Death and Destruction in Egypt Essay

I.Introduction

The conflicts taking place in Egypt in the summer of 2013 are causing severe strife for the country and its neighbors. Protesters and the military clash daily, and civilians are caught in the crossfire alongside those fighting against oppression and those defending the state in an official capacity. As of August 15, 2013, the death toll had risen to 638 in the protests throughout Egypt (Lynch, 2013), and that number was expected to climb further as the White House monitored the situation daily to determine whether aid was appropriate.A2 At that point, the White House disputed reports that it had decided to withhold military assistance, stating that no final decisions had been made and that the situation remained fluid (Lynch & Jackson, 2013). To understand the conflict and the determination of the protesters to keep fighting, it is necessary to understand the history of Egypt and the tensions that produced the current crisis. Without that historical foundation, it becomes nearly impossible to grasp the nature of the conflict itself, what the protesters hope to accomplish, or where Egypt is headed in the future.A1

II.The History of Egypt

Egypt's history stretches back to the tenth millennium BC, when hunter-gatherers and fishers gradually gave way to a grain-cultivating culture (Jankowski, 2000). Climate change and overgrazing led to the formation of the Sahara Desert around 8,000 BC, and the fertility of the Nile River valley became the engine of civilization in the region (Jankowski, 2000). In 3,150 BC a unified kingdom was established, inaugurating roughly three thousand years of dynastic rule (Jankowski, 2000).A3 The Arab and Ottoman empires were particularly significant chapters in that long story, followed by British rule beginning in 1882 and lasting until the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which removed British advisers and established Egypt as a republic (Jankowski, 2000).

The United Arab Republic, a sovereign union between Egypt and Syria, was formed in 1958 but dissolved in 1961 when Syria withdrew (Jankowski, 2000). The decades that followed were dominated by conflict with Israel, until a peace treaty was signed in 1979 by then-president Anwar Sadat (Jankowski, 2000). Sadat was assassinated in 1981, and his successor was Hosni Mubarak (Jankowski, 2000). The 1980s and 1990s also brought waves of terrorist attacks and deepening social tensions to Egypt (Jankowski, 2000).A4 It is against this long backdrop of foreign domination, revolutionary change, and fragile peace that the political crisis of 2013 must be understood.

III.Political Tensions

The Presidency

Mubarak, Egypt's fourth president, served until 2011, when he stepped down after eighteen consecutive days of mass protests (Khalil, 2013). Power transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Mubarak and his sons were detained for investigation on charges of corruption and abuse of power (Khalil, 2013). He was ultimately tried and convicted on charges of failing to prevent the killing of peaceful protesters; a life sentence was handed down in 2012 (Khalil, 2013). In August 2013, an Egyptian court ruled there were no legal grounds for his continued detention (Georgy & Nasralla, 2013). Mohammed Morsi, elected president in 2012, almost immediately found himself in conflict with the Supreme Constitutional Court, and violent clashes erupted in December of that year (Khalil, 2013). By June 2013, millions of protesters were in the streets demanding Morsi's resignation. On July 3, the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces removed Morsi from power; Adly Mansour was sworn in as president the following day, and the constitution was suspended.

Protests

Morsi's removal quieted some of the unrest but intensified other dimensions of it. Supporters of Mubarak rallied around the prospect of his release, while those who had demanded his imprisonment were alarmed at the prospect of his freedom. On August 22, 2013, Mubarak was released and transported by helicopter directly to a hospital (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). His successor, Morsi, remained imprisoned. In the seven weeks preceding that release, security forces gunned down a number of Mubarak supporters and jailed the protest leaders (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). Meanwhile, supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood — who regarded Morsi as the legitimate president — clashed with those backing the new military-backed order (Noueihed & Fick, 2013).

In the eight days leading up to August 22, more than 900 people were reported killed in the protests; one hundred of those were police and soldiers (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood contested these figures, claiming the actual death toll was considerably higher than the media reported (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). Although protest attendance had declined somewhat in recent days, the planned demonstrations of August 22 — already being called the "Friday of Martyrs" — were expected to test the movement's durability (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). The Brotherhood argued that Mubarak's release signaled the military's intent to restore the old order, and while Mubarak himself was unlikely to become any kind of political actor at his age, the symbolism of freeing him was potent: many of the freedoms won during the revolts surrounding his resignation in 2011 could be imperiled if the old guard returned to influence.A5

IV.Future Predictions

What will happen in the future is genuinely difficult to determine, but the available evidence points toward one conclusion: the most direct path to ending the bloodshed runs through Mohammed Morsi.A7 The military has declared its commitment to returning Egypt to democratic governance, yet that pledge has not been sufficient to end the protests. A nightly curfew is in effect, and security forces are actively searching for Brotherhood members and protesters. Both the European Union and the United States have placed their aid to Cairo under review, citing concern over the scale of the violence (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). Saudi Arabia — itself an enemy of the Brotherhood — has pledged to offset any reduction in Western assistance, and alongside allied Gulf states has committed some $12 billion since Morsi's removal (Noueihed & Fick, 2013). External financial support may keep Egypt's economy from immediate collapse, but it cannot substitute for domestic political legitimacy.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized political force in Egypt, and its institutional power explains why Morsi's continued symbolic presidency — even from a prison cell — carries such weight among the protesters.A6 As long as the Brotherhood frames Morsi's removal as an illegitimate coup, its members and sympathizers have a rallying cause. Every protester killed reinforces that narrative, becoming a martyr whose death demands further resistance. If Morsi were to resign formally — relinquishing even the symbolic claim to office — the Brotherhood would lose its central organizing grievance. It could then redirect its considerable organizational energy toward electoral participation rather than street protest. Morsi would, paradoxically, strengthen the long-term prospects of Islamist political participation by stepping aside: a voluntary resignation would allow the Brotherhood to engage the transition process as a legitimate actor rather than an aggrieved insurgency.

The damage being done to Egypt's economy compounds the political crisis. Tourism, foreign investment, and normal commercial activity have all been disrupted by weeks of unrest, and there is no clear endpoint in sight. Political instability of this kind typically takes months or years to reverse even after calm is restored. The longer the protests continue, the deeper that economic wound becomes — and it is ordinary Egyptians, not the Brotherhood's leadership or the military high command, who bear the greatest share of that cost.

V.Conclusion

Egypt's crisis in the summer of 2013 is political in origin but far-reaching in consequence. The conflict cannot be resolved simply by managing the protesters or by external financial pledges from Gulf allies. The Muslim Brotherhood's organizational depth means that as long as Morsi remains a symbolic figurehead — even from prison — the protests will continue to find fuel. If Morsi were willing to issue a formal resignation, the Brotherhood could disengage from street protest without appearing to abandon a wronged leader, redirecting its resources toward legitimate elections and the broader political process; absent that resignation, Egypt faces the prospect of prolonged unrest, a damaged economy, and an increasingly fragile democratic transition — and the Egyptians who are simply trying to live their lives, far from any protest line, will continue to pay the heaviest price.A8 Those who understand the logic of the Brotherhood's position are waiting for Morsi to make that choice. They may wait for a long time.