This act also grants the person or the victim the right to be notified just in case something happens. Another thing this act does is provide notification for the victim so that they will know what is going on. It also does further things such as not excluding them from the proceedings or the trials that could be going on.
¶ … Action Decision Brief
"What you want to do is to weigh all the numerous issues, distinguishing that in war some data could be wrong, that a lot is missing totally, and there are all sorts of essentials over which you have no control…. You have got to weigh all of these things and come to a decision as to what you want to do." Field Marshall William Slim
Agenda
Situation update.
Planning considerations.
Guidance received.
Centers of gravity.
Area of operations.
COAs.
Analysis of COAs.
COA comparison.
Risks.
Situation Update
Operations in water are restricted Numerous landing field exist all over the district.
would have to rely on its own intelligence to control the correctness of completed strikes and the degree of damage to key targets, since Iran would almost certainly move quickly to expel inspectors from the IAEA.
IRAN has 319 combat capable aircraft with pilots.
Inadequate Nautical skills.
Strategy of U.S.U.S. policy statements indicate that the objective of military action against Iran would be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
Mission
Higher. By the ORDERS of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS, in SUPPORT of AZERBIAJAN) to PROTECT and DEFEND the ARABIAN BORDER.
Restated mission. When directed U.S. European Command executes Flexible Preventive Decisions to discourage IRAN attack against AZERBIAJAN. When the order, USEUCOM organizes extra forces to the area of maneuvers and takes actions to discourage and protect AZERBIAJAN contrary to a IRAN attack; and if essential conduct aggressive processes to restore the pre-conflict international borders of AZERBIAJAN. The Government of AZERBIAJAN, conducts constancy operations, and changes operations back to the AZERBIAJAN Defense Forces or other chosen power when absorbed. .
Operational Planning Considerations
Significant factors that effect COAs.
-Controlling units, Soldiers, and fires.
-Identifying and engaging targets.
- Navigating and moving.
- Distinguishing friendly and enemy Soldiers.
-Locating, treating, and evacuating casualties.
-Locating and bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles
Primary source for this slide comes from the limitations determined during mission analysis:
Injury, occupational illness or death.
Equipment damage.
Mission degradation.
Reduced morale.
Adverse publicity
Those factors that seriously impact CONOPS:
Force flow
"Host country will allow temporary basing of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)."
Infrastructure
Limited ports.
Small airfields.
"We have the strategic lift but only one POD with limited MOG."
Weather
"In 5 days the monsoon season begins and will last for 3 months."
Limited flight permissions
"We have to fly around country X to get our CAP to the AO causing less TOS and fewer sorties per ATO cycle."
6
COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE
"Take no option off the table" to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb and attacking Azerbaijan.
The purposes of the new Azerbaijan Administration are not obvious; however, the already strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, which acts as an outpost of the United States and Israel on the Caspian Sea, have continued to worsen in recent days.
We have the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's base camps or other fixed sites, the company concept must avoid inconclusive fights between small units. For the protection of Azerbaijan and return of stability to the area. Therefore, we are going to recruit CAP actions.
It is necessary for the J-5 to progress some cautious courses of action for procedures in protection of Azerbaijan that we will forward to the SECDEF & POTUS for their consideration. -- Scenario Reference Book No. 1.
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions utilized in COA procedure:
The engineer effort will be centralized to support the preparation of battle positions, obstacle emplacement, and clearing routes in Iran.
The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on the nature of the buildings, obstacles along the street, and the time that the enemy must be delayed.
Operational CoGs
Friendly Forces
Friendly Intel action
Threat reaction to friendly actions
Friendly counteraction to threat reaction
Critical Capabilities
Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver
Mission Command
Visualize the flow of operations
Action- Reaction / Threat Consequence-Counteraction"
Critical Requirements
Access to APOD/SPOD
LOCs
Host Nation Support
CAISR
Mobility
Missile Defense
Air Superiority
Visualize the flow of operations
Critical Vulnerabilities
LOCs
C4ISR
Air Platforms
Firepower
Priority Targets
Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
9
CoG
Strategic mobility
Lines of communication
Resources
Time
Coalition/allies
Media
Critical Capabilities
State security forces
Unconventional forces,
Terrorists
Sea power
Critical Requirements
tracks, cars, operators,
Critical Vulnerabilities
Fuel
Tracks
locomotive
Strategic Center of Gravity-Friendly
Depict the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
10
Operational CoG
Clan support or sharing of power indirect attack against an enemy
economic/industrial capability military / security capability
Critical Capabilities
Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services
Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media
Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas
Critical Requirements
Command and Control Structure
Finances
Liaisons
Leadership
Training
IO
Critical Vulnerabilities
Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan
Lines of communications are just rails in a railroad in need of a locomotive
Coalition partners or allies might be required to bring
The media is a tool to influence the will of the people and key leaders, which is only a requirement.
Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
11
Operational CoG
Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Coalition forces
Critical Capabilities
Global Networks
State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism
Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors
Critical Requirements
the reliance on information technology
to advance their capabilities
Globalization
Critical Vulnerabilities
Communication Links
*Globalization
*Increased autonomy of network
*Financial Basis
*Muslim Diaspora
*International Cooperation
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
12
CoG
Ideology
freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens
Critical Capabilities
Fundamentalist Sheik
Belief in Cause
Shared Intelligence
Critical Requirements
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Time
Critical Vulnerabilities
Lack of credible HUMINT
Technological competence
Maintaining Focus
INSURGENTS
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
13
JOA
The light blue arrow marked SEABASE has CSG / MPS (F) underneath -- These stand for Carrier Strike Group and Maritime Prepositioning Force. It is an important tenet of modern expeditionary warfare that seabasing is actually preferred to land basing .
The green arrrow marked MAGTF refers to Marine Air Ground Task Force. ARG means Amphibious Ready Group. LOTS refers to Logistics Over the Shore. STOM is a Ship to Objective manoevre. Forcible Entry should be self-explanatory.
Depict only what is needed to illustrate the COA.
"Stay out of the weeds."
JSOA
AOA
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
14
Logical Lines of Operations
International borders reestablished in the region.
Red military defeated.
Red offensive capability neutralized.
Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.
Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.
Gain air & maritime superiority.
Support DOS and OGA.
Conduct stability operations.
Support Yellow leadership.
Mass combat power and sustainment.
Strategic end state
Retrograde coalition forces.
Attack strategic-level targets.
Security/Information Military
Governance
Economic
Diplomacy
Security
Information
Maintain sovereign state.
Secure Yellow borders.
Control population centers.
Isolate leadership
Establish legitimate coalition.
De-legitimize Red government.
Establish relationships with regional leadership.
Compel Red regime to step down.
Red is better off now than before.
Diplomatic isolation.
Modernize Yellow infrastructure.
Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Economic sanctions.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Increase NGO/PVO capacity.
Fund Red opposition.
Build international relief.
Defeat Red offensive.
COA 1
Conduct offensive.
Compel Red regime to give up fight.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
15
SEQUENCING of OPS
LCC
MCC
SOCC
Military
end state
Shape
Deter/seize initiative
Dominate
Stabilize
Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy
2
3
4
1
Build up
Integrate defense
Build up
Defend/CA
Counterattack
CA
Stability
CA
Handover/
scale down
Supporting effort
Main effort
Establish joint AD, ISR
air superiority
Psychological
operations
ISR
ISR/DA//UW
Psychological
operations
ISR/DA/UW
Psychological
operations
FID
CAS / AI
Shape
Support LCC Train Yellow Air
Handover/
scale down
C+DP1
D day
C+DP2
NET C+54
C+DP3
NET C+61
C+DP 4
DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs
1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.
FFIR- LCC RSOI.
FFIR- amphibious operations success.
3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.
IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.
4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.
PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.
5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.
5
Branch
Regime change
Legend
Psychological
operations
SPOD security
Maritime superiority
Maritime security
Amphib assault
Maritime security
Spt LCC
Maritime superiority
Spt ACC
Defeat Red Off. navy
Handover/
scale down
Maritime security
Train Yellow navy
COA 1
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
16
JTF
JFACC
JFLCC
JFSOCC
JFMCC
Yellow MOD
Coordination
TACON
OPCON
COCOM
XX
ESG
CSG
SAG
MPS
PATRON
SAG
Amphib
X
SF
NSWTG
PSYOPS
JSOAC
AETF
AEF
ASOG
Yellow
Patrol
Boats
COA 1
Task Force
Command Level
Major Subordinate Element
(MSE) Level
MSE Subordinate
Units Level
Depict Command Relationships
X
XX
Yellow
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
17
Phase I-Deter
Air and naval strikes, in coordination with Sof and Marine for Operation theater entry.
Additional forces are brought to the shore whenever it is necessary.
With control area being denied to enemy forces
That could be of a big threat to mine clearing operations.
With central areas denied to enemy forces that could threaten other areas, mine clearing operations commence in the Strait of Mormuz
With the straight being open, some of the forces that are ashore and then withdrawn.
Phase II-Seize Initiative
A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.
SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.
Forces can secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.
Phase III Dominate
In addition to creating lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- should be targeted by precision strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.
If permitted to remain under the command of the IRGCN [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy], these islands could be staging locations for operations to re-seed minefields and harass U.S. forces and civilian shipping transiting the Strait.
Phase IV -- Stabilize
Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors to stabilize operations.
To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.
Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority
Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors.
To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.
COA 2
This course of analysis this seeks to provide a foundation for clear thinking about the potential use of force against Iran in protecting Azerbaijan.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
23
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions operated in COA process:
The behavior of the Iranian regime postures as grave a set of challenges to the global community as any problem being faced currently. Iran's nuclear determinations against Azerbaijan; its support for terrorism;
The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iran, including lethal backing for groups attacking Azerbaijan troops, are all deeply troubling the nation
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
24
Operational CoGs
Friendly Forces
Friendly Intel action
Threat reaction to friendly actions
Friendly counteraction to threat reaction
Critical Capabilities
Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver
Mission Command.
To occupy a support-by-fire position to support an attack
Critical Requirements
Access to APOD/SPOD
LOCs
Host Nation Support
CAISR
Mobility
Missile Defense
Air Superiority
Critical Vulnerabilities
LOCs
C4ISR
Air Platforms
To attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction
Enhance international legitimacy
Gain multinational cooperation
Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations
Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
25
Operational CoG
Preserve sureness in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Alliance forces
Small naval fleet from allies
Critical Capabilities
State security forces
Unconventional forces,
Terrorists
Sea power
Airpower
Operate with allies
Critical Requirements
Good weather chemical gear fuel and ammo re-supply precise intelligence
Critical Vulnerabilities
IF Allies break ENIGMA code system
IF new merchant ships have faster speeds
IF Allies develop more effective radar capabilities
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
26
Operational CoG
Clan support or sharing of power
Ambushes and raids.
Insurgents
Underground militia
Critical Capabilities
Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services
Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media
Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas
Critical Requirements
Command and Control Structure
Finances
Liaisons
Leadership
Training
IO
fight more effectively at night move faster operationally to intercept reported convoy
Critical Vulnerabilities
Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan
IF they employ counter FW 200 operations
IF they change code settings frequently or adopt an unbreakable code system
IF new merchant ships have faster speeds
IF they come up with more effective radar
Capabilities
Electronic and technological advances may out pace Iranian developments.
Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
27
Operational CoG
Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Coalition forces
Critical Capabilities
Worldwide Linkages
State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism
Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors
Critical Requirements
Intelligence regarding production facilities in Iran
Effective and sustained bombing of production facilities
Critical Vulnerabilities
Communication Links
Globalization
Increased autonomy of network
Financial Basis
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
28
CoG
Ideology
freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens clandestine agents the civilian population,
Critical Capabilities
Fundamentalist Sheik
Belief in Cause
Shared Intelligence
Premeditated, politically motivated violence
Critical Requirements
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Time
Critical Vulnerabilities
Lack of credible HUMINT
Technological competence
Maintaining Focus
INSURGENTS
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
29
JOA
Continuous operations including normal and routine military activity "performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."
Goals include shaping perceptions, developing capacity for coalition operations, improving information and intelligence exchange, and providing peacetime and contingency access.
Also important that shaping activities could be "executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another."
Logical Lines of Operations
International borders reestablished in the region.
Red military defeated.
Red offensive capability neutralized.
Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.
Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.
Gain air & maritime superiority.
Support DOS and OGA.
Conduct stability operations.
Support Yellow leadership.
Mass combat power and sustainment.
Strategic end state
Retrograde coalition forces.
Attack strategic-level targets.
Security/Information Military
Governance
Economic
Diplomacy
Security
Information
Maintain sovereign state.
Secure Yellow borders.
Control population centers.
Isolate leadership
Establish legitimate coalition.
De-legitimize Red government.
Establish relationships with regional leadership.
Compel Red regime to step down.
Red is better off now than before.
Diplomatic isolation.
Modernize Yellow infrastructure.
Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Economic sanctions.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Increase NGO/PVO capacity.
Fund Red opposition.
Build international relief.
Defeat Red offensive.
COA 1
Conduct offensive.
Compel Red regime to give up fight.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
31
SEQUENCING of OPS
LCC
MCC
SOCC
Military
end state
Shape
Deter/seize initiative
Dominate
Stabilize
Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy
2
3
4
1
Build up
Integrate defense
Build up
Defend/CA
Counterattack
CA
Stability
CA
Handover/
scale down
Supporting effort
Main effort
Establish joint AD, ISR
air superiority
Psychological
operations
ISR
ISR/DA//UW
Psychological
operations
ISR/DA/UW
Psychological
operations
FID
CAS / AI
Shape
Support LCC Train Yellow Air
Handover/
scale down
C+DP1
D day
C+DP2
NET C+54
C+DP3
NET C+61
C+DP 4
DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs
1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.
FFIR- LCC RSOI.
FFIR- amphibious operations success.
3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.
IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.
4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.
PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.
5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.
5
Branch
Regime change
Legend
Psychological
operations
SPOD security
Maritime superiority
Maritime security
Amphib assault
Maritime security
Spt LCC
Maritime superiority
Spt ACC
Defeat Red Off. navy
Handover/
scale down
Maritime security
Train Yellow navy
COA 1
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
32
JTF
JFACC
JFLCC
JFSOCC
JFMCC
Yellow MOD
Coordination
TACON
OPCON
COCOM
XX
ESG
CSG
SAG
MPS
PATRON
SAG
Amphib
X
SF
NSWTG
PSYOPS
JSOAC
AETF
AEF
ASOG
Yellow
Patrol
Boats
COA 1
Task Force
Command Level
Major Subordinate Element
(MSE) Level
MSE Subordinate
Units Level
Depict Command Relationships
X
XX
Yellow
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
33
Phase I-- Deter
Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-
governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.
Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.
Phase II -- Seizure Initiative
A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.
SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.
Forces will secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.
35
Phase III-Dominate
In addition to making lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- will need to be besieged by accuracy strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.
They will continue to perform the same functions as the previous have. However, DOD military force will be used more aggressively to isolate the enemy force from outside support. OGAs and IOs will continue to influence allies or neighboring states in support of operational objectives.
S/CRS will then start preparing for the transition to stability and reconstruction operations during this phase. Unity of effort is critical to forcing rapid culmination of major combat operations
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