Cold War on the Periphery: U.S. Policy in South Asia

Introduction: The Cold War Beyond the Superpowers

When hearing the words "Cold War," what normally comes to mind are the events between the U.S.S.R. and the United States following World War II, including the arms race. Competition for the Third World was also part of this period, but it receives little attention by comparison. In his book Cold War on the Periphery, Robert McMahon explores in detail how the United States' alliance with Pakistan increased tensions between India and Pakistan and encouraged the Soviet Union to establish closer ties with India.

In the 1940s, almost all of the Central Intelligence Agency's strategic studies concluded that the Indian subcontinent — including Pakistan — was of considerable importance to the United States. It comprised one-fifth of the world's population, had a land mass as large as Europe, and occupied a strategically significant geographical position. The CIA also noted the region's abundant resources: "It ranks first or second in world production of such critical materials of war as cotton, mica, manganese, monazite (a source of thorium), and beryl, and is a major source of raw materials, investment income, and carrying charges for the UK, thus strengthening the UK's and Western Europe's efforts toward the economic recovery essential to U.S. security" (13).

Truman Era: India, Pakistan, and Initial U.S. Calculations

In 1947, when India and Pakistan were formed from former British colonies in South Asia, Pakistan took the majority-Muslim portion of British territory and India the predominantly Hindu portion. Jammu-Kashmir, with a majority Muslim population but a Hindu ruler, chose to join India. Many Muslims, as well as Pakistan, considered this decision illegal. Almost immediately, a war broke out between the two new nations. In 1949, the countries signed the Karachi Agreement, establishing a ceasefire line supervised by U.N. observers, though many questions remained unresolved.

Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India and an advocate of the Socialistic Pattern of Society, visited the United States in 1949. President Truman and his administration had considered both India and Pakistan as possible partners. Not surprisingly, they concluded that India offered far more strategic clout than Pakistan. Special Adviser Philip C. Jessup judged India "the most solid associate in the Asian area" and called Nehru "outstandingly the most vital and influential person for the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Asia" (35).

However, India made this potential partnership difficult. Nehru made clear that India needed help but not at a political cost. In 1948, he had bluntly conveyed his disdain for Pakistani claims when he told Secretary of State George C. Marshall that India's position on Kashmir was morally, legally, and practically correct. He denounced the so-called "gangsters from Pakistan" who had aided the tribal invasion of Kashmir and contrasted "the backward and theocratic nature of Pakistan" with the secular, democratic orientation of India. "India wished to develop a country wherein all elements of the population could share," he said, "whereas in Pakistan the underlying idea was the advancement of the most bigoted group of Moslems" (29).

Meanwhile, in other parts of the world, events heightened American anxieties about communist expansion. The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test, and the Communist Party seized control of the Chinese government.

Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sought to counter Nehru's Washington visit by accepting an invitation from Josef Stalin to visit the Soviet Union. U.S. Assistant Secretary McGhee, deeply concerned about a potential Pakistan-USSR alignment, suggested that Pakistan be invited to visit the United States instead. Unlike India, Pakistan was openly appreciative of American plans for South Asia. Given India's refusal to align with the West and Pakistan's advantageous geographical position, America began to seriously consider Pakistan as a second-best partner — though it was reluctant to sever ties with India or supply arms to Pakistan.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 significantly shifted American thinking about Asia, as it represented yet another instance of Soviet-backed aggression. The United States quickly deployed troops and dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. The fighting on the Korean peninsula further strained Indo-American relations. India declined to actively support South Korea and explored ways to reduce tensions in the East, including the recognition of and negotiations with China. When the U.S. sent grain to India, Nehru again refused to accept political conditions. India then boycotted the Japanese peace treaty convocation at San Francisco. Yet America remained contradictory in its approach to both India and Pakistan.

The Korean War and the Shift Toward Pakistan

Pakistan, by contrast, had demonstrated consistent support. It backed the initial Security Council resolutions condemning the North Korean invasion and accepted the Council's decision to aid South Korea "knowing full well what its implications are," Prime Minister Liaquat remarked. He predicted that Pakistan and the United States "will come even closer together in the troublous days ahead" (124). Pakistan was not, however, willing to send troops unless the United States backed its position on Kashmir.

Instability in the Middle East and Soviet movements there added yet another layer of concern beyond Korea. In 1951, Admiral Robert C. Carney, commander of U.S. forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, recommended that defense officials assess Pakistan's military potential for supporting Middle Eastern security. The U.S. moved to reconsider the Kashmir issue once more, but change came too slowly. Liaquat was losing political authority at home as opponents criticized the unfulfilled promises of Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy, and the ever-present threat of another war with India weighed heavily. Liaquat was ultimately assassinated.

When Truman left office, the question of India and Pakistan remained unresolved. President Eisenhower also viewed the Soviet Union as a fundamental danger. India was wary of the new administration, which might prove less flexible than its predecessor. Nehru and incoming Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a troubled prior history, and the administration's early behavior toward South Asia signaled a much stronger affinity for Pakistan than for India.

Pakistani Ambassador Mohammed Ali Bogra soon requested that the United States supply one to one-and-a-half million tons of grain on an emergency basis. The State Department quickly recognized both the opportunities and risks involved. "The political importance of assisting Pakistan in this matter is of a very high order," Assistant Secretary of State Byroade wrote to Dulles (158).

Conclusion: Lessons from U.S. Cold War Missteps in South Asia

Despite how frustrating it is to read about America's serious blundering, McMahon's book documents this period with detail and genuine interest. History once again demonstrates that policy fails when decisions are driven by emotion and by what leaders believe to be true rather than what is real. Driven by irrational fear, America pushed itself on Third World nations — pulling them back and forth as U.S. leaders continually changed course or could not make up their minds. America was fortunate that neither India nor Pakistan possessed the resources or strength to definitively reject the United States and align fully with the U.S.S.R. or China.

A contemporary perspective reinforces this historical lesson. Writing about U.S., India, and Pakistan relations throughout the Cold War in an article titled "A Story of Leaders, Partners and Followers," Zia Mian, a Pakistani physicist at Princeton University, analyzed the joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of July 18, 2005. That statement declared the leaders' "resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership" intended to "promote stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace throughout the world" and to "enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership."

Mian argues that such statements must be understood in the light of the fifty-year history described above. His conclusion is pointed: "It is clear who will lead and who will follow."