Cicero and Augustine on Virtue, Justice, and Natural Law

Introduction

Marcus Tullius Cicero was born on January 3, 106 B.C.E., and was murdered on December 7, 43 B.C.E. His life overlapped with the downfall and eventual destruction of the Roman Republic, during which time he played a significant role in political affairs; his writings are therefore a valued source of information about those events. He was a philosopher, politician, lawyer, and orator, among other things. To grasp the logic of his work and to appreciate his philosophy, one must keep that context in mind. Although philosophical study was important to Cicero, he regarded it primarily as a means toward more effective political action, and so he placed politics above philosophical inquiry. During periods when he was involuntarily prevented from participating in politics, he produced his philosophical writings.

St. Augustine's testimony that Cicero's Hortensius — an exhortation to philosophy — transformed him from a sinful life toward philosophy and eventually toward God is the most striking example of Cicero's lasting influence. According to Clayton (2016), Augustine later adopted Cicero's definition of the commonwealth, using it to argue that the sack of Rome by the barbarians could not be blamed on Christianity.

A Catholic bishop of Hippo in northern Africa, St. Augustine (354–430 C.E.) was formerly known as Aurelius Augustinus. He was the first great Christian philosopher, a thoroughly Roman-trained rhetorician, and an inexhaustible writer who produced over 110 works over more than thirty years. His political and social philosophy forms a significant intellectual bridge between late antiquity and the emerging medieval world, since he wrote from a unique vantage point as a keen observer of society on the eve of the collapse of the Roman Empire. Many scholars regard him as the most important and influential Western philosopher of his era. According to Mattox (2016), although Augustine would not have considered himself a political or social philosopher as such, his writings on the nature of human society, the role of the state, justice, just and unjust war, peace, and the relationship between church and state have all contributed significantly to shaping the development of Western civilization.

Cicero's Philosophy of Virtue and Politics

Clayton proposed that Cicero regarded philosophy as subordinate to politics; it should not surprise us, then, that there is a political goal behind his philosophy: the protection, security, and, if possible, the advancement of the Roman Republic. He held that the politicians of his day had become corrupt, lacking the noble character that had distinguished the Romans of earlier times. He believed that the Republic's difficulties stemmed from the loss of virtue. He hoped that the leading Romans — particularly within the Senate — might heed his appeals to restore the nation. This was possible only if the Roman elite chose to cultivate their character and commit themselves to social stability and individual virtue rather than to ambition, wealth, and power. If such a transformation of character were to occur, the elite might pass legislation compelling others to uphold the same standards, and the Republic might recover its former glory. Whether this vision reflects a genuine commitment to the ideals of nobility and virtue, or a blindness to the nature of the extraordinarily turbulent and brutal politics of Cicero's time — or perhaps both — is difficult to determine with certainty.

Cicero illustrates the significance of a committed life of virtue, the foundations of society, the universal community of all human beings, the function of the statesman, and the theory of natural law. He argues that moral value is the sole good; that virtue is sufficient for happiness; that all vices and virtues are equivalent in kind; that every foolish person is morally disordered; that only the wise man is truly free; and that only the wise man is truly rich. He claims that virtue, as cultivated through philosophy, is sufficient for a happy life — views all consistent with Stoicism. He also describes the nature of genuine friendship, which he holds is achievable only among virtuous men who live according to nature. According to Cicero, Griffin, and Atkins (1991), this friendship is founded on virtue and, though it brings tangible benefits, it does not aim at those benefits or seek them out.

In Cicero's time, the Epicureans and the Stoics represented, respectively, the contrasting poles of ethical philosophy, while the Peripatetics occupied the middle ground. The Epicureans held happiness — or, following their founder, the absence of pain — as the sole objective and end of moral conduct. They thus reduced all virtue to prudence, or enlightened self-interest, a doctrine that recognized virtue as the highest form of self-cultivation, holding that it alone was conducive to the happiness of the whole self — intellectually, spiritually, and physically.

Stoic Ethical Schools and Cicero's Natural Law

The Stoics viewed virtue as the sole objective and end of life. In their philosophy, virtue is the conformity of the will and conduct to universal nature; inherent fitness is therefore both the rule and the standard of the right. Complete conformity — or perfect virtue — is rendered by this school as attainable only by the truly wise. Its earlier followers, though doubting that any human being, even Zeno the grand master, had ever achieved this ideal perfection, nonetheless acknowledged no moral difference between those who fell slightly short and those who had made no meaningful progress toward it. The later Stoics, however, recognized gradations of goodness and became persistent expositors and teachers of the duties within the reach of those who are not yet wise, through the exercise of which one may move ever closer toward perfection. According to Cicero, from his time until Christianity achieved dominance, this belief was the sole remedy that saved Roman society from complete and irremediable moral corruption.

The Peripatetic view holds that virtue consists in moderation — the tempering of extremes — and locates each distinct virtue midway between opposing vices: sobriety between excess and abstinence; generosity between prodigality and miserliness; humility between irascibility and timidity. Cicero (1887) further explains that this school acknowledges the reality of the inherently right as distinct from the merely useful or advantageous, while also holding that happiness is the ultimate end of life and that virtue, though essential, is insufficient without external goods. The prudent and upright person will never violate what is right, but will pursue by all legitimate means whatever external benefits are within reach.

Cicero thus presents natural law as reason expressed in its highest form. A person who lives in accordance with natural law and practices virtue — defined as "right reason in agreement with nature" — is, in doing so, expressing submission to the divine order, though Cicero does not imply any personal relationship with God in this formulation.

Augustine's social and political views derive directly from his religious beliefs. The historical context is essential for understanding his intentions. Augustine lived at a time when Christianity, politics, and philosophy were all flourishing simultaneously. He believes that the primary objects of nature should be sought for their own sake, and that virtue — which can be taught — is the art of living well and the greatest of all spiritual goods.

According to Augustine, a person can be called virtuous if he lives well, since virtue is the art of living well. The question then becomes: what does it mean to live well? Augustine believed that a person's happiness depends on virtue and on how one makes use of the good things in life. If a person possesses many good things but lacks virtue, those goods do not serve his genuine good; they should not be called good things when the person who possesses them uses them inappropriately and renders them useless. To live well means knowing how to use one's possessions rightly, and this is what produces genuine happiness. According to Dyson (1998), happiness is the ultimate end of using one's resources, wealth, and even one's own body well, as directed by virtue.

Conclusion

Mattox, J. Mark. "Augustine: Political and Social Philosophy." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aug-poso/. Accessed 4 December 2016.

Neste, Berit Van. "Cicero and St. Augustine's Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea." 12 April 2006. Scholar Commons, University of South Florida. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4978&context=etd. Accessed 4 December 2016.