Political Economy of Africa

Famines and famine situations have been and presently are cruel realities in Africa. People like Alex de Waal or Dennis C. Galvan have attempted to (1) find the causes of famines and poor economic developments in Africa and (2) suggest intermediate ways of action, both in terms of prevention and acting against famines. On the way, tough realities have appeared, many with political consequences, including the fact that many NGOs, claiming to help people in Africa in times of need, are actually directing money and dedication elsewhere.

In his book, "Famine Crimes Politics & The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa," Alex de Waal points out towards the amplification of African problems because of the international humanitarian help the regions is often receiving. Of course, this is not necessarily a general evaluation. Waal himself never denies the help some of the NGOs are providing, but a misunderstanding of African realities often provides the premises for wrong actions, actions that amplify issues.

On the other hand, as Waal emphasizes, famine has a strong political component and is often closely correlated to the political regime existing in a country at a certain time. The famine in Ethiopia, for example, or Somalia are not isolated cases, but a reflection of the political regime the respective country had implemented.

Waal relates famine to the political regime by innovating the "political contract" or an "anti-famine contract" that may be concluded between the people and the rulers. He problem with such a contract is that it is much more likely to be concluded in democratic regimes rather than authoritarian ones (de Waal, 2000). The reason is more than simple: authoritarian regimes act and react based on their unlimited power. Hence, they have no obligation (other than the moral one) to conclude or to respect contracts with the people.

On the other hand, in a democracy, first of all, the rulers' powers are limited by a Constitution, by the legislative and judicial systems etc. This means that democratic rulers are subject to change and this change can be produced by the population. Hence, an "anti-famine" contract that is not respected is equivalent to a "political scandal" and "famine is deterred" (de Waal 1997:5).

In this sense, referring to the state and the authorities, as well as to international agencies, the most apt and available persons to produce the change on the economic level are the African citizens themselves. The African citizens would be able, according to de Waal to (1) produce the necessary political changes that would trigger the right economic changes and (2) implement at a local level the economic development movements necessary to reduce famine risks.

As a completion to what de Waal has mentioned, we should also relate to the fact that, in general, authoritarian political regimes sparkle corruption problems as well and the reasons for this are also closely linked to the limitless power they dispose of, a power that is unquestioned by the true beneficiaries of the respective regime.

Dennis C. Galvan's book, "The State Must Be Our Master of Fire" better describes the manifestations of economic development plans at a village and local levels, including a comparison between local governance and state rulers, both Senegalese and French.

The Serer of the Sin region in Senegal had developed over centuries a distinctive pattern of cleavage and land colonization, which included a very well-developed system relying on private property as the fundamental form of individual property. The people in this region also used land pawning as a form of cash loan in exchange for land collateral. In time, during the centuries that have passed since the appearance of the model, the system gradually progressed and could certainly be assimilated to any modern economic system, with a functional set of economic rules. The main issue we need to emphasize here is the fact that the system worked and had worked all throughout the history, providing excellent economic results, in the sense of a reasonable economic development at local level, which avoided any food shortages.

The Western style of economy, brought about by the French had several important problems to face. First of all, it was not a sustainable model, because the economic relations and conditions that existed in Senegal by the time had arrived were not fit to respond to a French economic model. The issue at hand here is not necessarily the fact that the French model was not functional, but the fact that the French model was not functional implemented on a different economic system such as the Senegalese one. Exemplified here, we need to point out that this was also the case for other colonial powers, like the British Empire in Sudan or the Portuguese in Mozambique, that implemented economic systems where these would not function.

As in many cases, we may conclude that the Occidental powers have brought on their so-called benefices in way that significantly damaged existing economic relations in the colonies and created issues that have remained unresolved over the next hundred of years. It should not be an exaggerated comparison to relate former colonial powers with present time NGOs, as de Waal would be keen to point out.