This essay examines the mechanisms through which political leaders in Bangladesh perpetuate systematic oppression of citizens and opposition parties. The paper argues that political leadership bears primary responsibility for institutional corruption, including the politicization of law enforcement agencies, abuse of executive privilege, and manipulation of the judiciary system. Drawing on documented incidents such as Rana Plaza, extrajudicial killings, and judicial delays in high-profile cases, the essay demonstrates how these three interconnected factors create a climate of impunity and human rights violations that disproportionately affect marginalized populations and political opposition.
Have you heard of the incidents at Tazreen Garments, Rana Plaza, the seven murders in Narayanganj, or the Sagor-Runy killing? These cases are well documented, yet a critical question remains: can law enforcement agencies ensure justice in Bangladesh? The answer is troubling—they cannot. The reason lies not with law enforcement capacity, but with political control. Law enforcement agencies lack the power to constrain political leaders who orchestrate or enable widespread abuse. As a result, ordinary citizens and opposition leaders face systematic political oppression with no recourse. I strongly believe that political leaders bear sole responsibility for political oppression in Bangladesh because they maintain direct control over law enforcement agencies, enjoy unaccountable executive privilege, and have corrupted the judiciary system to serve partisan interests.
The first cause of political oppression in Bangladesh is the systematic politicization of law enforcement. According to Ahmad (2013), the political, democratic, and constitutional rights of political parties and ordinary citizens are routinely denied when senior opposition figures are arrested by police without due process. Yet the constitutional mandate of law enforcement—under Article 27 of the Bangladesh Constitution—is to maintain impartial law and order. Instead, agencies such as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Police, and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) have become political cadres of the ruling party, applying law selectively and with institutional bias. Opposition party workers and ordinary citizens become the primary targets of harassment, beating, and torture by these nominally neutral agencies.
When law enforcement becomes biased, its entire mission transforms. According to Ahmad (2013), these agencies now function to protect and assist government party members and leaders while simultaneously harassing, beating, and torturing opposition members and ordinary people. Critically, these agencies operate without meaningful accountability. The results are documented: politicized law enforcement killed approximately two hundred people in March 2013 (Economist, April 2013), committed sexual violence against women across the country (Al Jazeera, December 2013), killed seven individuals in Narayanganj (The Daily Star, 27 April 2014), and arrested children as young as nine, pregnant women, and elderly men and women (Naya Digonto, 25 January 2013). Rather than take responsibility, law enforcement routinely blames opposition parties for vandalism while concealing their own involvement.
The incident involving Matiur Rahman, editor of Prothom Alo, illustrates this pattern. On 12 February 2013, plainclothes security personnel shot at Rahman's vehicle during clashes in the Kawran Bazaar area. Multiple news outlets reported conflicting accounts: some blamed Shibir (the student organization of Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami), while others reported police bullets caused the damage. Alternate media sources documented plainclothes gunmen openly firing on bound and handcuffed activists. According to New Age (February 2013), ballistics evidence pointed to police weapons. Yet official narratives blamed Shibir without investigation, demonstrating how politicized law enforcement manufactures evidence and controls the public narrative. This pattern—fabricated accusations paired with no accountability—underscores how political leaders weaponize security forces against opposition and dissent.
A second mechanism of oppression is the accumulation of unaccountable executive privilege by political leaders. Under Bangladesh law, political leaders face no meaningful legal consequences for criminal conduct; police cannot arrest them without institutional protection from superior politicians. A parliament member possesses far greater authority than a district commissioner, rendering local officials powerless to constrain national political figures. This structural imbalance creates systematic impunity.
Political leaders exploit this privilege to enrich themselves and their networks. They enjoy tax-exempt status, which incentivizes corruption and the laundering of illicit wealth into the formal economy. More critically, they appoint political loyalists to the highest positions across all sectors: banking, healthcare, law enforcement, universities, and public services. This politicization spreads corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement throughout institutions. The collapse of Bangladesh's share market in 2012 exemplifies these consequences. According to The Daily Star (2012), 1.8 lakh (180,000) crore taka vanished from the market, and three million citizens lost their property with no means of survival. At least five individuals committed suicide as a result. Yet those responsible for this institutional theft faced no prosecution and continued their business of expropriating public wealth—precisely because they are political leaders protected from accountability.
Political leaders maintain additional control through media ownership and suppression. Approximately 90 percent of Bangladesh's media exhibits political bias (Ahmed, 2013), and political leaders possess the power to shut down critical outlets. For instance, the government suspended The Daily Amar Desh, Digonto Television (DTV), Islamic Television (ITV), and Channel One—ostensibly neutral but actually opposition-friendly outlets—to silence vocal criticism. The Padma Bridge project further illustrates institutional rot: widespread corruption by political actors caused the World Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Asian Development Bank to withdraw funding. These patterns—the Hallmark scandal, Destiny Bank collapse, Basic Bank fraud—all trace to the unaccountable privilege of political leaders who use state power for private enrichment while ordinary people absorb the cost.
The third pillar of oppression is the politicization of Bangladesh's judiciary. Although law formally separates the judicial branch from the executive, political leaders in practice control the entire judiciary system. The last resort for ordinary citizens seeking justice is a court system—yet in Bangladesh, the judiciary itself has been captured by partisan politics.
High-profile cases demonstrate this capture: the trial of those responsible for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and General Manzur proceeded only with difficulty because judges felt constrained by government pressure. Similarly, the 21 August grenade attack case and the ten-truck arms case remain politicized. Most controversially, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)—established to investigate liberation war crimes—has been widely criticized as targeting opposition figures disproportionately. Transparency International ranks Bangladesh's judiciary as one of the world's most corrupt institutions. Lower courts function without independence or impartiality; decisions on bail and remand are issued through hidden government instructions (Ahmed, 2013). Judicial appointments themselves follow political rather than merit-based criteria. From 2009 to 2013, sixty judges were appointed to the High Court Division based on political loyalty, not qualifications (Ahmed, 2013). In the Appellate Division, two judges were elevated ahead of forty and forty-one more senior candidates to serve on the ICT—a transparent political selection.
This judicial corruption directly harms ordinary citizens. Unable to afford judges and court officials, impoverished people cannot access fair trial protection. Simultaneously, courts file tens of thousands of fabricated cases designed to silence opposition and marginalized communities. According to Sushashoner Jonno Nagorik (Sujan) (2012), approximately two lakh (200,000) cases are currently in court primarily to oppress ordinary people and opposition leaders, with no credible evidence and purely to suppress dissent. Judges and magistrates continue these cases absent any proof, illustrating how political control of the judiciary weaponizes law against defenseless populations.
Some argue that political leaders share responsibility for oppression with other factors: illiteracy, lack of civic awareness, poverty, and unemployment. They contend that uneducated populations, unaware of their rights and duties, become easy targets for exploitation. However, this argument misplaces primary responsibility. Political leaders have a constitutional duty to provide universal education, combat illiteracy, and create awareness among citizens. More fundamentally, political leaders bear responsibility for development itself.
"Addressing poverty and literacy as alternative explanations"
Bangladesh is signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These treaties legally bind the government to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. If political leaders continue to violate these binding obligations, victims should pursue remedies through international courts and mechanisms. Bangladesh's situation is urgent, but change is possible if citizens, civil society, and the international community hold political leaders accountable for their actions and demand genuine institutional reform rooted in fairness and justice.
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