Preparedness for a Major Incident

¶ … capabilities discussed on page 16 of the Government Accountability Office report from this unit's readings. In your view, why hasn't the federal government been able to fulfill those capabilities after the September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina incidents?

Effective emergency preparedness and response requires coordination across many levels of governmental and nongovernmental institutions. Successful responses to such major disasters, whether the result of natural forces or terrorist acts, necessitate large-scale planning, management and collaboration among well-trained first responder organizations in a wide range of disciplines, including public safety, fire, public health, and social service personnel. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the federal government has endeavored to enhance our ability to handle cataclysmic events by investing at least $11 billion in financial support to state and local authorities for the purpose of improving their emergency preparedness and response systems. In spite of this increased financial investment, the Government Accountability Office has reported that many weakness and areas of improvement remain in the federal government's development and implementation of effective emergency preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.

The GAO report of February 23, 2006 outlined six capabilities that need to be employed for successful emergency management plans, which, to date, have not been fulfilled:

Develop a strategic plan with clear goals, objectives, and milestones;

Develop performance goals that can be used to set desired performance baselines;

Collect and analyze relevant and reliable data;

Assess the results of analyzing those data against performance goals to guide priority setting;

Take action based on those results; and Monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated performance goals.

Several problems have inhibited the attainment of these capabilities.

First, there may be deficiencies in the government's philosophical approach. There seems to be an over-emphasis on setting standards, assessments, and strategies for preparation and response to terrorist attacks, and an under-emphasis on such efforts with respect to natural disasters or accidents. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornados, fires, floods, and hurricanes have statistically occurred far more frequently and caused significantly more damage than terrorism throughout the past decade. However, when Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 required DHS to establish goals that measure readiness by appropriately balancing these natural and man-made potential threats, DHS implemented the directive by using "15 emergency scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, in order to form the basis of identifying capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergency events."

Second, interoperable communications systems have not been established due to lack of effective intergovernmental planning. In a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina, having incompatible means of communication equipment and dysfunctional communication technologies among various first responder organizations was utterly disastrous. Accordingly, the GAO report recommended creating a database of all interoperable communications frequencies for compatible communication, which, to date, has not been attained.

Third, assessments of realistic rehearsals or exercises performed to test response systems revealed that many governmental agencies and personnel were uncertain as to their proper duties in responding to an emergency. For example, an assessment of the response training exercise, Hurricane PAM of 2004, noted that there was confusion regarding the distinct roles and responsibilities of the Principal Federal Officer (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). In addition, the response exercise showed a lack of guidance on training and certification standards for PFO support personnel.