War on Drugs: Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy

Introduction to the War on Drugs

The concept of the "War on Drugs" was first coined by President Nixon in 1971 in an effort to discourage the illegal trafficking of drugs. The primary motivation was the way many states were falling victim to the dynamics of the drugs-and-terrorism links prevalent in the region. Numerous studies have demonstrated authentic connections between the drug trade and how a majority of its profits are used to fund terrorism and other destructive activities.

Throughout the late nineteenth century and into the modern era, numerous parts of the United States have faced disruptions to the peace process because of the growth of the drug industry. The debate over the War on Drugs now revolves around whether certain drugs should be legalized or prohibited and how their trafficking and distribution can be monitored effectively. In a 2011 article published in The New York Times, the author argued that one of the major reasons drug addiction has played such a persistent role in American life is the inefficiency of the prison system. Specifically, the rigidity and inadequate monitoring within prisons cultivate criminal traits in first-time offenders (The New York Times, 2011).

The article also claims that the structure of prisons and criminal law does not support confining serious offenders; instead, it results in low-level criminals engaging in drug or alcohol abuse both inside and outside of prison, thus cycling them back into incarceration for offenses within the same domains. This dynamic, the article argues, disproportionately affects minority communities — particularly African Americans — who develop drug-dependent behaviors more quickly and are far more socially vulnerable due to deprived living conditions, falling wages, and rising prejudice and injustice (The New York Times, 2011). Their weakened social standing also makes them far more susceptible to drug traffickers who offer what appears to be a financially viable escape for themselves and their families. This is a compelling reason to support the aggressive continuation of the War on Drugs — not only through the legalization or restriction of certain substances, but also through dismantling the financial and social stronghold that drug trafficking organizations maintain within the United States.

The Obama administration took a notably different, and more measured, approach toward the War on Drugs — beginning, notably, by refusing to call it a "war" at all. The administration adopted a somewhat ambiguous stance on whether aggressive anti-drug campaigns should continue, framing drug addiction primarily as a disease to be treated rather than a criminal problem to be prosecuted. This meant that the administration believed drug abuse should be combated at the medical, psychological, and cognitive levels. Officials justified this approach by arguing that further restrictions or broad legalizations would make distribution networks more difficult to monitor, thereby reducing the government's ability to maintain community health and security (Institute for Behavior and Health, 2011).

The Obama Administration's Approach

While the current government's balanced approach to the legalization and restriction of drug access is understandable, the overall impact of drug trafficking cannot be ignored. That impact alone may be reason enough to pursue a more aggressive strategy in restricting access to certain drugs and monitoring their distribution. A compelling illustration of the stakes involved is the case of Colombia in Latin America, where the drug trafficking infrastructure has intensified terrorism and eroded an otherwise developing social order.

Two of the most powerful and financially influential organizations in Colombia — FARC and AUC — are simultaneously major drug-dealing operations and terrorist groups. A significant portion of their income derives from the drug trade, which they then invest in planning and executing acts of terrorism. In recent years, the Colombian government has made considerable efforts to curtail the activities of both organizations and pressure them to sever their ties to the drug industry in favor of financing that is accepted as legal and legitimate by both the domestic population and the international community. At times, the Colombian government has also resorted to forceful opposition, which has yielded significant results. This paper focuses on FARC and AUC — their background and their role in sustaining the drug-terrorism link (Kempe, 1990; Hudson, 1995).

War on Drugs and Terrorism in Colombia

During the 1970s, much of the Colombian economy was shaped by the marijuana trade, which served as one of the drug industry's primary profit-generating assets. Marijuana trafficking expanded rapidly and generated enormous revenue both domestically and internationally throughout the decade. Marijuana traffickers soon became among the most significant contributors to the Colombian economy. However, it was not until the 1980s, with the rise of cocaine trafficking, that left-wing terrorist factions identified an opportunity to generate substantial funds for their operations. Cocaine was far more potent and far more profitable than marijuana, and most dealers earned considerably more from its trafficking than from any other substance. This trend was simultaneously emerging within the United States, and it was the primary catalyst for President Nixon's War on Drugs initiative (Hudson, 1995).

This profit-making opportunity attracted many terrorist groups in Colombia, but none could identify a workable strategy until the M-19 movement emerged in April 1981. As a terrorist organization, M-19 concluded that its best opportunity lay in targeting cocaine trafficking groups and using fear, kidnapping, and forced extortion to redirect their profits toward terrorist activities. Its first target was the Medellín Cartel, one of the most profitable cocaine trafficking organizations of the era. The group's method of extortion began with the kidnapping of a member's sister — Jorge Ochoa's relative. The outcome was far from what M-19 had hoped: the cartel responded by launching a counterattack, using its drug revenues to fund the death squad Muerte a Secuestradores ("Death to Kidnappers"), which killed members and dismantled outlets of the terrorist group until the kidnapped victim was safely returned in early 1982 (Duzan, 1994).

M-19 also sought financial backing from Colombian traffickers as well as from organizations based in Cuba and Libya. Despite the catastrophic failure of its confrontation with the Medellín Cartel, M-19's association with Colombian trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara was beginning to prove productive. The terrorist group had reached an agreement with Lara that allowed him to smuggle drugs into Cuba under M-19's protection; in exchange, Lara would supply M-19's Cuban patrons with arms and ammunition, or the finances needed to acquire them. At the same time, M-19 was working to establish a similar arrangement with the Medellín kingpins. This is widely regarded as the origin of the modern drug-terrorism nexus — a relationship in which both parties derived mutual short- and long-term benefit. That negotiating model is one of the primary reasons the link has proved so enduring (Ehrenfeld, 1990).

This history offers a critical lesson for the United States government in its conduct of the War on Drugs: while restricting or legalizing certain drugs may result in reduced governmental oversight of community health, profit-motivated actors will likely find ways to access the substances they seek regardless, while simultaneously damaging the broader social and mental health of communities. A passive approach to the War on Drugs is therefore unacceptable — it can only give rise to a far more aggressive crisis in the future. A proactive, assertive policy toward legalizing, restricting, and monitoring access to specific drugs is essential to pre-emptively countering the harmful dynamics described above before they take firmer hold within the United States.

By 1998, the Colombian government had concluded that revenue from drug trafficking was the principal financial resource sustaining both right-wing and left-wing terrorist groups within the country. In order to gain control over terrorism in the region, the government recognized it would first need to control the drug trafficking industry. This realization prompted researchers to examine the drug-terrorism link not only in Colombia and Latin America but also within the United States (The Economist, 2001).

Conclusion

Ehrenfeld, R. (1990). Narcoterrorism. Basic Books.

Falcoff, M. (2000). Colombia: The problem that will not go away. AEI Latin American Outlook, March 2000.

Hudson, R. A. (1995). Colombia's Palace of Justice tragedy revisited: A critique of the conspiracy theory. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, 100–103, 119–121.

Institute for Behavior and Health. (2011). Global Commission on Drug Policy offers reckless, vague drug legalization proposal; current drug policy should be improved through innovative linkage of prevention, treatment and the criminal justice system.

Kempe, F. (1990). Divorcing the dictator: America's bungled affair with Noriega. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. Oxford University Press.

Suarez, A. (2000). [FARC revenue breakdown data]. Referenced in Falcoff (2000).

The Economist. (2001). A survey of Colombia: Drugs, war and democracy. The Economist.

The New York Times. (2011, October 30). Falling crime, teeming prisons.