Does Free Will Exist? Six Major Philosophical Views

The concept of free will has been debated by philosophers over centuries — not only regarding its very existence, but also regarding its elements, the extent to which it may or may not exist, and its moral implications. Though an exhaustive review of differing philosophical treatments of free will would require hundreds of pages, this paper briefly examines several major philosophical positions and some of their most notable proponents. In reviewing these sources and their differing approaches, we can see that philosophers define free will differently, examine disparate aspects of it, and arrive at somewhat different implications for morality.

One of the most notable proponents of unrestrained free will was René Descartes. Identifying free will with freedom of choice, Descartes simply defines free will as "the ability to do or not do something" and takes the extreme position that "neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 101). For Descartes, the breadth and depth of the will is breathtaking, for the will "can in a certain sense be called infinite, since we observe without exception that its scope extends to anything that can possibly be an object of any other will — even the immeasurable will of God" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 173).

Possessing essentially boundless free will, humans are readily held morally responsible for their actions: "I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 101). In Descartes' estimation, even in those instances when we may be deceived, our free will enables us to "withhold our assent in doubtful matters and hence avoid error" (Descartes, Cottingham and Stoothoff 171).

One of the most famous proponents of a rationality-based free will is Immanuel Kant, who sets forth his thoughts on free will and morality in several works, including the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. For Kant, free will and morality are ultimately grounded in reason. We know we have free will because we know that we have duties. Rejecting the idea that morality is based on practical facts, feelings, or selfish interests, Kant believed that there are a priori truths — rational laws that apply to all rational beings (Kant 506–7). Those truths create "imperatives" for humans, who are only partially rational.

In Kant's schema, there are two basic types of imperatives: the hypothetical imperative, which states that if you want goal "B," then you ought to do "A"; and the categorical imperative, which simply states that you ought to do "A" (Kant 507–8). Acting on a hypothetical imperative means acting in a "heteronomous" moral way — following someone else's laws. The categorical imperative, by contrast, means acting on principles that one could will to become universal, which is an autonomous form of morality. The supreme moral law in this framework is: "Act only on a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 510).

Kant illustrated this formula with two perfect duties — not committing suicide and not making deceitful promises — and two imperfect duties: to develop one's talents and to help people in need (Kant 511–12). Within Kant's construct, freedom and morality appear to be two sides of the same coin: to follow our rational principles, which is moral behavior, is to be free, and that is a noble end in itself.

A proponent of the "agent causation" concept of free will is Roderick M. Chisholm, who discussed the related concepts in several works, including Human Freedom and the Self. Chisholm supports "agent causation" and personal responsibility, arguing that personal responsibility is not compatible with determinism. Chisholm explained causation through two adapted medieval terms: transeunt causation, in which "one event or state of affairs…causes some other event or state of affairs" (Chisholm 394); and immanent causation, in which an agent "causes an event or state of affairs" (Chisholm 394).

Using Aristotle's example of "a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man" (Chisholm 394), Chisholm illustrates that there is at least one immanent cause — the man moving his hand — which in turn results in a series of transeunt causes. Based on this framework, determinism recognizes only transeunt causes and therefore admits no personal responsibility. In Chisholm's schema, we are "prime movers unmoved": "In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing — or no one — causes us to cause those events to happen" (Chisholm 397). Chisholm therefore argues for a type of indeterminism: when a human freely acts or freely chooses not to act, he or she does something for which there is no sufficient causal condition.

Peter Van Inwagen, a modern and influential philosopher, addresses free will and morality by examining time as "a garden of forking paths" — alternatives that a human being considers when determining possible futures (Van Inwagen 400). For Van Inwagen, true free will and genuine moral choice are possible only when more than one path is truly available, since a single possible path means no real choice exists (Van Inwagen 401). He uses this "forking paths" construct to discuss determinism versus indeterminism. Under determinism, several forks may appear to exist, but in fact only one can be followed; choosing any other would require a miracle. Under indeterminism, some or all apparent forks are genuinely open, creating the real possibility of choosing differently (Van Inwagen 401).

Van Inwagen also confronts the difficulties of incompatibilism — "holding that free will and determinism are incompatible" — and compatibilism — "holding that free will and determinism are compatible" (Van Inwagen 402). Compatibilism has become less common because it requires rejection of the "No Choice Principle" (Van Inwagen 410), which states: "Suppose that P. And that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether P. And suppose also that the following conditional statement is true and that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether it is true: if P, then Q. It follows from these two suppositions that Q. And that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether Q" (Van Inwagen 404).

Van Inwagen ultimately concludes: "There is no position that one can take on the matter of free will that does not confront its adherents with mystery. I myself prefer the following mystery: I believe that the outcome of our deliberations about what to do is undetermined and that we — in some way that I have no shadow of an understanding of — nevertheless have a choice about the outcome of these deliberations. (And I do not believe that the concept of agent-causation is of the least help in explaining how this could be)" (Van Inwagen 410).

Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will draws distinctions between genuine conscious will and the mere illusion of exerting it. Wegner separates human action into four quadrants to illustrate the difference between acting and the sense of acting "willfully." The upper-left quadrant — normal voluntary action accompanied by the feeling of doing — represents the uncontroversial union of action and will that we ordinarily assume as humans. The lower-right quadrant — neither doing nor feeling that we are doing — represents uncontroversial inaction. The two middle quadrants, however, illustrate controversial mismatches. In the upper-right quadrant, labeled "automatisms," human actions such as "alien hand" movements appear voluntary but are not controlled by the will. The lower-left quadrant illustrates cases in which humans believe they are in control while they are not actually acting — for example, the mistaken belief that one influenced the outcome of a sporting event merely by watching it (Wegner 10).