Plato, the Soul Is a Grounded Aspect

¶ … Plato, the soul is a grounded aspect of human nature; it is innate, and based upon an adequate understanding of human actions. Plato, from observing human tendencies, arrives at the conclusion that there must be three separate portions of the soul. This notion is based upon the fact that people are often drawn towards certain actions while they are simultaneously pulled away from them; an alcoholic may desire a drink, but at the same time may want to resist such behavior. This sort of conflict, residing in a single individual, could be interpreted or explained in a number of ways; Plato, however, rests his explanation upon a principle that he believes to be the truth: "It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we'll know that we aren't dealing with one thing but many." (Plato, BIV, 463d). In other words, Plato believes that a single entity cannot hold two contradictory opinions or aims at the same time. As a result, he divides the soul into rational, irrational, and spirited parts, because a single person often wills things that cannot possibly coincide.

One of the many problems that arise from this particular understanding of the soul is that it is not abundantly clear, from the examples Socrates uses, that Plato's conception of the irrational soul is truly driven by irrational motives. He uses the natural desire to drink as an illustration. Plato contends that when people are driven towards drink through thirst, this thirst is truly an irrational emotion. Socrates states, "Doesn't that which forbids in such cases come into play -- if it comes into play at all -- as a result of rational calculation, while what drives and drags them to drink is a result of feelings and diseases?" (Plato BIV, 439c). Glaucon readily consents to this idea; however, it is not quite so obvious that Socrates is correct.

Specifically, arriving at the conclusion that one should drink could, almost uniformly, be backed by rational thought processes. The physical feeling of thirst might be interpreted as an indication from the body to the mind that water is needed; accordingly, the higher capacities of the mind are presented with a choice between heeding the very real needs of the body or ignoring them. If the conscious mind chooses to side with thirst, this is not clearly an irrational decision: the mind knows that indications of thirst are associated with the rational need for water. So, it is not that the feeling of thirst is irrational, but rather that the thirst mechanism within the human body is very simple -- it is either on or off. Consequently, the desire to drink is driven by the limited nature of thirst; it is only concerned with the physical need for hydration, and not with the particular circumstances that might make drinking a good or bad decision for the conscious mind. Thirst cannot be attributed to irrationality because it is strongly connected to clearly positive and negative consequences, and the drive to drink is always aligned with the beneficial aspects of drink. Essentially, thirst can only appear irrational because the system within each human that chooses "thirst" or "not thirst" bases this decision entirely upon limited information.

Still, even this understanding of thirst must be at least somewhat flawed: I have divided aspects of the human mind and body to demonstrate how Plato's theories fall short, but there is no obvious reason why they should be so plainly divided. Certainly, it may sometimes be helpful to model human inputs and decisions in such a way, but this by no means implies that such mechanisms -- like thirst -- are truly self-sufficient or independent of the mind. This introduces another central failing of Plato's interpretation of the soul: in order to accept his organization of the soul, we must already accept the notion that the soul is something distinct from the body. This objection is granted little discussion within Republic; apparently, to Plato it is a natural fact that there is something immaterial to the human condition.

The most glaring problem facing any philosopher who attempts to generate a theory of the human being as having a distinct soul and body, is demonstrating how these competing entities communicate with one another. Plato seems to handle this fairly well with his idea of the irrational and rational; irrational aims are strongly linked to the needs of the body, while the other parts of the soul are more separate. However, this necessarily runs across problems if we recognize that Plato's understanding of irrational desires are not fundamentally irrational. If thirst is rational, then there can be no clear distinction between the irrational and rational aspects of the soul. Additionally, if this division is ambiguous, then the separation of the soul and the body, in general, must be equally ambiguous. At this point, we must appreciate that to accept Plato's separation of the soul demands that we already believe in the separation of the immaterial and material, and vice versa.