This paper examines the rules of engagement established by the United States during the Vietnam War and their impact across the military chain of command. It explores how political decisions made by President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara imposed restrictive combat guidelines that frustrated battlefield commanders and soldiers alike. The paper traces reactions from General William Westmoreland and division commanders such as General Ewell down to frontline troops who were prohibited from firing unless fired upon. It argues that politically motivated restrictions — driven largely by Cold War fears of Chinese and Soviet intervention — undermined military effectiveness and contributed to widespread frustration and low morale among U.S. forces.
The United States of America's war against Vietnam came at the height of divisive world politics. This was a primary reason for the institution of rules of engagement. The war was a political war fought by military personnel. The Secretary of Defense usurped the powers of the generals and commanders, placing himself at the helm of the command chain and answering only to the president. What followed was a broken chain of command that resulted in widespread suffering among soldiers on the battlefield.
In accordance with the rules of engagement during the Vietnam War, soldiers at the battlefield were placed at a severe disadvantage. They were not at liberty to shoot unless shot at, a situation that made them vulnerable to the enemy. There were instances where soldiers had to call for approval before firing at the Viet Cong; many times this led to humiliation, as enemy fighters escaped while troops waited for authorization. The rules of engagement were highly restrictive, had a negative effect on military operations, and led to frustration and lowered morale among soldiers.
Battalion commanders during the Vietnam War opposed the rules of engagement, as they witnessed the unfavorable conditions at the war front firsthand. The commanders were prepared to neutralize the Vietnamese Air Force and knew how to do so, but political leadership restricted them, forcing the U.S. Air Force to engage the enemy in the air instead. According to Boyne (1997), various commanders repeatedly requested permission to attack the enemy's Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites but were repeatedly denied.
During the Vietnam War, division commanders were responsible for everything that occurred within their command and were expected to adhere to the rules of engagement. However, that was not always the case. According to Sullivan (2009), under General Ewell's command, the 9th Infantry Division conducted a widespread offensive against the Viet Cong known as Operation Speedy Express, which was aimed at rapidly eliminating the entire Viet Cong army through overwhelming force. Ewell's actions reflected the sentiments of other commanders and illustrated their collective reaction to the restrictions imposed upon them.
General William Westmoreland's policies during the Vietnam War showed little regard for the rules of engagement. His policies were aimed at obliterating the Viet Cong army entirely. In this regard, the United States Army employed sophisticated firepower to attack enemy forces, while the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces assumed responsibility for protecting the civilian population from those attacks. General Westmoreland consistently engaged in activities that were in direct disregard of the rules of engagement.
"McNamara and Johnson drove restrictive war policy"
President Lyndon Johnson established the rules of engagement in the Vietnam War to ensure the conflict did not escalate to greater levels. The president expected to achieve victory by using an air pressure campaign in North Vietnam to end that government's support for the Viet Cong. He failed to accurately read the state of world politics at the time, and as a result restricted the scope of the war. His focus remained on the relationship with the Communist Bloc, not recognizing that the war was not in the best interest of either China or the Soviet Union.
The military men on the battlefield ultimately became the victims of this war. They fought under unfavorable conditions while their commanders watched on helplessly. General Westmoreland, however determined to achieve victory, could not change the course of the war because political leaders restricted him at every turn. Secretary Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson, for their part, were misled by the mixed signals they received from the Communist Bloc; they feared Chinese and Soviet entry into the conflict, a fear that proved to be largely unfounded but that shaped every major decision they made regarding the rules of engagement.
Boyne, W. J. (1997). Beyond the wild blue. St. Martin's Griffin.
Dorschel, M. J. (1995). The effects of restrictive rules of engagement on the Rolling Thunder air campaign. Diss. United States Air Force Command Staff College.
Sullivan, P. (2009, August). Julian J. Ewell, 93, dies; decorated general led forces in Vietnam. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 2012, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/04/AR2009080403187.html
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