Professor's Theory on Why the Allies Won World War II

Introduction and Thesis Overview

This paper summarizes a professor's thesis on the causes of Allied victory in World War II. The argument centers on three overriding factors: the ability of the Red Army to re-mobilize, the ability of the American economy to shift into wartime production, and the success of the Allied air forces over Fortress Europe. While the thesis focuses narrowly on the German enemy, it is the professor's contention that victory over Germany was the key to the war, as "Italy and Japan never posed the same kind of threat as the European superpower they fought alongside."

The Soviet Red Army's Adaptive Capacity

The Germans believed that the Red Army was a "primitive force," and yet, through the course of the war, the Soviets demonstrated an unexpected adaptive ability. They learned from their own mistakes and from the successes of their enemies, reinventing themselves into an effective fighting force. Late in the war, for example, they reorganized their own air and armored cavalry divisions around the more effective German model. The Soviet military command was also restructured to reflect the lessons learned from excessive political interference in military affairs. "Given the freedom to work out their own salvation, the Soviet General Staff demonstrated that they could match the Germans on the battlefield."

The third factor crucial to the Red Army's turnaround was the ability of the Soviet economy to quickly retool and modernize. Hitler himself made this transformation possible with his invasion of the western USSR. Sixteen million workers and some 2,500 major production enterprises were displaced by the German advance, and this upheaval proved instrumental in building a more modern, more war-ready economy behind Soviet lines. In short, while the German economy and army remained stagnant beneath their early victories, defeat compelled the Soviet economy and the Red Army toward the dynamic change that was ultimately necessary for survival.

American Industrial Mobilization and Economic Power

The professor believes that the primary American contribution to the war effort was not troops but materials. As the world's largest industrial economy at the time, and a leader in logistical support, America was able to field its own well-equipped armies while also keeping Soviet and British forces in the fight. Hitler believed that the American economy, though formidable, would not pose an immediate obstacle, since it was in a peacetime state; he assumed it would take years before the Americans could retool and field an effective force. This assumption proved fatally wrong.

The professor argues that the socio-economic planning experience gained by the U.S. government during Roosevelt's New Deal was important to that rapid retooling. He also cites an American "can-do ethos" as a spiritual driving force behind the effort. Finally, the Great Depression had left the American economy with significant room to grow — a structural advantage Germany did not share. The German economy, by contrast, was already operating at full employment levels by the time the war began, leaving little capacity for further expansion.

Conclusion: Germany's Fatal Misjudgments

The professor admits that "there are many other factors that explain victory and defeat" in WWII, but makes a strong case that the adaptive ability of the Red Army and the American economy, coupled with Allied air power, were the overriding causes. In the professor's own words:

"There were weaknesses and strengths in Hitler's strategy, but no misjudgments were more costly in the end than the German belief that the Red Army was a primitive force, incapable of prolonged resistance, or Hitler's insistence that the U.S.A. would take years to rearm and could never field an effective army, or the failure to recognize that bombing was a threat worth taking seriously before it was too late."