Cold War Counterintelligence Ethics: Angleton to COINTELPRO

Introduction

Intelligence and counterintelligence operations have always been a part of the American Republic (Federation of American Scientists 1996). General Washington was aware of the threat of foreign espionage and the need to counter it (Wettering 2000, 165). The need to deceive those whose intention is to deceive one's nation is, in fact, an ancient one, identified by Sun Tzu thousands of years ago (Select Committee on Intelligence 1986). Practicing deception while remaining free from the corrupting influences of deceivers has proven to be a challenge, however (Valentine 2016, 45). The circumstances under which counterintelligence in the U.S. was formally developed and pursued in its infancy, childhood, and adolescence could be said to have predicted what that program would become in its adulthood. Abuses, errors, and mistakes were so rampant that the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) counterintelligence program, run by James Jesus Angleton from inception in the 1950s to the 1970s, effectively had to be reconstructed by Director Colby, facing pressure from Congress and the public (Church Committee 1976, 171). The problem of ethics in counterintelligence is one that to this day has yet to be adequately answered. However, by understanding what counterintelligence was in the beginning, one may be better situated to understand what it is today and why its policies are the way they are. By learning from the mistakes made in the past, a better foundation can be set in place for the future.

Both Angleton and the era in which the counterintelligence program was formally organized shaped the nature of counterintelligence at a time when the nation itself was buckling under the stress of paranoia, anger, frustration, and mistrust (Valentine 2016, 23; Wettering 2000, 165). To some degree, the nation has never recovered from the stresses of the post-war climate that birthed the counterintelligence program in America (Valentine 2016, 9). When Director Colby dismissed Angleton from his position as head of counterintelligence at the CIA, Colby inherited a staff that was, by that time, a full-grown "adult." Facing political, social, and economic pressures, the CIA was compelled to reorganize, and as the Church Committee reported, it was "an end of an era in CIA counterintelligence" (Church Committee 1976, 171). Yet the consequences of that era remained. The structure that Angleton had created and the nature of counterintelligence itself had already come into being, much like Frankenstein's monster. Victor Frankenstein rejected his own creation, but that did not mean the creation ceased to exist. In fact, the creation went on to destroy the creator.

Such an ominous analogy may be appropriate, at least according to Wettering (2000), the retired CIA operations officer who oversaw clandestine operations in Europe and Africa for more than three decades. Director Colby certainly felt as much in the 1970s when it became apparent that the child the federal government had reared into adulthood was not exactly what the state had hoped for. The Church Committee noted that by 1976 the issues facing the counterintelligence program were "how best to protect the United States, including the proper degree of compartmentation of CI information, methods of operation, approaches to security, research priorities, extent of liaison cooperation, and emphasis on deception activities" (Church Committee 1976, 172). One dominant issue the Senate uncovered was the lack of cooperation among the various agencies on the counterintelligence front (Wettering 2000, 270). The tension between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been high since the former's birth, and while the two agencies could boast of a collaborative spirit in the 1970s, the lack of any substantial counterintelligence office in the FBI meant that the bulk of the work was coordinated by the CIA.

William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, has gone so far as to warn that the challenge of counterintelligence is no longer one the government can address on its own, and that the private sector must bear some of the burden and weight of protecting data and ensuring digital security in the face of foreign actors (Nakashima 2020). An additional consideration put forward by Tromblay (2017) is that technology has developed rapidly in the last two decades alone, and the counterintelligence program has been slow to cross the generational divide between itself and the digital natives of the 21st century who have grown up using technology. In response to the rise of new global technological advances, the counterintelligence program has appeared much like a member of an older generation attempting to catch up on what members of younger generations take for granted. Tromblay (2017) calls it the problem of counterintelligence's reactionary orientation—a characteristic of the program defined by the circumstances of its birth. Moreover, with so much data now in the hands of private industry, there is an increased need for counterintelligence to work more closely with the business world. Intelligence operations have always included work within private industry, but in many cases this work was compromised by conflicts of interest (Valentine 2016, 40).

The research question is: How can the U.S. counterintelligence enterprise support collaboration among the various United States Intelligence Community (USIC) members in an ethical and productive manner? To understand the issues and policies of counterintelligence today, it is worth examining and identifying the mistakes and lessons that can be learned from the past when the counterintelligence program formally began under Angleton. The purpose of this study is to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program so that the various agencies in CI can morally operate according to their mandate.

This research is beneficial to the academic community because it addresses a long-standing issue of ethics in intelligence work. Academics have often debated the matter but have not used comparative case study analysis to see why the problem of ethics must be addressed or how that problem can best be resolved. This thesis brings attention to the root of the issue by examining how and why a lack of ethical guidelines in CI prevailed.

It is helpful to first define the concepts, theories, and systems of ethics that will be discussed in this study.

Marxism is the root of conflict theory, but Ralf Dahrendorf promoted conflict theory by comparing it to structural functionalism and arguing that societies have two orientations or "two faces" (Ritzer and Stepinsky 2017, 120). One face suggests cooperation, consensus, and agreement; the other suggests conflict between a class with power and a class without. The conflict between these two faces is what explains, according to this theory, the actions of individuals and institutions.

Bellaby (2012) defines counterintelligence as "any action or activity that is knowingly designed and intended to encourage an audience of some sort to believe in something which is untrue" (147). Typically, counterintelligence (CI) is associated with misleading or duping an adversary so as to prevent that adversary from gaining a crucial advantage over one's own position. CI is as important in the private sector as it is in the public sector today, as information has become a vital resource in the digital age.

Critical theory stems from the post-Marxist view that the revolution predicted by Marx failed to occur because of cultural factors and institutions that prevented the class without power from fulfilling their Marxist mandate. This theory explores the reasons and ways the culture of those with power is used to prevent those without power from rising up to challenge the dominant class (Horkheimer 1972). The theory assumes that Marx was correct in predicting a worker uprising.

Kant put forward the concept of deontology, also known as duty ethics. The concept is that morality is determined by the extent to which one fulfills one's duty to the state (Messilbrook 2013). Duty can be dictated by an authority, and that is why counterintelligence has been described as a duty in the past (Pfaff and Tiel 2004). The line between duty to the state and personal ambition, however, has been crossed innumerable times throughout the history of counterintelligence (Morley 2017; Valentine 2016). This makes deontology a complicated framework with serious limitations in terms of utility and application.

Ethical egoism is the notion that the ends justify the means, and so long as one can identify a personal benefit to what one does, it can be morally justified. It goes against the notion of Kant's deontology by advocating subjective desire over external duty (O'Neill 1989). However, Sheppard (2012) explains that the world of deception that runs through counterintelligence aligns with the "general tenor of ethical egoism" (19). Sheppard's (2012) suggestion implies that an unhealthy subjective character animates the CI community.

Locke's view was that liberty is the fundamental law of nature and that the state should preserve liberty insofar as it is able (Pettit 1997). Lockean ethics as a system does not exist other than in the advocacy of freedom for action. This is a problematic ethical framework because it can branch off in two directions at once—one way toward utilitarianism, in which liberty is curbed only by the utility to the common good; the other toward ethical egoism, in which the ends justify the means.

Structural functionalism is a theory that explains social organization in terms of how relationships and institutions work together to bring stability and functionality to a community (Ritzer and Stepinsky 2017). Rather than identifying the problematic nature of these relationships and how oppression may figure into the equation, this theory identifies the positive aspects of these relationships. Its inverse theoretical counterpart could be called conflict theory.

Utilitarianism defines moral action as that which achieves the greatest common good (Carson 2010). However, it has no built-in framework for defining the "good"—unlike virtue ethics, which associates the "good" with transcendental ideals that form a person's character as they are pursued in thought and action.

Literature Review

Also known as character ethics, virtue ethics is not unique to the West but was embraced equally in the East for thousands of years. In the West it dates back to Aristotle; in the East, to Confucius (Slingerland 2011). The basic idea of virtue ethics is that actions are deemed moral if they contribute to the cultivation and development of one's character. Character and reputation go together, as individuals in society judge one another based on reputation, which serves as the indicator of a person's character. A state that has tarnished its reputation through bad-faith interactions signals an untrustworthy character and thus risks exclusion from a larger network of international collaboration (Mattox 2002).

This thesis first provides a review of literature that focuses on four themes: the problematic nature of deception, the role of ethics in CI, the need for a framework for analyzing the work of CI in the past, and the lack of clarity and collaboration in the CI community. The third chapter discusses the methodology used for this research. The fourth chapter presents the findings, and the fifth chapter discusses those findings.

The aim of this examination of the literature is to fill the wide gap that remains in counterintelligence research regarding an appropriate ethical standard that can guide and foster an ethical culture, as called for by Bellaby (2012) and Valentine (2016). The purpose of this review is to identify the lessons that have been learned and presented by researchers on this topic and to identify an appropriate theoretical framework for assessing the way forward. The research question for this study is: How can the U.S. counterintelligence enterprise support collaboration among the various USIC members in an ethical and productive manner? The ultimate purpose of this study is to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program as it works to fulfill its mandate in the 21st century. The themes this review examines are: 1) the problematic nature of deception in intelligence work; 2) the role of ethics in counterintelligence; 3) a framework for analyzing the past; and 4) the need for clarity and collaboration in counterintelligence efforts among the various agencies, organizations, and actors.

Deception is at the core of counterintelligence, yet it is a problematic core because of the corruption associated with deception in ethical systems. Mattox (2002), for example, observed that the practice of deception "is subject to limitations imposed by the demands of morality" (4). Mattox (2002) makes the good point that intelligence professionals must "act in good faith even with those who are their adversaries" (4). Yet this point is not supported by all researchers, including Cohen (2016), who argues that there are no moral limits on military deception. Mattox (2002) makes a better argument for numerous reasons: first, he supports his argument with a moral framework that is justifiable based on long-term results, which Mattox (2002) calls the limitation of long-term negative effects. When deception is used cautiously and morally, the adversary is more willing to accept it as a norm of state conflict; moreover, the adversary—who may become a state ally in the future—will not hold any ill will on this account (Mattox 2002).

But when moral limits are removed, as Cohen (2016) suggests should be the case, there is no foundation for future trust. Cohen's (2016) argument fails because it is based on a zero-sum game approach to statecraft: he does not anticipate the very real possibility of and need for collaboration with states that are adversaries today but potential allies in the future. Cohen (2016) implicitly views the entire act of counterintelligence from the standpoint of ethical egoism, which is highly problematic both from a rational and ethical standpoint and from a political standpoint (Lyons 1976). Both Western and Eastern cultures developed the first and most fundamental ethical framework in virtue ethics, with Aristotle summarizing the framework in ancient Greece and Confucius summarizing the framework in ancient China thousands of years ago (Hursthouse 2016).

Without imposing moral conditions on counterintelligence, the possibility of developing trusting relationships in the future is lost. Cohen's (2016) view aligns well with the former motto of the Mossad, "Thou shalt make war by way of deception" (Ostrovsky and Hoy 1991, 1). The fact that the Mossad abandoned this motto after other states expressed their displeasure with it proves the point that Mattox (2002) makes: states must be conscious of the moral limits of deception. The Mossad stepped back from the overt effrontery of advertising its no-limits approach to deception, but of course Israeli intelligence never stopped in terms of practice, which is why nations that support a multi-polar world are often at odds with Israeli aims (Kent 2019). Mattox (2002) at least approaches the issue of moral limits to deception from a practical, universal, political, and diplomatic position that has utilitarian, deontological, and even virtue ethics elements to it. The opposite position of Cohen (2016) can only be accepted from an ethical egoism point of view, and ethical egoism is the most relative and least effective ethical position, as pointed out by Lyons (1976).

Unfortunately, morality within the realm of modern counterintelligence is often the first casualty, as history shows (Valentine 2016). The official beginnings of counterintelligence under the leadership of James Jesus Angleton have illustrated the extent to which the art of deception can create problems within the intelligence community (Morley 2017, 69). Within this community itself, there is no standard ethical framework applied, but there should be (Bailey and Galich 2012, 77). To make matters worse, in counterintelligence, there is even less emphasis on ethical cohesion, as Valentine (2016), Unkefer (2013), and Pfaff and Tiel (2004) point out. If there were a more unified, standardized moral framework applied throughout counterintelligence, it is likely that its history in the U.S. would be less fraught with conflicts of interest, human failings, ulterior motives, problematic relationships, and questionable tactics. The reason such a framework has not been applied is that it is viewed as restrictive and inapplicable in the world of counterintelligence. Valentine (2016) details these problems very well in his work on abuses within the CIA, FBN, and FBI. Unkefer's (2013) memoir of counterintelligence in the FBN supports Valentine's claims and shows how dangerous and corrupting the lack of moral limits on deception can be.

Counterintelligence has often been linked with the idea of national security, yet as Nolan (1997) shows, it is dangerous to think of counterintelligence as a security exercise because it is literally nothing of the sort. Writing from the standpoint of private industry, Nolan (1997) states explicitly that "while security seeks to protect a firm's assets by a combination of policies, procedures and practices, counterintelligence, properly understood, aims to engage and neutralize a competitor's collection efforts through a variety of imaginative, flexible, and active measures" (53). There is also the matter of confusing counterintelligence with security, which is precisely what has happened in the past and has been occurring under the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy. The fact that counterintelligence has been conflated with security is part of the problem: it has led to a kind of self-deception within the government. It is no secret that self-deception weakens one's ability to engage in counterintelligence effectively (Unkefer 2013), and even the ancient art of war practiced by Sun Tzu suggests as much. American policy on counterintelligence has not been developed with the important warning from Nolan (1997) in mind. Instead, it has been formulated with a view toward removing all moral limits and constraints on counterintelligence and recommitting itself to the pursuit of victory in the zero-sum game that policymakers wish to see the nation playing.

It is helpful to consider how self-deceptive American policy has become in order to illustrate the important points that Nolan (1997), Mattox (2002), and Valentine (2016) make. For instance, the strategic objectives of the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States are: 1) to protect the nation's critical infrastructure, 2) reduce threats to supply chains, 3) counter the exploitation of the U.S. economy, 4) defend American democracy against foreign influence, and 5) counter foreign intelligence cyber and technical operations (4). These objectives differ from those of the 2018–2022 National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategic Plan. Under Director William R. Evanina, integration of CI and security activities was a top priority, but the strategic goals were quite distinct: Goal 1 was to "Advance our Knowledge of, and our Ability to Counter Foreign and other Threats and Incidents"; Goal 2 was to "Protect US Critical Infrastructure, Technologies, Facilities, Classified Networks, Sensitive Information, and Personnel"; Goal 3 was to "Advance our Counterintelligence and Security Mission and Optimize Enterprise Capabilities through Partnerships"; Goal 4 was to "Strengthen our Effectiveness through Stakeholder Engagement, Governance, and Advocacy"; and Goal 5 was to "Achieve our Mission through Organizational Excellence" (National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategy 2018–2022, ii). The difference reveals the issue of mission creep—the gradual blurring of lines and objectives, the expansion of meanings, and the taking of liberties with original mandates.

It should be considered that the official responsibility of counterintelligence is to "collect information and conduct activities to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations" (National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategy 2018–2022, 2). The conflated, mixed, broad, and somewhat vague strategic objectives developed for the counterintelligence community in 2020 reflect the same conflated, mixed, broad, and somewhat vague objectives that plagued the CI community's Phoenix Program, which Valentine (2016) has called the "blueprint" for all current intelligence action (50). Tromblay (2017) has concurred with the assessment that the intelligence community is overstretched and overtaxed and that counterintelligence is being tasked with too many objectives that are foreign to its mission. The issues identified by Tromblay (2017) are that "the U.S. government has attempted to partner with the private sector on counterintelligence (CI) awareness and response, [but that] these efforts have been plagued by a limited concept of which industry sectors are at risk, inconsistency in programs, and redundancies across agencies" (1). Overall, there is a lack of reconciliation between vision, mission, and what is being asked of CI.

To summarize the problem: the area of action for counterintelligence may be one thing in terms of a mission, but the strategic operations and integration of counterintelligence with security and other state-sanctioned actions has refueled and threatens to perpetuate the same problems that led to the Church Committee's (1976) conclusion that the CIA had created a counterintelligence monster (172). While it is acknowledged that the CI community should work more closely with private industry to engage effectively in its official mission (Nakashima 2020), the reality of how this collaboration is to take place ethically and practically remains a problem to be addressed. Nolan's (1997) warning is important to consider, but it has been largely ignored because the framework of ethical egoism has been adopted from the beginning under Angleton, who worked closely with the Mossad from the start of CI operations (Morley 2017). Rather than rooting CI in the strong moral foundations of the West—virtue ethics, deontology, or utilitarianism—Angleton adopted the ethical egoism framework of the Mossad, and that has made all the difference.

One of the problems encountered in studying counterintelligence is how to approach it from an ethical point of view (Pfaff and Tiel 2004). Defining an ethical framework is essential in approaching the subject, yet problematic at the same time because counterintelligence has not been approached in the same way by those who practiced or continue to practice it. Bailey and Galich (2012) make a very effective argument for why a more traditional and defined ethical framework is needed in CI. Pfaff and Tiel (2004) explain that currently there is a lack of ethical focus in CI, but Bailey and Galich (2012) get to the root of the matter: no agencies in CI appear to be interested in setting moral limitations on the practice of CI. While various theoretical assumptions have been applied to critical studies of the CI community in the past, none of these studies have actually gone so far as to recommend an ethical framework. Erskine (2004) addressed the utilitarian ethics of CI (360); Pfaff and Tiel (2004) argued that every ethical approach to CI is rooted in Lockean or deontological ethics (1–2); Mattox (2002) approaches the topic from the standpoint of virtue ethics, arguing that if leaders do not "act in good faith even with those who are their adversaries," the potential risk of damaged reputations can undermine the diplomatic strategies of the state and create greater problems than before (4).

Each of these studies is effective in illustrating the shortcomings of ethical application in CI, but none of them presents a way forward or a solution to the problem. The problem is real: to support the point of Mattox (2002), Lieberthal and Jisi (2012) explain that the alliance among China, Russia, and Iran—all considered counterintelligence targets in the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy—has come about as a direct response to the perception of these states that the U.S. has acted in bad faith and cannot be trusted. None of these studies by themselves provides a holistic solution because the problem is ultimately cultural. To understand that point, one has to consider the traditional purpose of ethics in both the West and the East and how that purpose differs from the modern approach to ethics from the standpoint of egoism.

Researchers consistently suggest that ethics matters in all aspects of statehood, no less in counterintelligence than in any other sphere (Bellaby 2012; Erskine 2004; Bailey and Galich 2012; Pfaff and Tiel 2004). However, there has been no standard ethical framework used in counterintelligence, and a need for consistency in the application of an ethical system to CI must be assumed. Bailey and Galich (2012) make this point most effectively by explaining the code of ethics in the intelligence community and identifying its weaknesses and problem areas. However, having a code and implementing a code are two different things, and this is where culture comes into play. The Mossad changed its motto to appease the world, but it did not change its tactics. In short, its words changed, but its actions stayed the same: the same culture remained. The culture in the U.S. is what must be addressed, as Valentine (2016) deftly shows.

With power as the main impetus, other drivers of human action—such as virtue ethics, duty ethics, utilitarianism, and ethical egoism—may be used to explain the problems that arose within the counterintelligence program from the 1950s to the 1970s. Relevant theories include conflict theory, structural functionalism, and critical theory. Conflict theory was posited as a response to structural functionalism, and critical theory arose out of the failure of conflict theory to fully account for the failure of the Marxist prophecy (Horkheimer 1972, 246). Horkheimer (1972) fills the gap in cultural studies left by other researchers who failed to draw the connection between media, the state, and the cultural aims of the elite. However, by itself, critical theory is inadequate because social action is more than a quest for liberation. Equally inadequate by itself is structural functionalism because it does not consider the role that conflict plays in society. With a focus on how ethics play a part in decision-making, structural functionalism, conflict theory, and critical theory can help to explain the complex culture of CI in America.

Because of the confusion regarding culture, cultural values, and ethics, there is no consensus on how to analyze the past, as Pfaff and Tiel (2004) show. Nonetheless, there is a need for a framework for analyzing the past, because only with such a framework can one begin to understand the mistakes and the lessons that can be learned. Before one can rightly consider the role that ethics should play in the field of counterintelligence, one must decide on the cultural perspective from which to judge. Morley (2013) illustrates how Angleton was influenced by Israel's culture of statecraft. That influence is what is at the heart of America's lack of moral restraint in counterintelligence. The lack of moral restraint has been well documented (Valentine 2016). As Bellaby (2012) states, counterintelligence is "any action or activity that is knowingly designed and intended to encourage an audience of some sort to believe in something which is untrue" (147). Trafficking in untruths can be highly risky if not approached with a firm ethical framework in place.

What are acceptable counterintelligence actions, and what are unacceptable counterintelligence actions? Mattox (2002) asserts that there should be moral limits on CI but does not go into considerable detail to explicitly state what those limits should be. The issue of delineation is avoided because it is at root an issue of culture, and cultural conflicts exist throughout American society from top to bottom.

Erskine (2004) provides an initial step toward thinking about CI from a more traditional ethical perspective—one that is realistic, consequentialist, and deontological—but the same problems emerge. Duty is relative to one's cultural imperative and one's perceived objective. Erskine (2004) is not unrealistic in appreciating the ambiguous moral nature of CI, as he states that "not only is deception intrinsic to clandestine collection, but it is also central to counter-intelligence activities such as the deployment of 'double agents' and the sending of false messages" (372). More to the point, in terms of the danger posed by an unethical approach to counterintelligence, is Bellaby's (2012) assessment of the underlying reason for the failure within the counterintelligence program in the past: the application of widespread deception represents a danger for one's own nation because "lying can damage society as it chips away at, and could destroy the social bonds of trust and as a result breaks down the moral and social relationships that hold a society together" (149). This danger is highlighted by Valentine (2016), who cites the Phoenix Program, initiated in Vietnam, as a template for corruption within the intelligence community.

A further problem, identified by Bailey and Galich (2012), is that there has never been a standardized ethical framework used within the counterintelligence program, and that, just as freedom of religion can quickly lead to freedom from religion, freedom of choice with respect to ethics can quickly lead to freedom from ethics. Those who analyze the past tend to do so without committing themselves to an ethical perspective. Cohen (2016) is alone among researchers in that his perspective is obvious even if not explicit: he is elitist, and ethical egoism is his framework. Other researchers, from Erskine (2004) to Bailey and Galich (2012), avoid making any explicit statements on ethical egoism. To call out the purveyors of ethical egoism in policymaking in the CI community would be akin to throwing down a gauntlet and inviting blowback. Realizing this is why it is important to keep conflict theory in mind when addressing these points.

The ethical framework used to analyze the past must be realistic, as Erskine (2004) argues. CI is, by nature, morally ambiguous. The fact is that deception is part of the trade in counterintelligence: "intelligence professionals around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders and agencies to use unethical tactics or 'tradecraft' (e.g. lie, deceive, steal, and manipulate) in order to obtain [crucial] information" (Coyne et al. 2013, 27). There is no way to avoid this fact, and negotiating with it from an ethical standpoint puts or removes limitations on human behavior. Those limitations, moreover, can be the difference between a successful counterintelligence operation and a failed operation (Unkefer 2013). This reality may be why researchers like Bailey and Galich (2012) and Erskine (2004) have been reluctant to provide an ethical framework for the CI community. Regardless, their studies indicate the need for one.

To prove the need for such a framework, it is helpful to draw upon Valentine's (2016) work, which is factual rather than theoretical. Valentine was given special access to CIA agents by Director Colby, and much of the information provided to him by agents was considered "safe" as the agents assumed Valentine would not publish what was being told to him. Valentine's reporting provides a unique but personal look into the history of intelligence in the U.S. It serves as a historical record of errors, mistakes, and problems within the intelligence and counterintelligence enterprise resulting from a lack of ethical imperatives. Pfaff and Tiel (2004) indicate that essentially these agents combined aspects of deontology and Lockean ethics, perceiving the practice of deception as a duty to the state—one that must be practiced to safeguard state secrets and prevent foreign actors from acquiring information that might compromise a mission in the field. Yet deontology and Lockean ethics have not safeguarded the intelligence community from errors and abuses (Pfaff and Tiel 2004; Valentine 2016).

Not only has a need been identified for collaboration between the CI community and private industry, but there is a recognized need that the globalized world has changed the way in which nations must interact: more collaboration and less intrigue is required. For example, Godson and Wirtz (2000) state that "the breakdown of the traditional barriers to national sovereignty—increases the information and economic channels" that international players must navigate, foster, and maintain (432). Godson and Wirtz (2000) further point out that "foreign denial and deception affects the quality of life in the United States by causing policymakers to waste scarce public resources and to fail to anticipate strategic threats" (435). Kent (2019) explains that to boast of openly deceiving by engaging in counterintelligence is to put one's own national reputation at risk—one reason the Israeli Mossad changed its motto. Both Kent (2019) and Godson and Wirtz (2000) represent the absolutist side of the discussion; Cohen (2016) represents the relativistic side.

The absolutist side has a much better argument than the relativistic side. As Bernardi (2013) states, "Usually, information control generates an escalation of counterintelligence measures, because information control on the part of one State invites other governments and agencies to counteract, by means of countermeasures against espionage and deception" (50). When one nation deceives, another will follow. Angleton faced the problem of escalation his entire career (Morley 2013). This is why the absolutist position of Kent (2019) makes practical sense. It may be better simply to focus on collaboration and clarity than to attempt to deceive. Ironically, it is in this context that the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2020) has identified a "need to clarify the role of CI in the era of globalization" (1). Yet the culture of deception has spread all over the globe. Developers, technicians, IT personnel, business development personnel, human resources personnel, and facility personnel are all potential targets of foreign actors and collectors of intelligence (National Counterintelligence and Security Center n.d.). Private industry is at risk because it possesses intellectual property that foreign actors covet, and business activities can be exploited. Cyber operations are also at risk, as is confidential information that can be mishandled by employees. Counterintelligence operations could be used to deliberately leak false information to known foreign actors, but doing so runs the risk of escalating a larger conflict among nations, as Bernardi (2013) notes.

Since counterintelligence came to maturity in the U.S. in an era of conflict, it is helpful to approach the subject from the standpoint of conflict theory and the theories developed around it, all of which focus on the ways in which power is sought and used by groups in order to obtain or maintain possession of vital resources or maintain a balance of relationships that ensure stability and order in a system. This approach allows the research to explore the ways in which power drove the initiatives of counterintelligence policies during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, the literature shows that the problem of ethics in counterintelligence has had no easy solution and that the art of deception is such that it fosters a gray zone of disinformation, conflicts of interest, and corruption. The outcome of this situation was that counterintelligence suffered from poor culture and various other issues, resulting ultimately in the dismissal of Angleton and an attempt to restart the program. As the program now tries to address the issues of the 21st century, it appears that guidance could be used to steer the counterintelligence program away from the same errors and policies that derailed it in the past. The literature suggests that a need exists for this problem to be addressed and that, to help respond to that need, a theoretical approach should be defined.

The gaps in the research indicate that, in spite of awareness among researchers regarding a lack of ethical standards in the CI community, no research has been conducted that focuses on establishing a suitable ethical framework. The problem has been debated, but a solution has not been offered. Some researchers have suggested that the prevailing ethical egoism in the CI community is appropriate, but this is little more than self-justification. The holes in the research that need to be plugged are related to understanding the root of the ethical problem in CI. To plug those holes, a comparative case study analysis can help.

A comparative case study approach is used in this research. The case study analysis focuses on three areas in particular: 1) the use of counterintelligence in the CIA under counterintelligence Chief James Jesus Angleton; 2) the conflation of counterintelligence with counterinsurgency in the FBI's COINTELPRO and the Phoenix Program; and 3) the use of counterintelligence by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).

Because there is no standard ethical framework in counterintelligence, there is a risk of subjective or questionable morality seeping into counterintelligence activities (Valentine 2016). To understand the problem, this research design is appropriately qualitative, as the subject is exploratory in nature. The FBN was founded in 1930 and dissolved in 1968 due to corruption. Its task was to prevent drug trafficking and to make cases against drug dealers and smugglers. Scholarly articles, Senate reports, memoirs, independent research, biographies, and analysis have served as the sources of information.

Findings and Analysis

Angleton's belief in the mole thesis proposed by Golitsyn was, in part, based on his own experience with moles. He had been best friends with the British diplomat Kim Philby, who defected to the KGB in the 1950s. His pre-conceived notions led him to believe Golitsyn foremost. Agent John Hart, who wrote The Monster Plan, stated condemningly that Angleton's handling of the affair "did not conform to any generally accepted sense of the term 'methodology'" and that an "improvement of intellectual standards" in the CI program was needed (Morley 2018). What went unsaid was any mention of an improvement in the agency's ethical standards. A standard ethical framework had not been established under Angleton and has not been to this day. Instead, Angleton focused on developing a network of tenuous relationships, many of which proved to be false.

The final view of Angleton's CI program can be summed up by Raviv and Melman (1990): "Admiration for the Jewish state became an obsession with Angleton, who fell captive to the magic of Israeli intelligence" (90). This suggests that rather than putting CI at the service of the U.S., Angleton placed himself at the service of Israel's Mossad. The extent to which the Mossad used Angleton can be seen at the very least in the development of Israel's nuclear arsenal, which occurred under Angleton's watch. Angleton, who had worked relatively closely with the FBI, failed to facilitate the FBI's investigation into the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, from which nuclear material was diverted illegally to Israel (Morley 2018). In short, Angleton was compromised by a conflict of interest that saw his loyalty to one state override his duties to another. In other counterintelligence operations, loyalty to a group or to an idea has led to similar outcomes. The Phoenix Program and the FBI's COINTELPRO are examples of this.

Though proponents of the Phoenix Program have hailed it as wildly successful, conflicts of interest plagued the program from the start, according to members of the intelligence community, including Captain Sidney Towle, who saw the effects of the program first-hand and witnessed how agents would abuse their authority out of personal spite for adversaries (Valentine 2014). A mixture of counterintelligence and counterinsurgency, the Phoenix Program was a vast gray area of application that consisted of identifying suspected adversaries and removing them. The adversary, ostensibly, was the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The blurring of lines between counterintelligence and counterinsurgency helped push CI in a new direction that is today commonly accepted by the state apparatus, though deplored by individuals like Nolan (1997). The program was described by Drosnin (1975) as "the only systematized kidnapping, torture and assassination program ever sponsored by the United States government" (2). Abuses ranged from the murder of suspected Viet Cong to suspects being named, tortured, and killed simply as a result of personal animosity or local quarrel among individuals who made false accusations, knowing that the accused would effectively be eliminated (Valentine 2016).

A top-secret report published by Vietnam Veterans Against the War showed that Phoenix was part of a broader campaign in the CI community to expand CI operations drastically, using PSYOPS to reinforce CI objectives. Former Captain David Curry, former Naval Intelligence officer Joe Miller, former Air Force Intelligence officer Pat McCann, former Army Security Agency officer Bill Branson, and former 1st Lt. Barry Romo (1990) all testified to the "personally and politically destructive" forces that such a campaign entailed. Under Operations Plan JERICHO, set in the Philippines in the 1980s, a Phoenix-style program was approved by the Army Chiefs of Staff: "Operations Plan JERICHO is the mandate for a program of community counter-intelligence (COINTELPRO) and psychological operations (PSYOPS)" that Curry et al. believed would be "morally corrupting for the protagonists" (Curry et al. 1990, 20). Like the Phoenix Program, it blurred the lines between CI, PSYOPS, counterinsurgency, and government-sponsored terror. By the end of the 20th century, CI was no longer simply about disseminating false information to confuse or mislead the adversary: it was now part of a broader strategy to attack and undermine the adversary's culture and social organization.

This strategy did not originate with Phoenix. It was evident, as well, in the FBI's COINTELPRO, which began in 1956. It is still evident today in the 2020–2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, which uses the goal of "national security" as the catch-all for steering CI further into the realm of psychological warfare, counterinsurgency, and defensive covert operations. The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976) found that "officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal but expressed concern only for 'flap potential.' Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that the law and the Constitution were simply ignored" (13). Agents in CI, whether acting in the Phoenix Program or in the FBI's COINTELPRO, believed themselves and their conduct to be above the law and outside the purview of normal ethical guidelines by sheer virtue of the fact that they were engaged in what was termed counterintelligence. From the beginning, the CI community had leaped from engaging in deception to seeking the destruction of the adversary.

The FBI's COINTELPRO was initiated with a similar objective to that of the Phoenix Program: to infiltrate American organizations like the Black Panthers and the KKK, assume positions of leadership within these organizations, and co-opt them. COINTELPRO tactics included:

"Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them;

"Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages;

"Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention;

"Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing the falsely labeled member to expulsion or physical attack;

"Pursuant to instructions to use 'misinformation' to disrupt demonstrations, employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration marshals to attempt to control demonstrations and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing 'long and useless journeys to locate these addresses';

"Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (described as 'violence-prone') stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have 'a hit out for you.' The letter was suggested because it 'may intensify . . . animosity' and cause the street gang leader to 'take retaliatory action';

"From 'late 1963' until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 'neutralize' him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's 'war' against Dr. King, 'No holds were barred'" (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 10–11).

The idea of a CI program unconstrained and engaged in a "no holds barred" approach to its operations reveals the extent to which counterintelligence operations were without ethical guidelines or frameworks. FBI Assistant Director William Sullivan testified that "never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: 'Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral.' We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic" (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 14). As the Select Committee pointed out in its findings, the question raised by intelligence officers "was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked" (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 138). It was often the view of CI officers that "in intelligence, the stakes involved, and the interest of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values" (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 144). Sullivan stated that agents typically had a "war psychology," meaning that they operated under the assumption that no holds are barred (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 144).

The point made by Sullivan was that agents in CI acted without asking moral questions in the same way a soldier fires upon the enemy without asking whether what he is doing is just or unjust: he fires because he has been told he is at war. This culture of war helps to explain the pathology of CI agents under Angleton, in the Phoenix Program, and in COINTELPRO. It explains the transgressions made by Angleton's CI department during Operation CHAOS, in which the recruiting and training of double agents in the domestic anti-war movement led to illegal spying on domestic citizens (Valentine 2016). The problem of blurred lines: the mandate to deceive became viewed as a mandate to do much more. There was no oversight, and Director Colby was essentially forced to scapegoat Angleton only after Nixon's "plumbers" were arrested and the Watergate scandal erupted (Valentine 2016). So long as operations could be justified via the "we are at war" argument, the only thing that mattered was efficiency. Mark Felt, another Assistant FBI Director, testified that "his job was to ensure that Bureau programs were being operated efficiently, not constitutionally" (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1976, 155). Were CI methods efficient? That was the subjective question those engaged in counterintelligence asked themselves. There was certainly no objective moral or ethical standard by which they could judge the virtue of their actions.

This same question of what "worked best" was the one asked routinely by agents of the FBN, as former FBN agent Dean Unkefer (2013) shows. The FBN was guided similarly to the FBI and CIA by a wholly pragmatic approach to drug enforcement, and its use of CI was no different from that of the FBI or the Phoenix Program. If a lie or deception got the job done, FBN agents considered it a good one, regardless of how immoral, corrupting, messy, deadly, or extra-legal the outcome.

To make cases, FBN agents routinely acted as drug buyers or dealers (Unkefer 2013; Valentine 2006). They infiltrated mob rings, mafia families, and entire communities; they used deception to ensnare drug traffickers for decades. Agents cut heroin and gave it away to informants in exchange for secrets and loyalty; they kept and divided drug money among themselves and used it both to buy off other actors and fund lavish lifestyles (Unkefer 2013). In many cases, their deception led to startlingly violent conclusions. In any event, the agents were guided not by a standard of ethics but rather by a pragmatic sense of duty: their duty was to stop drug traffickers by any means necessary. Skimming off the top was their just reward, many agents felt, for doing the dirty work the American government demanded of them yet was disinclined to remunerate to any substantial degree (Unkefer 2013).

It was partly this any-means-necessary approach that eventually led to the undoing of the FBN (Valentine 2006). The other reason for the FBN's undoing, as Valentine (2006) shows, was that it was incredibly effective in achieving its goal. Its pragmatic, typically amoral, and unethical approach to infiltrating and destroying the drug trade eventually caused its agents to run afoul of the CIA, which worked closely with drug traffickers for its own intelligence and CI purposes (Valentine 2006). The CIA pulled more weight in the hierarchy of government, and thus when the CIA saw its own operations threatened by the FBN's aggressive but effective tactics, the CIA initiated an assault on the FBN by way of an ethics committee. Essentially, what led to the FBN's success was also what led to its downfall: agents were turned one against another as an ethics probe turned the bureau inside-out, brought charges and convictions against several agents, and eventually dismantled the bureau altogether (Unkefer 2013; Valentine 2006).

A conflict of interest existed at the structural and functional levels of the FBN as well. Henry Anslinger, who headed the FBN from 1930 into the 1960s, had to satisfy multiple stakeholders, all of whom held contradictory desires (Valentine 2006). The established, well-connected families whose accrual of wealth during the robber baron era had made them powerful looked to Anslinger as a kind of gatekeeper. The drug trade was still licit in China when the FBN was created, and these families made millions partaking in that trade, using channels and working with actors who also participated in the illicit trafficking of drugs into the West (Valentine 2006). Anslinger was essentially appointed to his role as head of the FBN because he had married into one of these established families. He would make sure that while the war on drugs was prosecuted, their interests abroad would not be interfered with (Valentine 2006). At the same time, Anslinger had to appease the prohibitionists tasked with overseeing his performance. Cases were thus encouraged to be made against addicts and lower-level distributors, but the major traffickers were essentially off-limits (Valentine 2006). This led to a culture within the FBN in which agents had to deceive and lure addicts and low-level dealers, flip them into becoming informants—often through blackmail—and engage in illegal activity themselves both to ensure their covers were not blown and to exact a degree of street justice in lieu of prosecutors and judges (perceived to be on the take) supporting their work with convictions (Unkefer 2013; Valentine 2006).

Under Anslinger, CI in the FBN was used in a similar no-holds-barred manner to that of the CIA under Angleton. Because the degree of deception used by case-making agents in the FBN went beyond their legal mandate, reports were routinely falsified (Unkefer 2013). Angleton also falsified reports in attempts to prevent "moles" in the CIA from obtaining accurate data (Morley 2017). Deception was used not just against adversaries but against the state for which these agencies were working. When FBN agents began making bigger cases against major traffickers, thus threatening the relationships within the trade fostered by the well-connected families and the CIA, a crackdown on the FBN ensued (Unkefer 2013; Valentine 2006). The justification for the crackdown was the agency's use of deception against the state. The no-holds-barred approach eventually came back to bite the FBN just as it did Angleton's CI unit. Anslinger had done his best to ignore the criminal activity of allies of the established families, particularly in the 1934 case of the Transportes Aereos Centro-Americanos (TACA) "Honduran Guns for Drugs" scandal, in which various agencies "protected drug smugglers to ensure national security, as well as to protect corporate profits" (Valentine 2006, 33). Anslinger had to walk a tightrope between fulfilling his mandate and looking the other way when his work threatened to interfere with the affairs of groups with special interests, groups to whom he himself owed his career and fortune (Valentine 2006). Conflicts of interest at the top contributed to the FBN's demise.

The culture of deception utilized by the Mossad undoubtedly played a part in the development of the CI culture under Angleton, as the latter was highly influenced by Mossad agency personnel (Morley 2017). However, the frame of reference used by the Mossad was not consistent with that of the American intelligence officer: the Mossad's mission was to use deception to aid Israel; by working closely with the Mossad, Angleton potentially made himself an unwitting asset and pawn in the CI maneuvers of Israel. Angleton's apparent obtuseness with respect to the true nature of the Ring of Five and the problematic nature of the Soviet defectors in the 1960s is best understood if one considers that Angleton relied on information from his Mossad associates—associates who offered little intelligence on these matters (Morley 2018). Angleton simply had not established a clear frame of reference for the CI program in America and relied upon foreign actors with a dubious reputation themselves. In terms of an ethical standard, his own egoism served as the frame of reference, and his dependency upon alcohol did not support ego as a suitable reference point (Morley 2017, 74). Angleton lacked an objective framework outside himself: there was no ethical framework employed at all. Assumption led to later unwelcome revelations and a great deal of insecurity, confusion, and contradictory narratives when the Church Committee began investigating Angleton's work of the previous two decades.

The same problem occurred for Anslinger and the FBN. Anslinger had no ethical reference point, no ethical standard that was used to establish a clear and acceptable code of conduct with respect to CI. The Phoenix Program likewise suffered from such a lack of an ethical framework, and the FBI's COINTELPRO, along with the broader umbrella Operation CHAOS, suffered in the same way. In each of these cases, one sees CI agents going beyond the mandate of operating to deceive the adversary—killing, torture, rape, trafficking, falsification of reports, spying on domestic citizens—all resulting from the lack of any moral or ethical constraints. Time and again, agents from each of these cases viewed what worked "best" as the criteria for judging the virtue of one's actions. These agents believed themselves to be at war across the board. Because they considered themselves at war, they believed all was fair. They had a subjective ethical approach to their work that, in the end, undermined their missions and sabotaged their own aims.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program in the 21st century. By using comparative case study analysis, it has shown that CI under Angleton, CI in the Phoenix Program and the FBI's COINTELPRO, and CI used by the FBN have all suffered from a lack of ethics. These cases' problems are best characterized as stemming from reliance upon Ethical Egoism—an evolution of Lockean Ethics and an outgrowth of a poorly defined or constrained utilitarianism.