Crime Control Model vs. Due Process Model Explained

Introduction to the Two Models

This paper examines and differentiates between two "ideal type" models of the criminal process: the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. The Crime Control Model underlines an efficient criminal procedure by means of the early determination of guilt by law enforcement representatives (Aviram, 2010). The model requires considerable deference to police officers and prosecutors — the "torchbearers" of the criminal process (Feeley, 2003) — and, as a consequence, tolerates a degree of patience with their mistakes.

In comparison, the Due Process Model's main goal is safeguarding accuracy and avoiding the conviction of the innocent (Packer, 1969). Under a due process model, law enforcement judgment is seen as potentially biased (Packer, 1969) and is consequently carefully constrained by constitutional review and procedural safeguards acting as a "quality control" mechanism (Aviram, 2010).

Packer's models have been widely critiqued over the years (Feeley, 2003). Among the more compelling critiques is the observation that the models lack a shared epistemological basis — the Due Process Model refers primarily to doctrinal and normative justifications, while the Crime Control Model is by design a pragmatic description of the daily organization of law enforcement (Aviram, 2010).

Scholars today widely recognize that post-Warren Court pronouncements reflect a pendulum swing toward crime management. That shift is evident in four major themes.

Post-Warren Court Trends and Crime Control

First, the post-Warren Court emphasized that the ultimate mission of the criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, rather than to establish bright-line rules. The Court placed additional emphasis on the defendant's actual guilt — a practical application of Packer's "assumption of guilt" (Packer, 1969).

Second, the Court moved away from relying on clear standards of conduct and instead permitted an assessment of police behavior through a "totality of the circumstances" test (Feeley, 2003). Third, the post-Warren Court expressed greater deference to police discretion, frequently acknowledging that officers act in good faith under complicated conditions (Feeley, 2003). Fourth, the Court became less interventionist on behalf of defendants on appeal, particularly regarding collateral attacks in state courts (Packer, 1969).

These characteristics of the post-Warren Court are closely connected to a significant feature of the Crime Control Model: an escalating reliance on earlier steps in the criminal process and, especially, broad deference to police discretion. On a daily basis, officers exercise considerable discretion and make on-the-spot decisions about exercising their authority (Aviram, 2010) or refraining from doing so. Courts are well aware of this reality but defer to indistinct standards when evaluating police judgment. Courts do not view police discretion as a "necessary evil" but as a beneficial feature of professionalism (Packer, 1969).

Conclusion

The Crime Control Model places heavy confidence in the capabilities of investigative and prosecutorial representatives, operating in an informal setting in which their characteristic skills are given full latitude to reconstruct an adequately accurate account of what took place in a supposed criminal incident. The Due Process Model rejects this premise and substitutes for it a vision of formal, adjudicative fact-finding that takes seriously the possibility of error.