This paper examines the phenomenon of perjury in law enforcement, tracing how the U.S. Supreme Court's development of the exclusionary rule — particularly through Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and subsequent decisions — inadvertently incentivized false police testimony. Beginning with an overview of deception in policing, the paper analyzes how procedural safeguards designed to protect Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights led some officers to falsify reports and court testimony, especially in drug-related cases. It also discusses landmark exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the Inevitable Discovery doctrine established in Nix v. Williams and the good-faith exception recognized in Hudson v. Michigan, arguing that these limitations ultimately reduced officers' perceived need to commit perjury.
Dishonesty has always been part of human behavior, and it occurs at some point in virtually every conceivable type of relationship. Parents sometimes lie to children and vice versa, students sometimes lie to teachers, friends sometimes lie to friends, and spouses sometimes lie to each other. Certain lies are intended to mislead for the purpose of benefiting the liar at the expense of someone else; other lies are motivated by the desire to accomplish something positive, such as shielding someone from painful truths or embarrassment.
In law enforcement, deception often plays a role in investigating crimes, questioning persons of interest, interrogating suspects, concealing facts from public disclosure to preserve the integrity of ongoing investigations, and maintaining tactical advantage in covert operations and surrender negotiations. Not uncommonly, police officers are encouraged to misrepresent the truth in the performance of their duties — such as extending a "professional courtesy" to other law enforcement officers during routine traffic stops, or exercising "discretion" in ways that are technically prohibited. One of the most common examples occurs when a highway patrol officer decides to give a cooperative citizen a "break" by writing a summons for a speed less than the actual speed of the violation (Raymond, 1998).
In policing, the line between routine lies that are tacitly accepted and encouraged and lies that threaten constitutional rights can become blurry, especially when officers are genuinely motivated by the desire to protect society from those who are obviously guilty of heinous crimes. The motive is understandable — especially from the point of view of someone dedicated to fighting crime — when adhering strictly to the letter of the law would undermine the prosecution and punishment of known dangerous criminals. Likewise, when certain types of dishonesty are tolerated, the tendency to rationalize or justify other types of dishonesty naturally increases.
The United States Constitution, subject to interpretation by the Supreme Court, defines the rights of the individual and limits the authority of government agents to conduct criminal investigations without crossing procedural boundaries designed to protect recognized constitutional rights. In general, the Framers of the Constitution emphasized concepts such as a presumption of innocence, erring on the side of individual freedoms even at the inevitable expense of making some prosecutions more difficult.
Ensuring the success of criminal prosecutions would have required erring on the side of presuming guilt over innocence, which would have resulted, equally inevitably, in convicting a certain proportion of innocent defendants.
The laws of criminal procedure that have evolved since the adoption of the Constitution continue to reflect the competing goals of prosecuting the guilty while simultaneously respecting the constitutional rights of criminal suspects. Sometimes, changes in criminal procedure designed to protect one element of civil rights generate unintended consequences that threaten others. In many respects, this is exactly what happened after a series of Supreme Court decisions — intended to deter constitutionally improper investigations and evidence-collection techniques — inspired a surge of outright perjury among police officers (Cloud, 1994).
"Mapp v. Ohio and increased false police testimony"
"Inevitable Discovery doctrine and Nix v. Williams ruling"
Hendrie, E. (1997). The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from
Raymond, M. (1998). Police policing police: Some doubts. St. John's Law Review. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3735/is_199807/ai_n8806451/pg_1
Schott, R. (2006). Knock and announce violations: No "cause" to suppress. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from
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