This paper examines three interrelated questions about China's currency policy and its effects on the U.S. economy. First, it argues that a significant yuan revaluation would ultimately benefit American consumers by reducing dependence on consumer credit and restoring balance to global trade. Second, it contends that China is not solely to blame for the U.S. current account deficit, since American consumer demand and retailer behavior drive the search for low-cost imports regardless of the supplying country. Third, it advocates for an aggressive legislative posture — including tariffs, sanctions, and anti-dumping measures — as the most effective means of pressuring China to alter its currency policy, while noting that such measures are only meaningful if backed by genuine political will.
If the Chinese government revalues the yuan by 20% or more, this would in the long run be a desirable outcome for American consumers. The present situation is not as sustainable for Americans as it is for the Chinese. The Chinese have established their exchange rate as a source of long-term competitive advantage, but this artificial construct distorts the market. With a seemingly boundless source of cheap labor and land, China can maintain the artificial rate for a long time. However, the cost of this is being borne by the American consumer.
The current account deficit with China is fueled largely by the explosion in consumer debt in the United States. This high level of consumer debt has stretched U.S. consumers to their limits, such that any shock can have a devastating impact on the economy, as the subprime crisis demonstrated. Ultimately, the U.S. consumer needs to begin scaling back their dependence on credit for the overall health of both the U.S. and world economies. Domestic policy considerations aside, higher prices on Chinese imports can help drive this change by forcing reduced U.S. consumption.
China's resulting loss in competitiveness from a yuan revaluation would benefit other emerging economies. This, along with a reduction in the U.S. current account deficit with China, would provide greater balance to the world's economic order — a desirable outcome in its own right. In the long run, it would likely produce a positive outcome for China as well, since the country would be forced to compete less on price and more on quality.
As seen with Japan and South Korea, transitioning from price-based to quality-based competition is the final stage in moving an economy from the emerging stage to the developed stage. China has already begun entering this stage, with some factories becoming highly automated (Bradsher, 2005).
China should not be blamed entirely for the U.S. current account deficit, the flood of imports, or downward wage pressures. There are a hundred other developing countries that would gladly take China's place as the provider of choice for low-cost consumer goods (Kirchhoff, 2005). U.S. consumers and retailers are constantly seeking lower costs and higher margins, respectively, and this demand has created the conditions for such trade. Before China, it was Korea, Taiwan, and Japan that filled this role — and indeed, the same arguments were made in the 1970s with respect to Japan (McKinnon, 2001).
The problem is that U.S. consumers and retailers — beholden to shareholders and the pressure to satisfy markets every quarter — are easily dazzled by the estimated $600 billion in savings and fail to consider the long-term costs associated with those savings. China's currency policy may make that country the primary source of the U.S. current account deficit, but absent China, the U.S. would face the same structural problems with another country standing in as the target of protectionist arguments.
"Tariffs and sanctions are the most effective policy tools"
"WTO rulings unlikely to change Chinese behavior alone"
An aggressive legislative posture is only meaningful if paired with genuine political will to follow through on threatened sanctions and quotas. Without that commitment, trade rhetoric becomes empty — and China, as a rational economic actor, will have little reason to alter a currency policy that continues to serve its national interests.
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