Case of Richards vs. Wisconsin: Knock-And-Announce Rule

Steiney Richards, Petitioner v. Wisconsin

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits police officers from conducting seizures and searches on a suspect's person or property, unless under the authorization of a judge. The case of Richards vs. Wisconsin brings into perspective the knock-and-announce rule of the Fourth Amendment.

Statement of the Case (adopted from LII, 2014; ACLU, 1997; Hall, 2014)

Police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug dealing and requested authorization to search his motel room under a no-knock warrant. The judge, however, found the facts insufficient to justify a no-knock entry, and instead granted a conventional warrant requiring police to knock on Richard's door and announce their presence prior to resorting to forcible access. On arrival at Richard's motel room, one of the officers knocked and announced that he was an employee of the hotel. Richards opened the door, and on seeing a uniformed officer, slammed it shut. Almost instinctively, the officers rammed the door and found the suspect trying to make a break for it. They also found cocaine and drugs hidden in his bathroom. At trial, the suspect sought to subdue the presented evidence, as obtained from his motel room on grounds that it had been obtained through forcible entry. The trial court denied Richard's motion, holding that law enforcement officers are not necessarily obligated to knock and identify themselves during the execution of a search warrant in drug related cases, largely because reasonable cause for exigent circumstances necessarily exists. Richards sought review on certiorari, which the court granted

The Issue: is it mandatory for law enforcement officers to 'knock and announce their presence' in the course of search warrants execution in drug felony cases; or rather, does a blanket exception for the said criminal behavior category exist?

Holding: under the circumstances of the case, the resolve of the policemen not to knock on the door and identify themselves was reasonable; however, the 'blanket exception' with regard to the knocking stipulation or prerequisite for drug felony cases was unconstitutional.

Analysis

There are two underlying questions in this case; i) are exigent circumstances calling for, or giving grounds for a no-knock entry by police officers present at all times in cases involving drug felonies?; and ii) does the nature of felony drug investigations justify a blanket exception rather than an assessment (on a case by case basis) of the search warrant execution procedure?

Are 'exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry' by police officers in place at all times in cases involving drug felonies?

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits police officers from conducting unlawful seizures and searches on a suspect's person or property. In the case of Wilson vs. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Supreme Court held that in line with the amendment, "police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry" (LII, 2014, n.pag). However, as ACLU notes in its 1997 brief, there are exceptions to this requirement. These exceptions exist due to exigent circumstances that concern either public safety or destruction of evidence (ACLU, 1997). Felony drug investigations in most instances entail the above circumstances.

To justify their operation under the provision of these exceptions, however, police officers must be reasonably convinced that the proclamation of their presence could in one way or the other "inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence" (LII, 2014, .pag). One can rightly assume that felony drug investigations will always pose a high safety risk to the police, and that knock-and-announce modalities would often present opportunities for suspects to, prior to the entry of officers, dispose off drugs. In Richard's case, the slamming of the door implied that he either intended to cause violence and escape, or dispose of the drugs before the officers could gain access (ACLU, 1997). Either action would have inhibited the effective process of the investigation; and the officers' decision to resort to forcible entry was, in essence, reasonable.

The Wisconsin Court concluded that such exigent circumstances would always exist in felony drug investigations because the drug culture necessitates the same (LII, 2014). Furthermore, the privacy violation that comes about when policemen operating under a search warrant enter a dwelling forcibly and without prior identification is minimal because after all, the occupants would still have no authority to refuse police entry. It is undisputable that a dangerous convergence of weapon and evidence-destruction would surround police notice, posing a threat of physical violence in felony drug cases (LII, 2014). All the same, does this fact justify a blanket exception for this general category of criminal behavior?

Does this nature of felony drug investigations justify a blanket exception?

The answer is an assertive no. According to the LII (2014), "the 'culture' surrounding a general category of criminal behavior" cannot be used as a basis for creating exceptions to the notice rule for two major reasons (n.pag). First, the reasons could be easily, yet wrongly applied to other categories of criminal behavior. Take the example of armed bank robbers; they present a threat of physical violence, and cash (the evidence in this case) can easily be destroyed. To this end, this category of crime too qualifies to be exempted from the knock-and-announce rule (LII, 2014). Eventually, the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment would lose meaning.