This paper responds to a series of questions on Plato's Meno and Laches, tracing Socrates' methodological insistence that virtue must be defined before it can be taught. The paper examines why Meno's first definition is too scattered and his second too general, then explores why Plato believed inquiry into virtue must begin with a universal definition. It also considers how moral traditionalists might object to this approach, arguing that they prioritize observable deeds over abstract definitions, while Socrates' deductive method ultimately reaches an impasse because no single definition proves fully all-encompassing.
When Meno opens by asking whether virtue is taught, Socrates declines to answer directly. His reason is that he cannot address the question because he does not know what virtue actually is — a condition he claims is equally true of everyone in Athens. Without a definition of virtue, any attempt to teach it would be groundless.
The first definition Meno offers is too scattered. He defines virtue as a variety of qualities that differ according to a person's role in society: for men, it is managing the city; for women, managing the home; and for children, it is obedience. Socrates objects that because all human beings are fundamentally human beings, there should be a single, unified definition of virtue applicable to all of them, not a collection of role-specific descriptions.
Meno's second attempt suffers from the opposite problem: it is too general. He proposes that virtue is "to rule," but Socrates finds this unacceptable because it cannot apply universally. It would not constitute virtue for a child or for a slave. Indeed, if a slave were "virtuous" under this definition — that is, if a slave ruled — he would by definition no longer be a slave. The definition therefore fails on its own terms.
According to Socrates, virtue cannot be taught until we know what it is. This same concern runs through the Laches, where there is considerable debate about how to educate youth in what constitutes military valor. Definitions of courage drawn from commonly accepted wisdom tend to be too narrow and serve primarily the interests of the state — for example, the idea that standing one's ground in battle and showing valor in combat are the ultimate virtues.
In the Meno, Socrates similarly observes that different classes of society are assigned different tasks at which they are expected to excel, yet he does not believe these tasks constitute virtue in any meaningful universal sense. A general definition of virtue must be arrived at that holds for all people. In the same way, a general definition of valor must be found — one that is not valid only for soldiers.
"Traditionalists judge virtue by deeds not definitions"
"Deductive approach ends in philosophical impasse"
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.