate their strengths and limitations.
"Formal verification vs. human-feedback cryptosystem models"
Of these two models, the first is more prone to reductionism, or system limitations in its span, and the second is more holistic but also more prone to human error. They are not mutually exclusive: formal verification of avionics is not inherently problematic, unless people then start to trust the perfection of the system too much. The main difference is one of system philosophy — whether the computer or human control reigns supreme (Cullyer, 2003).
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