War Without Violence: U.S. Strategy Against Salafist Jihadism

Introduction and Overview of Proctor's Argument

Pat Proctor's article, published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Security in 2012, is less a question-and-answer exercise than it is a formal proposal. The proposal is directed at the United States, suggesting in strong terms how the U.S. — and presumably its allies — could and should engage in what Proctor calls "mass politics," or "war without violence" (Proctor, 2012, p. 47). The theme of the article is the remarkable transformation that took place in Arab countries during the so-called "Arab Spring" — in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The hypothesis and central argument are very clearly stated. The thesis is that the United States needs a new strategy for persuading the Muslim world to "reject the salafist jihadism idea" without further exacerbating the tensions that already exist between the West and the Muslim world (Proctor, p. 48). This thesis is grounded in the fact that, in the decade following September 11, 2001, the United States launched a "War on Terror" under the administration of George W. Bush and yet failed to win it. Although the U.S. killed a number of jihadist leaders — including Osama bin Laden — it cannot kill every radical Islamic militant who seeks to bring violence to the West.

"The United States has failed to eradicate the threat of salafist jihadism," Proctor explains (p. 48). Notwithstanding the West's rhetoric against terrorism, it would be impossible for the U.S. to "kill its way to victory in this war" because there is "simply no government to force to capitulate" — the terrorists are mobile and not affiliated with any state (Proctor, p. 48).

In defining salafist jihadism, Proctor offers useful context for understanding why many Muslims — particularly younger men struggling economically and exposed to radical rhetoric — are angry at the West. On page 49, he explains that "the great powers of Europe ultimately carved up and colonized the Arab world" in the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth. During Britain's domination of Sudan in the late nineteenth century, the word ista'mar emerged among Muslims, meaning "to colonize" or "to exploit" (Proctor, p. 49).

After World War I, the West seized and exploited Arab territories — including Iran and Iraq — and that bitterness persists today. Many young Muslims have rebelled against their governments, in part because they perceive those governments as being propped up by Western power, military weapons, and money. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, salafism intensified under bin Laden. Proctor defines salafism as an ideology — "an idea that has mobilized a global movement" — one the U.S. cannot defeat militarily, "because an idea can only be defeated by another idea," not by drone strikes or soldiers in Afghanistan (Proctor, p. 51).

Jihadism and the Salafi Jihad

Professor David Cook, writing in the peer-reviewed journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, explains that jihad has three categories rooted in the original definitions found in the Qur'an. There is the jihad of the hand (or the sword), which "is military in nature" (Cook, 2009, p. 178). There is the jihad "of the tongue, which involved the reproof of an unjust ruler or corrupt society," and the third form is the jihad "of the soul, developed mostly by the Sufis," which involved waging an "internal struggle against one's lower soul" (Cook, p. 178). Over time, jihad has been appropriated by militants to describe the targets they wish to kill; it can now mean "beheading, kidnapping, and the mutilation of bodies" (Cook, p. 185). Extremist Muslims have taken a term from the Qur'an and transformed it into a label that identifies enemies — such as the U.S. and the UK — to be attacked and killed.

Regarding the Salafi Jihad specifically, Assaf Moghadam explains that it is an "ideology" — what Proctor calls an "idea" (Moghadam, 2008, p. 1). The Salafi Jihad "identifies the alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum in the persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims" dating back to the Crusades (Moghadam, p. 1). Moreover, Moghadam explains that Salafi jihadists "present a program of action, namely jihad, which is understood in military terms" (p. 2).

Salafi jihadists believe that jihad will "reverse the tide of history and redeem adherents of Salafi-Jihadist ideology from their misery," and martyrdom is held up as the "ultimate way in which jihad can be waged" — providing the justification for suicide attacks against the West. Salafi jihadists also "openly justify the killing of civilians, including Muslims, under a logic of the ends justifying the means" (Moghadam, p. 3).