Winning the Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan

Winning the Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan

It has been a common belief among military strategists ever since the time of Clausewitz in the early 19th century that gaining the support of the people is necessary for the success of any military endeavor. (Clausewitz 1873) Modern strategists call this idea "winning the hearts and minds of the people," and generally perform this mission by providing aid to the local people in an effort to win approval for the presence of military troops to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, the recent military conflict in Afghanistan has called into question the validity of this assumption.

One common assertion among military strategists is that there three elements in conflicts: the people, the military, and the government. In order to gain the support for the military to conduct operations the government must gain the support of the people. Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, no government's military operations, particularly counterinsurgency ones, can be successful. In the current conflict in Afghanistan the United States has attempted to do this by building infrastructure and providing aid to the local people; a traditional means of winning the hearts and minds of the people. However, studies have determined that providing aid to the people has not gained their support for counterinsurgency operations.

In March of 2010 an international conference was held examining the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan. The conference agreed that there was a "surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives." ("Winning the Hearts and Minds In Afghanistan") In other words, the policy of winning hearts and minds through providing aid was not working. The aid was helping the people, but they were not giving their support in return. Because of the failure to win the support of the people, counterinsurgency operations were ineffective.

Trying to understand this failure of traditional military doctrine, researchers studied the cause of insecurity in Afghanistan, or the reason the people were not supporting the war effort. It was found that the main reasons for insecurity in Afghanistan "were poor governance, corruption, and predatory officials…criminality and narcotics…." (Fishstein 2011, p.2) Because their government was exceedingly corrupt and tyrannical, the people of Afghanistan simply did not trust it and did not support its activities against the insurgents. As the military aspect of the three elements of war, the U.S. military, primarily responsible for counterinsurgency operations, did not gain the support or aid of the people in their operations and thus were only moderately successful.

The war in Afghanistan has reinforced Clausewitz' view that it is important to win the approval of the common people in order for a government to be successful in conflict. However, it has not supported the belief that providing aid to the people will be an effective means of "winning their hearts and minds." The United States has provided billions of dollars in aid to the people of Afghanistan, and while studies indicate that this aid is appreciated and helpful, it has not translated into support for the government or its counterinsurgency operations. Corruption and heavy-handed practices by the government of Afghanistan have turned the common people against it, and as a result they have not supported America's effort to fight the Taliban.