Paper Example Undergraduate 4,284 words

Action Decision Brief What You

Last reviewed: January 31, 2013 ~22 min read
Abstract

This act also grants the person or the victim the right to be notified just in case something happens. Another thing this act does is provide notification for the victim so that they will know what is going on. It also does further things such as not excluding them from the proceedings or the trials that could be going on.

¶ … Action Decision Brief

"What you want to do is to weigh all the numerous issues, distinguishing that in war some data could be wrong, that a lot is missing totally, and there are all sorts of essentials over which you have no control…. You have got to weigh all of these things and come to a decision as to what you want to do." Field Marshall William Slim

Agenda

Situation update.

Planning considerations.

Guidance received.

Centers of gravity.

Area of operations.

COAs.

Analysis of COAs.

COA comparison.

Risks.

Situation Update

Operations in water are restricted Numerous landing field exist all over the district.

would have to rely on its own intelligence to control the correctness of completed strikes and the degree of damage to key targets, since Iran would almost certainly move quickly to expel inspectors from the IAEA.

IRAN has 319 combat capable aircraft with pilots.

Inadequate Nautical skills.

Strategy of U.S.U.S. policy statements indicate that the objective of military action against Iran would be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon

Mission

Higher. By the ORDERS of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS, in SUPPORT of AZERBIAJAN) to PROTECT and DEFEND the ARABIAN BORDER.

Restated mission. When directed U.S. European Command executes Flexible Preventive Decisions to discourage IRAN attack against AZERBIAJAN. When the order, USEUCOM organizes extra forces to the area of maneuvers and takes actions to discourage and protect AZERBIAJAN contrary to a IRAN attack; and if essential conduct aggressive processes to restore the pre-conflict international borders of AZERBIAJAN. The Government of AZERBIAJAN, conducts constancy operations, and changes operations back to the AZERBIAJAN Defense Forces or other chosen power when absorbed. .

Operational Planning Considerations

Significant factors that effect COAs.

-Controlling units, Soldiers, and fires.

-Identifying and engaging targets.

- Navigating and moving.

- Distinguishing friendly and enemy Soldiers.

-Locating, treating, and evacuating casualties.

-Locating and bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles

Primary source for this slide comes from the limitations determined during mission analysis:

Injury, occupational illness or death.

Equipment damage.

Mission degradation.

Reduced morale.

Adverse publicity

Those factors that seriously impact CONOPS:

Force flow

"Host country will allow temporary basing of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)."

Infrastructure

Limited ports.

Small airfields.

"We have the strategic lift but only one POD with limited MOG."

Weather

"In 5 days the monsoon season begins and will last for 3 months."

Limited flight permissions

"We have to fly around country X to get our CAP to the AO causing less TOS and fewer sorties per ATO cycle."

6

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

"Take no option off the table" to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb and attacking Azerbaijan.

The purposes of the new Azerbaijan Administration are not obvious; however, the already strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, which acts as an outpost of the United States and Israel on the Caspian Sea, have continued to worsen in recent days.

We have the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's base camps or other fixed sites, the company concept must avoid inconclusive fights between small units. For the protection of Azerbaijan and return of stability to the area. Therefore, we are going to recruit CAP actions.

It is necessary for the J-5 to progress some cautious courses of action for procedures in protection of Azerbaijan that we will forward to the SECDEF & POTUS for their consideration. -- Scenario Reference Book No. 1.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions utilized in COA procedure:

The engineer effort will be centralized to support the preparation of battle positions, obstacle emplacement, and clearing routes in Iran.

The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on the nature of the buildings, obstacles along the street, and the time that the enemy must be delayed.

Operational CoGs

Friendly Forces

Friendly Intel action

Threat reaction to friendly actions

Friendly counteraction to threat reaction

Critical Capabilities

Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver

Mission Command

Visualize the flow of operations

Action- Reaction / Threat Consequence-Counteraction"

Critical Requirements

Access to APOD/SPOD

LOCs

Host Nation Support

CAISR

Mobility

Missile Defense

Air Superiority

Visualize the flow of operations

Critical Vulnerabilities

LOCs

C4ISR

Air Platforms

Firepower

Priority Targets

Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

9

CoG

Strategic mobility

Lines of communication

Resources

Time

Coalition/allies

Media

Critical Capabilities

State security forces

Unconventional forces,

Terrorists

Sea power

Critical Requirements

tracks, cars, operators,

Critical Vulnerabilities

Fuel

Tracks

locomotive

Strategic Center of Gravity-Friendly

Depict the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

10

Operational CoG

Clan support or sharing of power indirect attack against an enemy

economic/industrial capability military / security capability

Critical Capabilities

Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services

Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media

Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas

Critical Requirements

Command and Control Structure

Finances

Liaisons

Leadership

Training

IO

Critical Vulnerabilities

Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan

Lines of communications are just rails in a railroad in need of a locomotive

Coalition partners or allies might be required to bring

The media is a tool to influence the will of the people and key leaders, which is only a requirement.

Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

11

Operational CoG

Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Coalition forces

Critical Capabilities

Global Networks

State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism

Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors

Critical Requirements

the reliance on information technology

to advance their capabilities

Globalization

Critical Vulnerabilities

Communication Links

*Globalization

*Increased autonomy of network

*Financial Basis

*Muslim Diaspora

*International Cooperation

Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

12

CoG

Ideology

freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens

Critical Capabilities

Fundamentalist Sheik

Belief in Cause

Shared Intelligence

Critical Requirements

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Time

Critical Vulnerabilities

Lack of credible HUMINT

Technological competence

Maintaining Focus

INSURGENTS

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

13

JOA

The light blue arrow marked SEABASE has CSG / MPS (F) underneath -- These stand for Carrier Strike Group and Maritime Prepositioning Force. It is an important tenet of modern expeditionary warfare that seabasing is actually preferred to land basing .

The green arrrow marked MAGTF refers to Marine Air Ground Task Force. ARG means Amphibious Ready Group. LOTS refers to Logistics Over the Shore. STOM is a Ship to Objective manoevre. Forcible Entry should be self-explanatory.

Depict only what is needed to illustrate the COA.

"Stay out of the weeds."

JSOA

AOA

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

14

Logical Lines of Operations

International borders reestablished in the region.

Red military defeated.

Red offensive capability neutralized.

Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.

Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.

Gain air & maritime superiority.

Support DOS and OGA.

Conduct stability operations.

Support Yellow leadership.

Mass combat power and sustainment.

Strategic end state

Retrograde coalition forces.

Attack strategic-level targets.

Security/Information Military

Governance

Economic

Diplomacy

Security

Information

Maintain sovereign state.

Secure Yellow borders.

Control population centers.

Isolate leadership

Establish legitimate coalition.

De-legitimize Red government.

Establish relationships with regional leadership.

Compel Red regime to step down.

Red is better off now than before.

Diplomatic isolation.

Modernize Yellow infrastructure.

Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.

Enable markets and trade agreements.

Economic sanctions.

Enable markets and trade agreements.

Increase NGO/PVO capacity.

Fund Red opposition.

Build international relief.

Defeat Red offensive.

COA 1

Conduct offensive.

Compel Red regime to give up fight.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

15

SEQUENCING of OPS

LCC

MCC

SOCC

Military

end state

Shape

Deter/seize initiative

Dominate

Stabilize

Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy

2

3

4

1

Build up

Integrate defense

Build up

Defend/CA

Counterattack

CA

Stability

CA

Handover/

scale down

Supporting effort

Main effort

Establish joint AD, ISR

air superiority

Psychological

operations

ISR

ISR/DA//UW

Psychological

operations

ISR/DA/UW

Psychological

operations

FID

CAS / AI

Shape

Support LCC Train Yellow Air

Handover/

scale down

C+DP1

D day

C+DP2

NET C+54

C+DP3

NET C+61

C+DP 4

DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs

1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.

2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.

FFIR- LCC RSOI.

FFIR- amphibious operations success.

3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.

IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.

4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.

PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.

5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.

5

Branch

Regime change

Legend

Psychological

operations

SPOD security

Maritime superiority

Maritime security

Amphib assault

Maritime security

Spt LCC

Maritime superiority

Spt ACC

Defeat Red Off. navy

Handover/

scale down

Maritime security

Train Yellow navy

COA 1

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

16

JTF

JFACC

JFLCC

JFSOCC

JFMCC

Yellow MOD

Coordination

TACON

OPCON

COCOM

XX

ESG

CSG

SAG

MPS

PATRON

SAG

Amphib

X

SF

NSWTG

PSYOPS

JSOAC

AETF

AEF

ASOG

Yellow

Patrol

Boats

COA 1

Task Force

Command Level

Major Subordinate Element

(MSE) Level

MSE Subordinate

Units Level

Depict Command Relationships

X

XX

Yellow

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

17

Phase I-Deter

Air and naval strikes, in coordination with Sof and Marine for Operation theater entry.

Additional forces are brought to the shore whenever it is necessary.

With control area being denied to enemy forces

That could be of a big threat to mine clearing operations.

With central areas denied to enemy forces that could threaten other areas, mine clearing operations commence in the Strait of Mormuz

With the straight being open, some of the forces that are ashore and then withdrawn.

Phase II-Seize Initiative

A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.

SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.

Forces can secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.

Phase III Dominate

In addition to creating lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- should be targeted by precision strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.

If permitted to remain under the command of the IRGCN [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy], these islands could be staging locations for operations to re-seed minefields and harass U.S. forces and civilian shipping transiting the Strait.

Phase IV -- Stabilize

Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors to stabilize operations.

To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.

Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority

Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors.

To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy "commercial" vessels capable of dispensing mines.

COA 2

This course of analysis this seeks to provide a foundation for clear thinking about the potential use of force against Iran in protecting Azerbaijan.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

23

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions operated in COA process:

The behavior of the Iranian regime postures as grave a set of challenges to the global community as any problem being faced currently. Iran's nuclear determinations against Azerbaijan; its support for terrorism;

The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iran, including lethal backing for groups attacking Azerbaijan troops, are all deeply troubling the nation

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

24

Operational CoGs

Friendly Forces

Friendly Intel action

Threat reaction to friendly actions

Friendly counteraction to threat reaction

Critical Capabilities

Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver

Mission Command.

To occupy a support-by-fire position to support an attack

Critical Requirements

Access to APOD/SPOD

LOCs

Host Nation Support

CAISR

Mobility

Missile Defense

Air Superiority

Critical Vulnerabilities

LOCs

C4ISR

Air Platforms

To attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction

Enhance international legitimacy

Gain multinational cooperation

Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations

Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

25

Operational CoG

Preserve sureness in ultimate victory or success

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Alliance forces

Small naval fleet from allies

Critical Capabilities

State security forces

Unconventional forces,

Terrorists

Sea power

Airpower

Operate with allies

Critical Requirements

Good weather chemical gear fuel and ammo re-supply precise intelligence

Critical Vulnerabilities

IF Allies break ENIGMA code system

IF new merchant ships have faster speeds

IF Allies develop more effective radar capabilities

Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

26

Operational CoG

Clan support or sharing of power

Ambushes and raids.

Insurgents

Underground militia

Critical Capabilities

Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services

Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media

Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas

Critical Requirements

Command and Control Structure

Finances

Liaisons

Leadership

Training

IO

fight more effectively at night move faster operationally to intercept reported convoy

Critical Vulnerabilities

Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan

IF they employ counter FW 200 operations

IF they change code settings frequently or adopt an unbreakable code system

IF new merchant ships have faster speeds

IF they come up with more effective radar

Capabilities

Electronic and technological advances may out pace Iranian developments.

Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

27

Operational CoG

Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Coalition forces

Critical Capabilities

Worldwide Linkages

State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism

Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors

Critical Requirements

Intelligence regarding production facilities in Iran

Effective and sustained bombing of production facilities

Critical Vulnerabilities

Communication Links

Globalization

Increased autonomy of network

Financial Basis

Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

28

CoG

Ideology

freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens clandestine agents the civilian population,

Critical Capabilities

Fundamentalist Sheik

Belief in Cause

Shared Intelligence

Premeditated, politically motivated violence

Critical Requirements

Resources/Means to receive Intelligence

Time

Critical Vulnerabilities

Lack of credible HUMINT

Technological competence

Maintaining Focus

INSURGENTS

Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

29

JOA

Continuous operations including normal and routine military activity "performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."

Goals include shaping perceptions, developing capacity for coalition operations, improving information and intelligence exchange, and providing peacetime and contingency access.

Also important that shaping activities could be "executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another."

Logical Lines of Operations

International borders reestablished in the region.

Red military defeated.

Red offensive capability neutralized.

Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.

Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.

Gain air & maritime superiority.

Support DOS and OGA.

Conduct stability operations.

Support Yellow leadership.

Mass combat power and sustainment.

Strategic end state

Retrograde coalition forces.

Attack strategic-level targets.

Security/Information Military

Governance

Economic

Diplomacy

Security

Information

Maintain sovereign state.

Secure Yellow borders.

Control population centers.

Isolate leadership

Establish legitimate coalition.

De-legitimize Red government.

Establish relationships with regional leadership.

Compel Red regime to step down.

Red is better off now than before.

Diplomatic isolation.

Modernize Yellow infrastructure.

Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.

Enable markets and trade agreements.

Economic sanctions.

Enable markets and trade agreements.

Increase NGO/PVO capacity.

Fund Red opposition.

Build international relief.

Defeat Red offensive.

COA 1

Conduct offensive.

Compel Red regime to give up fight.

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

31

SEQUENCING of OPS

LCC

MCC

SOCC

Military

end state

Shape

Deter/seize initiative

Dominate

Stabilize

Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy

2

3

4

1

Build up

Integrate defense

Build up

Defend/CA

Counterattack

CA

Stability

CA

Handover/

scale down

Supporting effort

Main effort

Establish joint AD, ISR

air superiority

Psychological

operations

ISR

ISR/DA//UW

Psychological

operations

ISR/DA/UW

Psychological

operations

FID

CAS / AI

Shape

Support LCC Train Yellow Air

Handover/

scale down

C+DP1

D day

C+DP2

NET C+54

C+DP3

NET C+61

C+DP 4

DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs

1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.

2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.

FFIR- LCC RSOI.

FFIR- amphibious operations success.

3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.

IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.

4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.

PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.

5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.

5

Branch

Regime change

Legend

Psychological

operations

SPOD security

Maritime superiority

Maritime security

Amphib assault

Maritime security

Spt LCC

Maritime superiority

Spt ACC

Defeat Red Off. navy

Handover/

scale down

Maritime security

Train Yellow navy

COA 1

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

32

JTF

JFACC

JFLCC

JFSOCC

JFMCC

Yellow MOD

Coordination

TACON

OPCON

COCOM

XX

ESG

CSG

SAG

MPS

PATRON

SAG

Amphib

X

SF

NSWTG

PSYOPS

JSOAC

AETF

AEF

ASOG

Yellow

Patrol

Boats

COA 1

Task Force

Command Level

Major Subordinate Element

(MSE) Level

MSE Subordinate

Units Level

Depict Command Relationships

X

XX

Yellow

JTF-50 COA Presentation Format

DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL

Reading C340.3

33

Phase I-- Deter

Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-

governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.

Deterring undesirable adversary action and demonstrating joint force capabilities and resolve. This phase specifically includes preparatory actions for subsequent phases of the campaign, such as mobilization, staging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, developing logistics and force protection plans and assisting other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. In this phase, military action is focused on "crisis defined.

Phase II -- Seizure Initiative

A force of special operations forces and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command's choosing Immediately after landing.

SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons.

Forces will secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.

35

Phase III-Dominate

In addition to making lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf -- including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb -- will need to be besieged by accuracy strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required.

They will continue to perform the same functions as the previous have. However, DOD military force will be used more aggressively to isolate the enemy force from outside support. OGAs and IOs will continue to influence allies or neighboring states in support of operational objectives.

S/CRS will then start preparing for the transition to stability and reconstruction operations during this phase. Unity of effort is critical to forcing rapid culmination of major combat operations

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References
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