Cause study concepts and applications

¶ … Skylab Mission Strike

Though the strike declared on December 27, 1973 by the third crew of the Skylab station may have caught many off-guard, their actions were a result of being overworked and frustrated by the mounting workload imposed on them by engineers and mission control stationed on earth. Numerous factors have been attributed to the strike including the mission's length, the individual astronauts' personalities, and their isolated and awkwardly constructed environment. While the preceding contributed to the strike, failure to clearly communicate the mission's goals to the crew, in addition to the engineers' unwillingness to ease up on the number of experiments and duties required of the crew, led to the strike.

The expectations of the third crew had been established by the performance and rate at which the second crew conducted experiments. Because the second crew was eager to work beyond the constructs of their schedules and wanted to provide data that could be measured against and compared to the results of the first crew, engineers assumed that the third crew could take on a larger workload than the previous two missions. Acknowledging the success and the speed at which the second crew worked, Lt. Col. Gerald Carr had clearly informed ground control that the crew did not intend to work at the sped-up rates that the second crew worked at before the third crew was deployed into space. Furthermore, the director of the Skylab program, William C. Schneider, agreed to Carr's demand and issued instructions "before the third crew went up that they were to take things easy."

Schneider provided the crew with contradicting information, sowing the seeds for contempt and distrust. Though Schneider agreed that the third crew would not have the same heavy workload as the previous crew, the numbers of experiments were increased to that of the second mission's workload with additional experiments being added. In essence, the third crew was subjected to a "bait-and-switch" tactic in which they were promised one thing and delivered another.

Consequently, it appears as though the third crew was not properly prepared to go into space. They seem to not know the proper channels and procedures that must be followed, nor are they coached or instructed as to how things should be properly done as evidenced by their harsh reprimand after the vomiting incident. Also, their concerns about their personal and mental health were not taken into consideration, and were even sacrificed by the flight surgeons that had the opportunity to forgo some of their experiments.

The flight surgeons take responsibility for the difficulty in communication because they could not clearly convey the dangers of overworking the crew to the engineers. Had they been able to express their concerns, the engineers may have been able to reduce the number of experiments required.