Political Unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th Century

Introduction: The Congress of Vienna and the Challenge of Unification

The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) was dominated by conservative diplomats who sought to ensure the supremacy of the great European powers for the long term. The concept of a balance — or equilibrium — of powers left little space for maneuver for small states or national unity movements. In Italy, for instance, while Piedmont was reinforcing its position, Mazzini's democratic and republican movement was facing serious difficulties. The conservative order established at Vienna thus set the central challenge that nationalists across Europe would spend the following decades attempting to overcome.

Italy: Mazzini and the Limits of Democratic Revolution

An insurrection organized in February 1853 in Milan against the Austrians had failed. The democratic movement was further discredited by the execution at Belfiore of the leaders of the Mantua conspiracy, as well as by the unsuccessful insurrections at Cadore and Lunigiana. Even the movement's most dedicated adherents were discouraged. Mazzini suffered an even harder blow when it was discovered that he had supported an expedition to the southern mainland (Sapri, June–July 1857). The purpose of this expedition was to incite the population to insurrection; the result was the death of 300 members, including the Neapolitan republican and socialist Carlo Pisacane. The consequence of these failed actions was deep division among the democrats, who were rendered unable to continue their revolutionary activities.

Their lack of vision was compounded by the repressive measures taken by Austria in Lombardy-Venetia, the refusal of Pope Pius IX to grant reforms in Rome — since the pope was under the influence of Giacomo Cardinal Antonelli, known for his reactionary beliefs — and the reaction of the rulers of Naples and Tuscany. Although reforms were badly needed, the only place where they seemed possible was Piedmont.

The year 1857 was marked by the formation of the Italian National Society. Renowned for its monarchist-unionist approach, the Society owed its existence largely to Camillo Benso di Cavour, who had served as minister since October 1850. It was led by Manin as president and by Garibaldi as vice president, which assured it a very wide popular appeal — wider, in any case, than it would have achieved under moderate leadership alone. Cavour had a different conception of how to solve the Italian national problem. He believed that international negotiations were preferable to revolutions; however, he did not resort to the elimination of conspiratorial movements entirely.

Italy: Cavour, Napoleon III, and the Piedmontese Strategy

Cavour was responsible for holding a secret conference at Plombières, France, in the summer of 1858, which gave him the opportunity to speak with Louis Napoleon-Bonaparte — Emperor Napoleon III — about the possibility of French military intervention in Italy should Austria choose to attack Piedmont. Cavour sought to eliminate all Austrian imperial troops from the Italian peninsula, for which he was willing to concede Savoy and Nice to France.

Ironically, Napoleon III blamed Mazzini and his followers for a failed attempt on his life in Paris on January 14, 1859, carried out by the anarchist Felice Orsini. Despite this, the alliance between France and Piedmont was sealed that same month. With the French emperor's approval, King Victor Emanuel II made a speech in which he declared himself prepared to hear "the cry of woe" against the Austrian oppression that was omnipresent in Italy.

During this period, leaders of the Austrian military and their sympathizers at the imperial court pleaded for war on Piedmont. Francis Joseph addressed an unacceptable ultimatum to Piedmont demanding the demobilization of all its troops. As the ultimatum was rejected, Austria declared war within days. Fulfilling Cavour's hopes, France intervened in favor of Piedmont according to the terms of the alliance.

The new allies won bloody battles at Magenta, Solferino, and San Martino, all in 1859. Since the Austrian army was in poor condition and had received orders to retreat, Napoleon III judged it preferable to sign an armistice with the Austrian Empire, concluded at Villafranca. Two reasons prompted this decision: first, French public opinion was growing increasingly sensitive to the loss of lives in a campaign fought on foreign soil and not in the immediate interest of France. Second, the structure of Italian society was already undergoing imminent transformation. Leopold II of Tuscany had been overthrown in a coup at the end of April 1859, and the duchy was now run by moderate political leaders such as Baron Bettino Ricasoli, who had formed a provisional government. Rebellions spread across the peninsula; Parma, Modena, and the Papal Legations were all affected. Only in Marche and Umbria were insurgents defeated by government troops. The people wished for unification with Piedmont, a desire that materialized in plebiscites organized across the Italian states — a fact that triggered France's opposition.

The terms agreed by Napoleon III at Villafranca included the cession of Lombardy from Austria, which was later passed to Piedmont. The legitimate rulers of Tuscany and Modena were to be reinstated so they could participate in the formation of an Italian Confederation. Although these events initially meant Cavour's defeat and resignation, England opposed the return of the rulers of Tuscany and Modena, and Napoleon III ultimately accepted this position. Consequently, Cavour returned to office at the beginning of 1860. Plebiscites in the duchies and the Papal Legations confirmed the popular desire for unification with Piedmont. The reasons behind the great European powers' support for the Piedmontese monarchy were diverse: the desire for a weaker Austria, the existence of a strong Italian state that would better serve England's commercial interests, and fear of a democratic revolution.