This essay explores G.E. Moore's philosophical argument in "Proof of an External World," examining the distinction between internal mental experience and the objective external world. Drawing on Moore's lectures and Kantian categories, the paper considers how physical and non-physical entities — such as shadows and afterimages — relate to external reality. It also engages with Cartesian ideas about the thinking self as the basis of existence, ultimately arguing that Moore's proof — demonstrated through the plurality of observable physical things like hands — establishes an undeniable external world beyond individual perception.
Man seems to be an innately selfish creature, unable to see a world outside of himself. Each man feels that he is the center of the universe, and little logic can be used to change his mind on this regard. A man who does not accept the fact that he is not the center of the universe — and that there is a world beyond his own mind — is limiting himself to a narcissistic existence devoid of true understanding.
In his lecture "Proof of an External World," Moore makes it clear that, as with all topics of philosophy, the proof is very much open to interpretation and individual analysis. Things external to us, external things, and things external to our minds are all equivalent terms (70). The individual is more or less entirely his or her mind, because it is in the process of thinking that a person exists — to paraphrase Descartes. Because so much of identity and understanding of the existence of self is concerned with the individual perspective, and because it is the ability to process intellectually that confirms we do exist, it is easy to become numb to the external forces outside of that individual perspective.
Kant classified these external forces as "physical object," "material thing," or "body," but Moore stresses that there are equally important external factors that do not have physical depth — such as a shadow — which still can be met with in space (71). So much of what is encountered in the external world may not have physical presence, and yet it exists all the same.
Moore uses the example of a white star against a black backdrop, which when stared at for a period of time leaves an afterimage. The resulting image — a grayish star upon a white sheet of paper — is still an object in space, although it cannot be physically touched, nor is it observable to everyone unless they have also participated in the experiment. Yet the gray star exists nonetheless. Not all things, however, can be met in space. The afterimage of light, which can only be viewed with eyes shut, is not an example of an entity in the external world, because it requires a closing off of reception to that external world.
"Human experience as the boundary of individual perception"
"Moore's hands proof demonstrates plurality in external world"
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