Social Disorganization Theory and Juvenile Delinquency

Introduction: Neighborhood, Race, and Crime

What do the phrases "other side of the tracks," "tough neighborhood," and "the bad side of town" have in common? They all indicate that specific parts of a city or urban area are more prone to crime and criminal activity. These neighborhoods tend to be run-down, poorly maintained, and have few, if any, long-term residents. Many people believe these areas are more prone to crime because of the racial or ethnic makeup of the majority of their residents. For example, many Washington, D.C. residents believe that Anacostia, a neighborhood in the southeast quadrant of the city, has a higher crime rate because the majority of its residents are African American. Capital area residents are not alone in holding such racially biased views. The Compton area of Los Angeles, the South Side of Chicago, and the Flatbush area of Brooklyn all share a similar reputation as rough neighborhoods, attributed by many to the racial or ethnic composition of their residents.

However, Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay, a pair of sociologists, developed a different theory to explain the proliferation of crime in specific urban areas. They believed that certain places within cities — usually neighborhoods located near the urban center — are more prone to crime because of their location and social conditions, not because of the people living within them. They developed a school of thought called the Social Disorganization Theory, which claims that crime, specifically juvenile delinquency, arises more in response to difficult and abnormal social conditions than from individual decisions or characteristics of its perpetrators. In short, Shaw and McKay believed it was not the juvenile delinquent who created the rough neighborhood, but the rough neighborhood that created the juvenile delinquent.

Shaw and McKay studied the rough neighborhoods of Chicago in the 1930s, which at that time were inhabited primarily by working-class immigrants from Poland, Ireland, and other parts of Europe. Using data on rates of juvenile delinquency, Shaw and McKay mapped specific hot spots of crime and tracked how these areas remained high-crime zones across three time periods — 1900–1906, 1917–1923, and 1927–1933 — despite significant changes in the ethnic and racial composition of their inhabitants (Shaw, 1939). The sociologists pointed out that the transient nature of these areas was itself a contributing factor in the high juvenile delinquency rate (Wong, 2001–2009).

Social Disorganization Theory

Shaw, McKay, and other sociologists who contributed to the Social Disorganization Theory further noted that when people of a specific ethnic or racial background moved away from these rough neighborhoods to safer areas, the crime rate did not change in either location. This evidence, they argued, affirmed their theory: it was the inhabitants' natural reaction to the deteriorated physical characteristics of the neighborhood that caused juvenile delinquency, not the emotional, intellectual, or cultural makeup of the individual.

Shaw and McKay found that instances of juvenile crime occurred most frequently in inner-city neighborhoods, while more residential neighborhoods on the outskirts were less prone to crime. According to Wong's analysis of the theory, there are four assumptions about how a specific location can contribute to juvenile delinquency. First, delinquency results from the collapse of community-based, institutionalized controls, leaving residents without a standard set of rules and norms to follow. Second, those rules and norms deteriorate as a result of rapid growth, change, and urbanization. Third, as an area undergoes radical change, it becomes more neglected, run-down, and less desirable. Finally, as an area becomes less desirable, its residents invest less in it, making the neighborhood more vulnerable to the development of criminal behavior and traditions (Shoemaker, 1996).

Following Shaw and McKay's studies from the 1930s, many programs and groups were developed to combat juvenile crime. These programs worked to engage youth in social activities, form committees charged with rebuilding blighted areas, and create pathways for low-income residents to purchase homes in struggling neighborhoods. However, many of these programs stalled or failed altogether because they were organized and managed by people outside the community. Sociologists concluded that simply making an effort to clean up a neighborhood did not lower the crime rate or change the outlook of its youth. Shaw began to wonder whether the solution lay not outside the blighted inner-city neighborhood, but within it.

The Chicago Area Project

While conducting his research, Shaw and his colleagues at the Institute for Juvenile Research noticed that one particular neighborhood in Chicago — Russell Square Park — had a growing crime rate despite numerous programs, agencies, and institutions established there to address the problem (Sorrentino & Whittaker, 1994). Shaw concluded that this area, and others like it, needed a new approach: rather than implementing more outside programs, he sought help directly from the neighborhood's own residents. This was the beginning of his then-experimental Chicago Area Project (CAP), a program that remains committed to the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency to this day (Sorrentino, 1994).

Shaw and McKay deduced that while juvenile delinquency is largely a natural reaction to outside influences — such as deteriorated properties and the absence of established community organizations — meaningful change is more likely to come from residents themselves making an effort to improve their living conditions. Shaw focused on Russell Square Park, which was home to approximately 15 local gangs that frequently fought one another, disrupting peace and safety on the streets. Shaw and his colleagues reached out to these gangs and redirected their energy toward more conventional, community-oriented behavior. He stressed that soliciting positive cooperation from residents, rather than imposing authoritative control from outsiders, would prove far more effective (Sorrentino, 1994).

Ultimately, Shaw was correct. The Chicago Area Project continues to operate today and produces positive outcomes for youth living in Chicago's poorer neighborhoods. Given its success, any effective proposal for decreasing juvenile delinquency should prioritize the involvement, cooperation, and buy-in of the people who actually live in these communities. The key challenge is earning their trust and gaining their cooperation.

Conclusion

While the Chicago Area Project has been successful in combating juvenile crime for over 60 years in Chicago, many other American cities remain powerless against the growing influence of gangs in inner-city areas. With funding for community-oriented projects declining alongside support for schools and other public programs, it falls to inner-city residents themselves to work together to address juvenile crime. Residents concerned about the safety of their streets, their neighbors, and their children should organize and seek more positive alternatives for their adolescents and young adults. Although the still-struggling economy has reduced funding for national and state community improvement organizations, this very scarcity may motivate inner-city residents to develop their own solutions. In doing so, they may discover that they possess far more powerful and effective tools than any well-funded outside organization could have provided.