This paper analyzes the managerial decision-making failures that led to the 1986 Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, focusing on the role of improper communication framing between NASA and Morton-Thiokol engineers. It explores how cold weather concerns about the shuttle's o-rings were inadequately communicated, how organizational pressure caused engineers to reverse their safety recommendations, and how miscommunication about launch conditions ultimately proved fatal. Drawing on Bazerman and Moore's framework for managerial judgment and Pinkus's engineering ethics scholarship, the paper argues that the disaster was not inevitable but rather the preventable result of improperly framed information and the failure to convey critical safety concerns within their proper context.
On the day of the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, there were many factors at play — and a number of them emerged before the actual day of the incident. These were decisions made by NASA and by the engineers at Morton-Thiokol, and they definitively affected what took place the day the disaster occurred. The morning of the launch, the weather was unusually cold, which affected the o-rings in the shuttle (Pinkus, 1997). The weather had been discussed throughout the development of the shuttle and again on the morning of the launch. More than 15 engineers expressed their concerns about whether the o-rings would fail during launch because of the colder temperatures, but NASA wanted to proceed with the launch after considering how long a postponement might take (Pinkus, 1997). There was no backup system in place if the o-rings failed, meaning the shuttle would be destroyed. Although NASA was originally agreeable to waiting, they later reconsidered and decided they did not want to delay until warmer weather arrived (Pinkus, 1997).
The temperature was so cold that ice had formed across the launch pad, raising additional concerns. Ice had the potential to damage the shuttle during liftoff (Pinkus, 1997). Despite its ability to reach space, the shuttle was actually quite delicate — simple factors like ice or cold temperatures could cause serious damage. Engineers and manufacturers understood this vulnerability, yet the information did not effectively reach or influence the final decision makers.
There was a great deal of miscommunication between Morton-Thiokol and NASA, along with critical issues that were not adequately addressed. One of those issues was that NASA was not informed that the shuttle's actual manufacturer did not want it launched under icy conditions (Pinkus, 1997). Another significant problem was that Morton-Thiokol eventually reversed its position under pressure from NASA and stated that the launch should proceed (Pinkus, 1997). The way the issue was framed may have contributed more to the tragedy than any single technical failure. Issues must be presented correctly in order for them to make sense to everyone involved and to be addressed in the right way (Bazerman & Moore, 2008). Too often, important concerns are overlooked because people fail to recognize that deeper issues are not being considered. When managers address problems, they must frame them appropriately so that those they communicate with can understand the value of what is being said and the goals being pursued (Bazerman & Moore, 2008). This was something that both NASA and the engineers at Morton-Thiokol failed to do.
"Reversed engineer recommendations under NASA pressure"
"Framing theory applied to the disaster"
Bazerman, M. H., & Moore, D. A. (2008). Judgment in managerial decision making. Wiley.
Pinkus, R. L. (1997). Engineering ethics: Balancing cost, schedule, and risk. Cambridge University Press.
You’re 60% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 2 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.