Shutting the Gates of Mercy the American Origins of Total War 1860-1880

Shutting the Gates of Mercy:

The American Origins of Total War

In his thesis, Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880, Lance Janda asserts that the tactics used in the Civil War are the origins of the concept of total war for America. The definition of total war he chooses for his thesis lends itself especially well to his argument. Since the terminology was not used during the time of the Civil War, Janda may interpret its meaning with 20/20 hindsight and this may be his most glaring bias.

He supports his claim with numerous examples taken from the memoirs and letters of the Union Leaders he feels most responsible for the shift from Napoleonic and American tactics to those used in later wars. He even calls them a "trinity of generals" (Janda p. 9).

Had Janda quoted from Military Law or theory of the time he would not have had the same support for his argument. He reveals this in his citation notes from the U.S. War Department, citation 10 when he writes, "the order reflects official Army thought, and probably the consensus of most Union Commanders" (as cited Janda pg. 10). The order he refers to the "distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself" (Janda p. 9). Janda's bases his theory upon the actions of a specific few actions, which he generalizes to a broad change in tactics.

If one approached the actions of Sherman, Sheridan, and possibly McClellan from a different point-of-view, one might make the case that desperation drove their actions in the later years of the war. One might also observe that the "trinity" abhorred the actions they were forced to take. Grant's views on the battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 seem like an apology and an excuse for the destruction that he brought upon the South. "It was a policy born of the necessity to completely subjugate an entire people" (Janda p. 13), assuming that submission by the South was the only course of action that would end the conflict.

Many of the source materials were primary. They came directly from the memoirs of those generals whose actions support Janda's view, and contained their reasoning for their actions. However, a seemingly equal number of Janda's source materials were from authors writing about one battle - Sherman's March to the Sea. Granted, this was one of the more decisive battles of the war, but not the only one. Janda states, "Sherman was eager to teach the people of the South a lesson in the horrors of war" (Janda p. 16). "Vengeance against the South" (Janda p. 18) was as much a factor in the tactics used as was any theory devised by Grant, or Sherman. As the war dragged on, those whose desperation became tactics still held esteem for most noncombatants. It appears that they questioned their righteousness to the end and let the people live. Who better to argue that the devil is righteous than the devil himself?