Crime Flinn Operated a Loan Brokering Business

Crime

Flinn operated a loan brokering business without a license. Flinn was prosecuted for violating the statute required that persons engaged in the business of brokering loans obtain a license from the state. Flinn's defense was that he was unaware of the statute and therefore lacked criminal intent. Where criminal intent is not a specific element of the crime, a party's intent is irrelevant to a determination of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, ignorance of the law is not a defense. Because criminal intent is not a necessary element in the charge of violating a licensing statute, Flinn's defense that he lacked criminal intent will be unsuccessful.

Jennings, a courier, used money that belonged to his clients to make investments, but always delivered the money to his clients on time. Jennings kept the profits from the investments and was prosecuted for embezzlement. Embezzlement involves the fraudulent conversion of property that is lawfully in the hands of the embezzler. Jennings was guilty of embezzlement. When he used his clients' money, he was converting the money to his own use. The fact that he later returned the money did not change the fact that he converted client property to his own use. Such use of the money was outside of the parties' contract and was therefore embezzlement.

11.

Chaysee sold franchises to people, authorizing the sale of a product that did not exist. Chaysee was charged with a pattern of racketeering under the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act. Chaysee pleaded not guilty on the grounds that there was no pattern of racketeering because he only engaged in one fraudulent scheme. A pattern of racketeering activity involves at least two acts of racketeering activity within a certain period of time. To constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, it is not necessary for the two acts be different forms of racketeering. Each time Chayssee sold the fraudulent franchises, he engaged in an act of racketeering, therefore he was guilty under the Colorado Crime Control Act.

Chapter 9- Torts

1.

Boytera and Langley were involved in a collision on the curved portion of a two-lane road. Langley claimed that Boytera was driving in her lane and hit her head-on. Boytera claimed that Langley was driving at an excessive speed. Boyter and his employer, Concrete Specialties defended Boytera's negligence lawsuit on the grounds of contributory negligence. A contributory negligence defense requires that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the harm. Langley was not guilty of contributory negligence because even if she had been traveling at the legal speed Boytera would have hit her if he was traveling in her lane. If it is found that Langley was guilty of contributory negligence, she could only recover for that part of the damages caused by Boytera's negligence.

5.

The city of Chicago failed to remove an abandoned van in an alleyway. The van's gas tank exploded, injuring James Ortiz. Ortiz brought suit against the city, seeking damages for his injuries. In order for the city to be liable, the city must have had a duty to remove the van, and the breach of that duty must have caused the harm that resulted in Ortiz's damages. Finally, the damages had to be foreseeable. The city had a duty to remove abandoned vehicles. Failure to remove the van resulted in its parts being stripped, which caused the gas tank to explode, injuring Ortiz. The fact that the van belonged to the owner did not prevent the city from being liable for the injuries because the city's duty to remove abandoned vehicles existed independently of the owner's duty not to abandon his vehicle.

6.

Brodsky's car went out of control, striking several objects and Neiderman's son. Neiderman witnessed the event and brought suit for damages to his heart, which he alleged were caused by shock and fright to his heart. Brodsky's maintained that he was not liable because he had not touched Neiderman. A tortfeasor is responsible for damages to witnesses when the tortfeasor is aware that the witnesses are present. Neiderman was clearly present with his son; therefore Brodsky's defense was invalid.

8.

Defendant one parked his truck with iron pipes projecting 9 feet from the rear, but without warning lights or flags, as required by state statute. Defendant two was a taxicab driver who was speeding and hit the poles. Defendant one claimed that he was not liable because defendant two's negligence caused the harm. Defendant one's defense was invalid. Violation of a statute was prima facie evidence of negligence and the harm caused was the one that the applicable statute intended to prevent. However, defendant two also violated the applicable speed statute. Because both parties were negligent, they were jointly liable for the injuries to the plaintiff.

9.

A statute required air vent shafts on hotel roofs have parapets at least 30 inches high. Nunneley, a guest at the Edgar hotel, placed her mattress on a parapet and sat on it. The parapet collapsed and Nunnely fell into the air shaft and was injured. Nunnely sued the hotel because it had breached the statute by having 27-inch parapets. Nunnely could not recover. Although violation of a statute was prima facie evidence of negligence, the harm caused had to be the harm anticipated by the statute. The Edgar could not have foreseen that Nunnely would have tried to sit on a mattress on a parapet. Furthermore, the statute was not aimed at preventing the harm in question.

11.

A truck belonging to Unijian enterprises struck Hegyes. Hegyes was injured and received an implant. In a subsequent pregnancy, the implant caused problems and the child was delivered prematurely and suffered breathing problems. Unijian was not liable for the child's handicap. The placement of the implant in Hegyes' body, Hegyes pregnancy and the doctor's decision to perform a c-section were intervening variables between the accident and the delivery. Therefore, the harm was too remote from the injury to enable compensation