Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute Between China and Japan

Introduction and History of the Islands

The Senkaku Islands (also known as the Pinnacle Islands and the Diaoyu Islands) are composed of eight volcanic, uninhabited islands with a relatively small total land area of 6.2 square kilometers. The Japanese government claims the islands for Japan, while China also asserts ownership. According to Seokwoo Lee, writing in the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) publication Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands (Boundary & Territory Briefing Vol. 3, No. 7), the islands lie in the East China Sea approximately 200 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and 300 kilometers west of Okinawa (Lee, 2000, p. 2).

Lee notes that during the 16th century, travel accounts of Ming Dynasty envoys mentioned three of the islands — known by their Chinese names as Tiaoyutai, Huangweiyu, and Chihweiyu — which the envoys visited on their way to the Ryukyu Islands. At that time, the Senkaku Islands were considered to be the "boundary separating Taiwan from the Ryukyu Islands" (Okinawa) (Lee, p. 2). After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China agreed to "cede" Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki (May 1895).

Language in that treaty clearly indicated that the Senkaku Islands belonged to Japan: "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories… (b) The island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa."

However, in 1945 — at the end of World War II — Taiwan was "returned to China" following the signing of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. The Cairo Declaration stated that Japan accepted that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" (Lee, p. 4). When Japan surrendered to the United States following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan was required to turn over the administration of much of its territory ("Nansei Shoto") to the U.S. Civil Administration. That territory included Okinawa and "those islands, islets, atolls and reefs as well as their territorial waters within specific geographic coordinates" that included the Senkaku Islands (Lee, p. 5).

Complicating matters further was the discovery of "the possible existence of large hydrocarbon deposits in the waters off the Senkaku Islands… [that] might contain substantial resources of petroleum, perhaps comparable to the Persian Gulf area" (Lee, p. 6). Rongxing Guo explains that the discovery of potentially enormous fossil fuel resources near the islands is critically important to both nations because "the two nations are among the world's biggest energy importers," as both hope to sustain the growth of their enormous economies (Guo, 2006, p. 96). In 1999, when Japanese scientists surveyed the disputed offshore fields near the Senkaku Islands, they reported that approximately 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas might lie beneath the seabed in that region (Guo, p. 96).

The Dispute as Analyzed in The Pacific Review

Min Gyo Koo, a specialist in territorial disputes and the political economy of the Asia-Pacific, reports that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea formed the "United Oceanic Development Company" and temporarily set aside the sovereignty question (Koo, 2009, p. 213). However, China soon asserted that "foreign exploitation of the area would not be tolerated" (Koo, p. 213). When the United States completed its responsibilities under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and returned Okinawa — along with the Senkaku Islands — to Japanese administration (the U.S. had controlled both since Japan's 1945 surrender), the move "increased the tension even further" (Koo, p. 213).

Tokyo was sensitive to the growing tensions, and in 1971 Japan decided to postpone oil exploration. Initially, Washington supported the Japanese claim to the Senkaku Islands; however, the U.S. subsequently adopted "a neutral stance over the dispute," which it continues to maintain because it believes that "any conflicting claims are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned" (Koo, p. 216).

By 1976, the issue resurfaced when Mao Zedong died and Deng Xiaoping assumed power in China. According to Koo, "his immediate reaction was to escalate the island issue." On April 12, 1978, "more than 100 fishing trawlers bedecked with Chinese national flags reached the area and more than thirty of them entered the islands' 12 nautical mile territorial sea" (Koo, p. 217), creating a significant incident.

Tensions rose again in 1990 when right-wing groups in Japan sought official lighthouse status for a beacon that had been built on one of the islands in 1978. The Japanese government accepted the application, and the lighthouse was upgraded to meet the technical standards of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) (Koo, p. 219). Taipei protested immediately, declaring it would not "tolerate Japanese invasion of Chinese territory." On October 21, 1990, a group of Taiwanese activists attempted to land on the islands to place an Olympic torch as a symbol of Taiwanese sovereignty against the Japanese lighthouse (Koo, p. 219).

Later that same month, China joined the dispute, demanding that Japan "restrict the ultra-nationalist activities of its citizens," though China refrained from taking formal action against Japan. Koo suggests that China chose not to escalate the lighthouse situation, possibly because of its "low international status after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 and its reluctance to further antagonize Japan" (p. 219). A period of relative calm followed until 1996, when another lighthouse was constructed on one of the islands and a series of "abrasive behaviours in the East China Sea" renewed tensions.

A Taiwanese fishing boat was detained near the islands, straining relations further. In 1997, pro-Chinese activist David Chan attempted to land on the disputed islands; when Japanese groups tried to block his vessel, Chan jumped into the water and drowned. His death triggered "large-scale anti-Japanese protests and boycotts in Hong Kong, Taiwan and North America," and anger on both sides reached alarming levels (Koo, p. 223).

Hostilities were somewhat defused later in 1997 when Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Beijing in September, and Chinese Premier Li Peng reciprocated with a visit to Tokyo in November. These diplomatic exchanges cooled tempers and produced a new fisheries agreement between the two nations (Koo, p. 224).

The Senkaku Islands Dispute from the Chinese Perspective

Toward the end of his analysis, Koo acknowledges that there are no "conventional explanations" for how China and Japan have managed to contain this dispute. The two countries have avoided pushing for "a more definitive political showdown with respect to the island dispute" (Koo, p. 228), even as the situation has at times edged toward a military incident. Koo's explanation is that both parties have a strong interest in "maintaining the lucrative trade and investment relations that both countries have enjoyed since 1972" (p. 228). Despite unresolved territorial claims, both sides "have found it a convenient strategy to shelve final resolution attempts" rather than risk destroying the strategic and economic relationship they have built (Koo, p. 228).

From China's perspective, the islands have been Chinese territory since the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and were reportedly used as "navigational aids and an operational base" for Chinese fishermen (Pan, 2007, p. 77). China maintains that it incorporated the islands into its "maritime defenses in 1556." Furthermore, in 1893 — just two years before Japan claims to have established title — the Empress Dowager Cixi of the Qing Dynasty issued an imperial edict awarding the Diaoyu Islands to a Chinese alchemist who had reportedly harvested medicinal herbs there (Pan, p. 77).

China's case is bolstered by a study conducted by Kiyoshi Inoue, a Japanese professor at Kyoto University, who concluded that the islands do indeed belong to China. Pan quotes the professor: "The so-called Senkaku Islands were recorded in Chinese documents in the middle of the 16th century at the latest" (Pan, p. 78). After extensive research, Inoue concluded that "these islands are territory of the People's Republic of China" (Pan, p. 78). China also points to the Treaty of Shimonoseki timeline as suspicious: if the islands were legitimately Japanese, why did Japan only claim them in 1895 and not earlier, for example in 1885 when Japan took over what are now the Daito Islands? Inoue supports this line of inquiry, arguing that the Japanese government's hesitation when the governor of Okinawa asked to "take over the Diaoyu Islands" shows the islands were "clearly" Chinese territory (Pan, p. 82).

China has also never recognized the San Francisco Peace Treaty as legally binding. It filed a formal protest with the U.S. government shortly after the treaty was signed in 1951 (Pan, p. 78). In his conclusion, Pan notes that both Japan and China have done their best to "downplay the issue, keep the dispute as low-key as possible, and prevent the trouble from deteriorating bilateral relations" (Pan, p. 87). Maintaining the status quo is the most likely outcome going forward, and a military conflict seems "improbable" because self-restraint on a relatively obscure territorial issue serves the interests of both sides (Pan, p. 88).

Conclusion

It is clear from the literature that Japan and China are not going to allow this dispute to interfere with their strategic and economic relationship. The world would be deeply unsettled if those two countries decided to go to war over this dispute, but that outcome appears unlikely given the mutual economic stakes involved.