MDMP Analysis: Cabanatuan POW Camp Raid Planning

Movement Estimate of the Operations

The planning for the liberation of American and Allied prisoners held in a compound at Pangatian is to be conducted in central Luzon. The camp was five miles east of Cabanatuan.

The primary hindrance to the plan would be the rapid and frequent movement of Japanese troops on the highway in front of the camp where the POWs were held. The compound, in addition to being behind enemy lines, was also a mainstay of Japanese troop movements. The Japanese retreating troops moved at night and rested during the day, and the POW camp was one such resting place. The roads in the Pangatian area were regularly used by Japanese tanks. Dense troop concentrations were also reported in Cabanatuan City and Cabu.

The camp is 600 by 800 yards and has three-layered fencing on three sides, with outposts at the main gate and at the rear side of the camp. The main gate is locked, with a concealed sentry on guard.

Given the risk of being spotted by the Japanese, the march would be conducted primarily in darkness, especially just before entering enemy territory. The actual attack would also be executed after sunset.

There was not much time available, as the Japanese had already moved some of the POWs from the camp. If the remaining POWs were to be saved, swift movement of the forces was necessary. It is estimated that, at the pace the Japanese forces are retreating from the area, the Rangers should have no more than a week to plan and execute the rescue operation.

Planning is to be based on aerial photographs. Air reconnaissance data would reach the 6th Army from the Air Corps, which would then forward the intelligence to a base at Guimba, from where it would be transferred to the Rangers over SCR 694 radio.

Ground surveillance of the objective would be conducted by the Alamo Scouts, who would depart the Rangers' base camp at Calasiao on the afternoon of 27 January and proceed to a guerrilla headquarters at Guimba. From there, they would be escorted by guerrilla guides to Platero, three miles north of the POW camp. The objectives of the surveillance were to determine the number of Japanese troops, the number of guards, and their daily routines. This information would be relayed to the Rangers after they reached the area.

It is estimated that, at a comfortable pace starting from base camp, it would take two days for the Rangers to reach the objective — the POW camp.

The Rangers would begin marching toward Guimba, approximately seventy-five miles east of base camp, on 28 January, where they would be joined by an eighty-man guerrilla force and native guides. At Balincarin, about five miles northeast of the objective, the Rangers would link up with the Alamo Scouts and a second eighty-man guerrilla force on 29 January.

If the march began at 0500 on 28 January in a truck convoy, it would reach Guimba at around 1400 hours, from where native guides could take the column southeast to a guerrilla camp near Lobong, approximately five miles away, arriving by late afternoon.

At the same pace of movement, the Rangers would be able to cross into enemy territory about a mile south of Baloc after nightfall, moving through open grasslands and rice paddies. At around midnight, the team would cross the Talavera River at approximately 0000 hours, and reach and cross Rizal Highway at around 0400 hours the next day — 29 January. Within a couple of hours they would reach Balincarin.

Following the route selected and recommended by locals and guerrillas, the soldiers should rest for the day and begin their march toward Platero — approximately 2.5 miles south — after 1600 hours. At this pace, the Rangers should reach Platero at dusk. The team is advised to rest and await the final assault there.

On 30 January, at around 1700 hours, the team should depart Platero for the final assault. Moving cautiously, the team should reach a clear position about a mile from the objective camp within approximately one hour. By then it would be dark, and the element of surprise would aid the Rangers in achieving their objective.

The safe return of the POWs would ensure the complete success of the mission; therefore, the return journey is of equal importance to the onward march.

The Rangers and the liberated POWs would first stop at Platero for reorganization and food. The rescued POWs would need to begin walking to Balincarin the same night, as soon as possible.

The next stop for the column would be at Matoas Na Kahey, which they should reach by around 0200 hours on 31 January, given the expected slow pace of the POWs.

The most dangerous leg of the return journey would come after crossing Matoas Na Kahey, where the column would be required to cross Rizal Highway — an crossing that entailed a one-mile walk along the highway itself. At the expected pace of the weakened ex-POWs, it should take about one hour to traverse this stretch. The column is expected to reach Sibul at around 0800 on 31 January. The column should be relatively safe upon reaching this point, and, given sufficient radio contact with the base camp, evacuation trucks and ambulances can be expected at this location.

The locals and guerrillas would assist the Rangers at every step. The Alamo Scouts would be supported by local guides, and guerrillas would assist in surveillance of the camp. The route would be selected by locals to ensure maximum safety for the Rangers and availability of food and water on both legs of the journey.

The guerrillas under Prince and Pajota would arrange all-around security, a carabao-cart train for 200 liberated POWs, and food for 650 men along the return route. Civilians along the route, under instruction from the guerrillas, would pen all chickens and muzzle all dogs so that no sound would be made while the Rangers marched through. The Rangers would be provided with food, water, and shelter by the locals at Platero.

The guerrillas would also support the mission by establishing roadblocks on the highway on both sides of the POW camp to prevent Japanese troops from entering the area before and during the attack.

The locals would arrange carabao carts for the POWs on the south bank of the Pampanga River. The returning column would be provided food and water by locals at Platero, and the guerrilla doctor would treat the sick and wounded. At Balincarin, the returning column would receive more food and water from local civilians, along with the possibility of additional carabao carts. Similarly, food, water, and additional carts were expected from civilians at Matoas Na Kahey.

The mission is to free POWs comprising American soldiers and soldiers from allied forces, taken hostage by Japanese forces and held in a reportedly heavily guarded camp. The commander's intent is to utilize available resources to free the POWs with as little damage to the rescuing forces as possible. The intent includes the following tasks: surveillance, discreet marching, striking with surprise, neutralizing the enemy, freeing the POWs, and returning safely with them to base camp. Implied tasks include securing assistance from Filipino guerrillas and local civilians on both legs of the journey.

The enemy includes approximately 75 Japanese soldiers posted as guards at the camp, as well as retreating Japanese forces regularly using the highway in front of the camp. The heavy Japanese presence in the towns of Cabu and Cabanatuan City, and the movement of a new Japanese force of approximately division strength heading toward Bongabon from the southwest, represent serious threats. If the Japanese were able to alert the troops in those two towns, they could reach the camp very quickly via the highway, and the enemy's tanks could inflict heavy casualties on the Rangers.

One major problem for the Rangers is that the stretch of land approximately one mile from the target is barren, offering no concealment; any troop movement in this area could be detected by the enemy. The 12-foot-high guard posts inside the camp provide the enemy with wide fields of observation. A second terrain problem arises on the return journey just outside Matoas Na Kahey, where the large, slow-moving column — including weakened POWs — would need to cross the highway and walk approximately one mile along it before the terrain allowed a crossing.

The troops available are among the best for this type of mission, and when combined with the guerrilla fighters, the friendly force presents a formidable presence.

Time is a critical constraint. Reports indicate the Japanese had already relocated some POWs and could move or kill the remainder to prevent their capture. The Rangers therefore have no more than a week to plan and execute the operation. The Rangers must also avoid detection while moving in large numbers, requiring that the bulk of the march — especially inside enemy territory — be conducted at night. The speed of the return column, given the number of POWs and their physical condition, is an additional concern.

Civilian support is one of the most critical factors in the mission. While local support is expected, there is a possibility of a clash between American forces and the Communist Huk guerrillas operating in the area around the base camp, which represents a potential complication.

According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the relevant terms are defined as follows:

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

Liberate: To set free an individual or group of persons from imprisonment or bondage, or to free a region, area, or nation from the control of a foreign power or oppressive government.

Raid: An operation in which armed forces temporarily seize control of an area with the aim of securing information, confusing the adversary, capturing personnel or equipment, or eliminating an enemy capability. A raid begins with a planned incursion and ends with a strategized withdrawal after completion of assigned objectives.

Secure: In the context of an operation, to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, thereby preventing, as far as possible, its destruction or loss to enemy action.

The appropriate term for inclusion as the essential task in the Rangers' mission statement is raid. Although the overall objective is to free the POWs, the mission cannot be completed without an effective raid on the holding compound. While "liberate" could theoretically apply, it is not the most critical term, as liberation might be achieved through other means such as negotiation or prisoner exchange. Given the present operational conditions, however, the only viable method is the use of surprise, which is delivered through an effective raid. The term "secure" need not be included, as securing the camp is implied when the Rangers take control through the raid, and the securing is in any case only temporary — the Rangers will depart as soon as the mission is complete.

The Filipino Guerrillas: Their most important task is providing security cover for the Rangers throughout the entire operation and ensuring that nearby Japanese troops do not reach the camp. Their purpose is to allow the Rangers to exploit the element of surprise and to return safely to friendly territory with the POWs. The guerrillas held the Japanese forces at bay while the enemy continued to attack their positions during the evacuation of the compound, but remained unable to gain ground.

The Alamo Scouts: The Alamo Scouts conducted vital surveillance of the POW camp so that the Rangers could finalize their assault strategy. The scouts corroborated the information provided by the guerrilla captains regarding Japanese troop movements in the area.

The Filipino Civilians: The Filipino civilians supported the Rangers with food and water at multiple points along the route so that the troops remained fit during and after the raid. The civilians also penned their chickens and muzzled their dogs to ensure silence as the Rangers moved through the area.

The Radio Team in Guimba: The radio team received all information from air reconnaissance and transferred it to the Rangers so that they could formulate their strategy with respect to Japanese troop movements and the situation at the POW camp. The radio team also established contact with the 6th U.S. Army base camp and secured trucks and ambulances for the returning column, many members of which would require medical attention.

The 6th U.S. Army: The 6th U.S. Army division established a solid front for the Rangers to operate from and served as the base camp for planning. During the return of the Rangers with the POWs, the 6th U.S. Army arranged trucks and ambulances to transport the POWs and wounded Rangers.

The commander took the decision to assault the camp holding the POWs on 30 January at dusk, rather than the previous evening. Several constraints influenced that decision.