In fact the insurgence continued and the violence was a daily part of life in Algeria until 1962 when the French finally exited and Algeria had its own country to work with rather than a European colonizing force. Of course Galula offers final thoughts and strategies for those who follow in his footsteps in a situation that calls for counterinsurgency. Every conflict, he writes on page 272, is all about the "will between two camps" -- and a camp lacking in sheer political and social will shall lose. Galula notes that France did not "lean on the minority among the Algerian Moslems" that in fact favored the French; if France had worked harder to enfranchise the Moslem minority, it might have been a more fruitful formula (272).

The strategy is to assure the minority that supports France that indeed France will come down hard on the minority that is not supporting France; and it will done thusly: rebel bands must be destroyed; troops must be left in the area so rebels can't return; the population must be engaged and controlled;...

That has been proven in Afghanistan by U.S. forces; keeping the Taliban and other insurgents from coming over from Pakistan and terrorizing local people and shooting down U.S. helicopters has not been possible in the past, and won't likely work in the future. Still, Galula's book is an excellent historical document as to what actually happened in Algeria, and what might have worked if Galula had received the support and materials he asked for at the time he made those requests.
Works Cited

Galula, David. 2006. Pacification in Algeria 1956-58. Rand Corporation.