Political inquiry and contemporary analytical approaches

Political Inquiry

Utility of Political Inquiry Models: Scientific vs. Interpretive

Scientific methods of inquiry, also called empirical, positivist, or rational approaches, are used by the vast majority of researchers in the social sciences (deLeon, 1998). The scientific approach has largely relied on a behaviorist approach, which defines human behavior as following the laws of nature and therefore inherently predicable. The logical conclusion from this is that the goal of political research is being able to predict the behavior of humans as they engage in politics. As Douglas Torgerson stated in 1986, "… knowledge would replace politics" (as cited by deLeon, 1998, p. 148).

In contrast, the interpretive school of political inquiry advocates for a more nuanced approach, one that recognizes that human behavior, whether by individuals or groups, is far too complex to render it reducible to quantitative measures (deLeon, 1998). Rather than having a goal of being able to predict human behavior, interpretive inquiry seeks to gain beneficial insights into the political process. These scholars would even go so far as to claim that a scientific approach which excludes the influence of human traits, such as patriotism or free will, does more damage than good.

One example of a political issue that received a lot of attention in the recent past is the welfare and welfare-to-work programs (WWP) that swept the country in the mid-1990s. Writing in the New York Times, Steven Manos (1994) argued that WWP merely shifts welfare recipients to jobs by displacing others who would have otherwise taken those jobs. From his perspective, WWP does not result in a net savings by reducing the number of welfare recipients or increasing the amount of income taxes paid, because WWP does not actually create jobs. In other words, WWP does nothing more than churn the welfare rolls. This cost-benefit analysis would represent a scientific approach to this policy issue; however, Manos' argument makes clear that shifting welfare recipients to jobs alone is not a valid measure of welfare reform success.

Using an interpretive approach, Coffield (2002) examined the experiences of a mother as she navigated a WWP implemented in Indiana. President Clinton touted the Indiana program as the most successful WWP in the country based on the magnitude of welfare roll reductions. What Coffield and Indiana welfare recipients discovered was that the "work first" program in Indiana emphasized gainful employment to such an extent that efforts to overcome persistent poverty were formally marginalized. Of the policies that contributed to this trend was a prohibition on state support for training programs lasting longer than a month and the pursuit of college degrees taking longer than a year to complete. The outcome of these policies was a drop in the number of welfare recipients enrolled in training and college programs from 68% to 28%.

The case study presented by Coffield (2002) is about an African-American mother (Bridgett) with five children in her late 20s. With a history of being on and off welfare and working low-wage jobs, the WWP case workers had declared Bridgett hostile because she refused to reveal intimate details about her personal life or engage in activities needed to meet the program's requirements. Bridgett had also 'voluntarily' refused benefits so that she could continue attending college classes towards a nursing degree. Apparently the "work first" program in Indiana placed so much emphasis on getting any job that Bridgett would have been required to attend classes in life skills and job search strategies, instead of attending her nursing classes. The effective goal of these WWP classes was getting Bridgett off welfare by finding her another low-wage job. As Bridgett declared with conviction: "I can't work some stupid minimum wage job and end up screwing up my chances with my schooling & #8230;, and I'm not sticking my kids in some fifth-rate child care center to do it!" (Coffield, 2002, p. 268).

The WWP reforms that swept the nation in the mid-1990s were a response to the belief by conservatives that many welfare recipients represented a demographic addicted to public assistance (Coffield, 2002). The solution, they argued, was employment at almost any cost. The social benefits proclaimed to be possible were a reduced public tax burden and the moral rehabilitation of welfare recipients. From the liberal perspective, vocational training or a college degree was the surest route to ending reliance on public assistance and the rehabilitative benefit would be an end to the cycle of poverty. The concept of welfare reform therefore meant different things to different people.

If political scientists were to try and measure the effectiveness of welfare reform they would first be stymied by how to define the criteria with which success could be measured. A scientific approach assumes that success can be predicted when the most important variables that contribute to success can be identified. However, with respect to welfare reform the variables selected will depend on whether you are talking to a conservative or liberal. A conservative would define success as employment of any kind and a reduction in welfare rolls, while a liberal would define success as overcoming poverty. Any measure of welfare reform success is therefore contestable and cannot be operationalized. This also supports Connelly's (1993) contention that an analytic/synthetic dichotomy does not exist in the field of political inquiry, since an analytic statement about welfare reform success cannot be made that is not contestable.

After Coffield (2002) described Bridgett's experiences, she used several pages to try and define how welfare success might and might not be measured. The complexity of this issue is not lost on her or many of the other researchers she cites. Welfare reform therefore represents a prototypical 'concept cluster'.

Coffield (2002) then begins to evaluate the implications of Indiana's "work first" program and others like it around the nation from a moral perspective. For example, WWP advocates cited reduced welfare rolls and higher employment rates as evidence of success, but Coffield points out that this was accomplished by shifting welfare recipients into low-wage jobs with high insecurity. The median wage earned by women who participated in Indiana's WWP was $6.00 and close to 50% had left the job after six months. Of those who left their job, only 17% reported that it was to find a better position.