War and Prussia Probably One

¶ … War and Prussia

Probably one of the most notable battles of the Franco-Prussian War was the Battle of Mars-La-Tour, fought on 16 August 1870 in Mars-La-Tour, France. The French Army had been in retreat when the Prussians found them and soundly defeated them, despite being outnumbered about four to one. These two Prussian corps of about 30,000 literally held the entire French Army of about 130,000 for an entire day before the French gave up. The most decisive aspect of the battle was the cavalry charge called Von Bredow's "Death Ride," which was one of the last successful cavalry charges of modern warfare.

Many of the nine principles of war apply to Prussia's victory, and some clearly do not. Even though they were outnumbered, Prussia's mass and objective were all clearly focused on the French Army. They took the offensive, even when they were outnumbered, and even acted suicidal in the charge of the cavalry. They lost have the men in the cavalry, but they won the battle. They took the enemy by surprise when they attacked the advanced guard of the group, when they actually thought they were attacking the rear. They also maneuvered to place the enemy in a position of weakness, which added to their victory. Finally, they never allowed the enemy, even though they were much larger, to gain an advantage. They were tenacious, they did not think they could lose, and they used as many principles of war as applied to gain the advantage and hold their ground. If they had gone by the "book," they would not have attacked the French, but because they followed many of the principles of war through sheer luck and skill, they won the battle.

The French also forgot some of the principles of war in their defeat, which helped Prussia win the war. They allowed the Prussians to surround them and block their escape, and when the Prussians attacked the forward guard mistakenly, they missed the advantage of destroying them before they could defeat the French. The Prussian victory was also due in part to mistakes the French made in ignoring some of the basic principles of war.