Conflict Alert as Travel Technology

Conflict Alert

As travel technology improves and develops, so does the technical complexity of regulating traffic. This is especially the case in aviation. The air traffic controller needs to be absolutely aware of all open travel routes at all possible times. This knowledge is then used to guide all air traffic safely to their landing positions. A large amount of technology is available in order to accomplish this. In air traffic control, it is also vital that the controller be well versed in all the technology at his or her disposal in order to successfully carry out the work. The problem is that, because of the complexity of the operation, many things can potentially go wrong.

Faulty design in terms of either the planes themselves or the technology designed to guide them safely to land, for example, can cause accidents. While these design flaws are the result of human error, they are not as directly related to the human factor as air traffic controllers themselves. These workers are also human. Any number of factors, including fatigue, distraction or a momentary lack of concentration can cause an accident and the death of hundreds or even thousands of people. Most accidents as a result of this human factor, according to Don Brown (2005), occur in lower air space, where there is a significant amount of traffic landing or taking off. Accidents at higher altitudes are almost unheard of, but they do occur. Particularly, Don Brown, as will be seen later in this document, addresses one such accident, and the human factor involved in its occurrence.

Conflict Alert Technology

According to Wallace E. Kelly (1999), the problem of air traffic accidents as a result of poor traffic control occur more often than is recognized. It is therefore the ideal that air traffic control be improved to such an extent that customers can fly with peace of mind. One of the problems that the author cites is the lack of efficiency caused by the currently centralized control system. This system places stress on a single, central entity, while other involved parties, such as the pilots, are basically at the mercy of the alert functioning of the central air traffic controllers.

One of the solutions suggested for this problem is a distributed control paradigm, in which the technology known as Conflict Alert. A distributed control model would mean that pilots, rather than being at the virtual mercy of potentially exhausted traffic controllers, have an element of control over selecting and modifying their routes. According to Kelly (1999), this would also mean an increase in information reaching the cockpit, the responsibilities expected from pilots, and avionics technology.

Specifically, conflict alert technology involves conflict detection and resolution systems. The concept of conflict itself relates to air traffic separation. In other words, there is a separation standard, by which air traffic is required to adhere in order to avoid mid-air collisions. Conflict then means that this separation standard is violated; that aircraft are too close to the same route for optimal safety. This needs to be detected, so that pilots can be alerted to the conflict, after which the issue can then be resolved.

According to Kelly (1999), there are two possible understandings of the term "conflict" in terms of aviation. The first is limited by distance; conflict exists only when two aircraft are within this distance of each other in airspace. An alternative understanding is however possible in terms of a "predicted violation of a separation assurance standard." This means that the conflict is predicted as occurring at a future time, when two aircraft will be within a certain distance of each other. This provides pilots and air traffic controllers with more time to make decisions regarding route modifications. Conflict alert can then also occur within a more reasonable time frame to take preventative action.

As seen above, the human factor is an important consideration in conflict alert systems.

The implementation of these alert systems not only affect the human factor in air traffic control, but also interacts with this factor in providing pilots and passengers with the optimum in air traffic safety.

The Human Factor

Air Safety Week (2004), features an article that poignantly addresses the human factor and its interaction with the conflict alert system. Several important issues come to light as a result of human error and the importance and reliability of conflict alert technology. The specific accident referred to in the 2004 article is the mid-air collision of a B757 cargo aircraft and a Russian TU154 over Switzerland. According to the article, the direction of the traffic alerting and collision avoidance system (TCAS) was contradiction by air traffic control. Following the latter's instruction resulted in the collision.

Implementing such a system therefore highlights the importance of its accurate use by both air traffic controllers and pilots. Furthermore, the distributed system of air traffic control is a factor here. This would minimize the stress of decision-making on the shoulders of a single human entity, while allowing the optimum of sound decisions to be made.

Furthermore, the article cites a recommendation to implement a resolution advisory (RA) as part of the conflict alert system. This is integrated in the distribution paradigm, by providing pilots with a commanded avoidance maneuver when there is a danger of conflict. The conflict alert system in each aircraft is then notified, providing each pilot with the recommendation to change course in order to avoid collision. According to the article, both aircraft were equipped with conflict avoidance systems that included the RA. Both worked properly. The collision occurred purely as a result of human error.

According to the article, human factors that played a role in the collision include policy, training and procedural issues. In this specific case, air traffic controllers were not sufficiently informed regarding the conflict avoidance technology aboard each respective aircraft. Policies and procedures were also not updated to integrate with the new technology. Implementing the most recent in this technology is therefore not a guarantee of increased safety, unless the human factor is fully integrated with it. A further lesson from the accident is that pilots should also receive sufficient training to recognize which instruction can most safely be followed. Had they followed the conflict avoidance technology, the accident could have been avoided, and many lives saved.

Equally tragic is the mid-air collision cited by Don Brown (2005), which occurred on July 1, 2002 between a DHL Boeing 757 and Bashkirian Airlines Tupolev TU154 over uberlingen, Germany, in which 71 passengers and crew were killed. What makes this collision unusual, according to the author, is the high altitude at which it occurred - 35,000 feet, which is almost unheard of for accidents of this kind. The problems cited by Brown include both human and technological factors.

Like the Swiss collision, the aircraft involved and the traffic control system were all of highly advanced quality, according to reports. Nevertheless, Brown points to certain flaws in the system. Firstly, technological factors played a role. The conflict alert system usually operating during the flight was worked on for maintenance purposes, while the telecommunications system was also not functioning optimally for the same reason.

Furthermore, the hour was late, with only two controllers were assigned to the work station at the time. They had two assistants who were not qualified to handle air traffic on their own. A specific human factor highlighted by Brown is the fact that, the two controllers at the two scopes would each take a number of breaks during their shift. This would leave only one qualified person to handle both scopes during the break. This, as Brown terms it, is an "undesirable situation." Although it is not a busy time of night, human factors such as exhaustion would play a role in the potential of a controller to become distracted, especially if a crisis should occur and too many tasks need to be performed with the utmost of precision. This, according to the author, is precisely the reason for the accident.