As the article indicates, "before 9-11, for example, there was a 'big picture' out there of the terrorist threat, but organizational boundaries, hierarchies, turf, or constraining organizational policies prevented the different pieces of information from being connected, and the big picture from emerging. Effectively connecting those dots, it is assumed, would have brought the bits of information on the terrorist threat together, the big picture to take shape, and effective decision making to occur." (Kronenberg & Khademian, 49) This is a premise which applies with value to the broader discussion here on organizational change, perhaps even providing the proper balance between March's optimism concerning change and Jarzabkowski's apprehension based on...

Indeed, Kronenberg & Khademian seem to argue that a micro-level understanding of the processes and bottlenecks defining organizational performance must be intimately understood and addressed before proceeding with the type of sweeping change that March correctly identifies as inherently and constantly necessary.
Works Cited:

Jarzabkowski, P. (2004). Strategy as Practice: Recursiveness, Adaptation, and Practices-in-Use. Organization Studies, 25(4), 529-560.

Kronenberg, P. & Khademian, A. (2009). Beyond "Connecting the Dots": Toward the Strategic Managing of Organizing. International Public Management Journal, 12(1),48-81.

March, J.G. (1981). Footnotes to Organizational…