This essay compares the 1789 French "Declaration of the Rights of Man" with Olympe de Gouges' 1791 "Declaration of the Rights of Women," examining how de Gouges extended Enlightenment ideals of natural freedom, reason, and the social contract to include women. The paper explores de Gouges' critique of marriage as a socially constructed institution, her radical proposal for communal property, and her rejection of distinctions based on birth legitimacy. It argues that while both documents share Enlightenment optimism about human perfectibility, de Gouges' declaration is the more radical text, and concludes by reflecting on the fate of revolutionary idealism after the French Revolution's descent into violence.
Enlightenment thought posited that the human animal — defined as the male animal in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 — was inherently free in its natural state. Social laws and customs, however, hemmed most of humanity in and limited the freedom of the human potential for goodness. Limitations upon freedom were occasionally necessary for the common good, but more often limitations by law were placed upon persons to enrich the ruling classes for the profit of the minority. Thus, the Declaration of the Rights of Man held in Article 6: "All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents."
Many women, including many women of the French Revolution, took these ideas quite seriously. The word "citizens" in the Declaration of the Rights of Man was not read by many female citizens as referring merely to men, but to women as well. According to Olympe de Gouges in 1791, not only were women equally free in a state of nature as their male counterparts, but the original French Revolution had done little to benefit the female sex, despite considerable female support for the revolution and its underlying Enlightenment ideals.
Just as the male members of the human race — the members of the second and third estates — deserved freedom, so did women. "The powerful empire of nature is no longer surrounded by prejudice, fanaticism, superstition, and lies," de Gouges declared. Rationality must prevail instead.
De Gouges thus agreed with the prevailing Enlightenment sentiment that religion was nothing but a series of lies and half-truths, and that in a state of free nature, human beings were best able to explore their full intellectual breadth and depth — and that a proper definition of humanity included women. The Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaimed an end to "ignorance" and the neglect of human rights; the Declaration of the Rights of Women did the same, but in a far more radical and inclusive manner.
The ideas of the Declaration of the Rights of Man posited that merely because the ruling elites had dominance over the poorer classes did not make royalty inherently superior to those who, from historical misfortune, lacked the social privilege of high birth. The first listed Article read: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good." Similarly, de Gouges wrote: "In the centuries of corruption you [women] ruled only over the weakness of men. The reclamation of your patrimony, based on the wise decrees of nature — what have you to dread from such a fine undertaking?"
The reclamation of natural rights outside of the outmoded, false notions of intellectual superstition is again quintessential Enlightenment discourse. Rationality and reason should govern the rule of law, as opposed to custom and class, both of which reinforced the imbalanced state of relations between the genders.
It is worth noting, however, that de Gouges writes her tract in an accusing voice, first rallying women before calling upon men to enter into a mutual social contract with them. This is a distinct difference in tone from the Declaration of the Rights of Man's general principles, which cagily exclude the female sex in some statements but not in others — "citizens" is only occasionally used as a gender-inclusive term.
"Marriage critiqued; communal property proposed"
"De Gouges condemns distinctions based on birth"
De Gouges stresses a social contract that reinforces happiness — a happy government mutually agreed upon by both genders. She does not deny the need for law, although her system of law aims at societal engineering rather than merely protecting rights, as articulated in the first declaration. Despite her cynicism about the current relationship between the genders, even in her tract one can see the Enlightenment optimism that rejected the idea that human nature is flawed by original sin, a faith-based doctrine. If only humanity were to abandon its erroneous attitudes about illegitimacy and the inequality of women, then humanity is perfectible — just as the Declaration of the Rights of Man suggested that humanity's supposed tendency toward evil and error was rooted in constraint rather than a lack of constraint. By eliminating bad laws, humanity's innate democratic goodness would emerge.
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