Clausewitz's "Paradoxical Trinity" March 16, 2012
Clausewitz

Carl Von Clausewitz, the prominent theorist of war, stated that "a certain grip of military affairs is essential for those in control of general policy."First identifying the actuality of government leaders not being military experts, and the only sound measure is to formulate the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet. Governments, are organized when their chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by regulation the top military consultant to the president. The evidence of military success in this century specifies that Clausewitz was right. The deeper the association between the nation's senior military commanding officers and the government, the more successful that nation is in using the military instrument of foreign policy to achieve national political objectives.

The paradoxical trinity is one of the Clausewitzian perceptions which have been most recurrently cited in all of current military literature. Given that interpretations of Clausewitz are a…...

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References

Harris, B.F. (2008). America, technology and strategic culture: a Clausewitzian assessment.

USA: Taylor & Francis.

Herberg-Rothe, A. (2007). Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War. Great Britain: Oxford University Press.

Huber, T.M. (n.d.). H100: Rise of the Western Way of War Parallel Block. Us Army Command and General Staff College, p. 1-2.

Clausewitz's Paired Concepts
Clausewitz's contribution to the art of warfare is well established. In this treatise, On War (Clausewitz,1989), he set forth his various views on how modern warfare should be conducted. Although the treatise is not always easy to read or understand, the concepts contained therein remain applicable today. The criticisms of Clausewitz's approach are numerable and his views have been debated vigorously since they were first published. Yet, Clausewitz's theories retain their validity nearly two centuries after they were first proposed.

Before examining the validity of Clausewitz's theories it must be remembered that the era in which his theories were formalized is significantly different than the era in which the Korean War occurred. For example, Clausewitz never envisioned a weapon as powerful as an atomic bomb. The atomic bomb created methods of warfare radically different from those considered by Clausewitz and any analysis of his theories must be balanced against…...

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References

Brodie, Bernard. (1973). War and Politics. New York: Macmillan.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1989). On War. Prnceton, NJ.:Princeton University Press.

Clodtfelter, Mark. (1989). The Limits of Airpower. New York: Free Press Publishing.

Cohen, Eliot A. And John Gooch.(1990). Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press Publishing.

14). As the U.S. plays with one hand tied behind its back, the terrorists do not.
Mao Zedong

He led the People's Republic of China for almost 30 years and created the set of communist policies now known as Maoism (Lynch, p. 126). He was a creative, shrewd politician and a masterful military strategist. He destroyed U.S.-backed Nationalist China's 4-million strong armies in a long line of huge battles, and forced them to escape to Taiwan .

Today, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States faces terrorist enemies and insurgents that are fully utilizing versions of Maoist military strategy. Mao called for careful and capable organization, patience in military commanders, and intelligent and astute political operatives.

Mao has been called the "consummate Clausewitzian strategist" (Grant).

Maoist strategy for war comes in three phases. Revolutionaries, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, begin as relatively weak and desperate, and end up eventually, as a strong, politically motivated…...

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Bibliography

Clausewitz, Carl von, et al. On War. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Grant, T. "Revolutionary strategies: Maoism." 24 June 2005. armsandinfluence.typepad.com. 20 February 2010 .

Heerwagen, B. "Carl Von Clausewitz and his Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist." 27 March 2007. dtic.mil. 19 February 2010 .

Lynch, M.J. Mao. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Some contend that Hitler order Operation Barbarossa because there was the threat of imminent Soviet aggression toward Germany. This claim has been dismissed, for the most part, as Nazi propaganda. Whether or not ussia was going to attack Germany and whether or not Hitler's reasoning for wanting to preemptively strike or simply he had his eyes on the prize, both of these thoughts are make-believe thoughts. What this shows in the terms of war is that discourse is not just between two nations or territories, but discourse often goes on inside the minds of individuals in a somewhat abstract way. Thus, Hitler was obeying his own inner rules by choosing to go forward with Operation Barbarossa. It was attack or be attacked; kill or be killed. Take or be taken. "Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an…...

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References:

1. Clark, Alan. Barbarossa. Harper Perennial. 1985.

2. Copeland, Dale C. The Origins of Major War (Cornell studies in Security Affairs).

Cornell University Press: 2001.

3. Grant, Gordon R. Operation Barbarossa: The German Campaign in Russia -- Planning

Jomini and Clausewitz
Over the years, many doctrines have seen the light regarding military doctrine. While some of these theories have worked well in tandem, others have diverged and suggested different approaches to explaining the various arts and crafts related to war. Two such theorists include Antoine Henri Baron De Jomini and Carl Don Clausewitz. Although most investigators focus on the fundamental differences between the theories of these authors, it is also possible to recognize them as having co-existed in the historical process and the nature of military doctrine. One might therefore promote the view that Jomini and Clausewitz coexist in many modern military strategies; this has been proven throughout history during the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

Baron De Jomini and the physical aspects of war.

Jomini has placed emphasis on the principals and applications dominating at the operational and tactical levels of war. He mentions, for example, that the…...

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References

Baron De Jomini, Antoine Henri. 1862. The Art of War. J.B. Lippincott & Company.

Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1906. On War. Project Gutenberg

e felt that it was the responsibility of the military generals to execute the war in accordance with the policies set by the political leaders. "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means," said Clausewitz
. Jomini, however, took a contrary view. Jomini had little concern with political implications. Jomini's suggestion was that a government should choose its ablest commander and then leave him alone to wage the war according to scientific principles.

Clausewitz and Jomini developed their theories of war in a world that was much different than today's world. Their world was dominated by monarchial style governments that participated in warfare for reasons different from the reasons that modern democratic governments choose to pursue military options. Policies in the dynastic period were formulated by monarchs and had more to do with familial relationships and the acquisition of territory than for pure political considerations. In modern times,…...

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Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War. (Boston: George Allen and Unwin 1983), 94.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 479.

Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989).

The Art and Science of WarWar is as much an art as it is a science. There is in fact a science to art. Mathematical certitude, line, color, shape, the use of space, the logic of the mindit is all there in any artistic endeavor. One must understand the laws of physics and how the eye apprehends beauty to create marvels of architecture like the dome of St. Peters. War is no less a science or an art. The science of war is found in the way one must strategize and calculate according to logistics, resources, support, and knowledge of the enemy. Its art is found in the way one must be flexible, able to adapt at a moments notice, able to interpret the mission command and implement the spirit even if the objective must change on the fly. The art of war and the science of war must find…...

Clauswitz
At the end of Chapter One, Book One of On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously gives his "paradoxical trinity" in regard to the nature of the forces arrayed against each other in war. He tells us war is a "total phenomenon" in which there are three "dominant tendencies" that characterize the nature of warfare, and that any theory of war which neglects or ignores any of these tendencies would both "conflict with reality" and thus be "totally useless."[footnoteRef:1] These three tendencies are so intertwined that they act like "three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship with one another;" that is, each of the three tendencies is variable in its operative force, and the strength of each strand dominates or is diminished in any given particular case, but nevertheless, each magnet is still intimately involved in a given war or engagement.[footnoteRef:2] Clausewitz's…...

As it has been said by David Chandler, "the airy Kantian generalization of Clausewitz has held on for quite some time now." Another reason can be the fact that in a world that seems to have freed itself from the fundamental ideological conflicts and in a period in which there are some who seriously think and hope that the history has come to an end, the strife-driven world view of Clausewitz probably seems to be less important.
Conclusion

As an off shoot of the era of enlightenment, Jomini inclined towards natural laws to manage the control warfare. He developed an extremely geometrical as well as scientific methodology to modern warfare. In addition, he focused on the value of awareness, the principle of inner lines, as well as the intimate link amid combat and logistics. Inner lines are those assumed by one force to defend against the hostile forces.

On the contrary, according…...

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References

Aron, Raymond. (1985). Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. (1985). 418 pp.

Bassford, Christopher. (1994). Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945. New York: Oxford University Press.

Corn, Tony. (2006). Clausewitz in Wonderland. Policy Review.

Edmonds, Brigadier General Sir J.E. (1951). "Jomini and Clausewitz." Canadian Army Journal, v.V, no.2 (May 1951), 64-69.

military philosophies of von Clausewitz, Vegetius, and Machiavelli reveal common threads of pragmatism and political realism. Vegetius focuses less on philosophy and theory, and more on the practical details and logistics of military campaigns. Yet in so doing, Vegetius does evolve a foundational political strategy that remains relevant almost two thousand years later, even as technology and the dictums of foreign affairs have changed. Likewise, the tenets embodied by Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli are still studied in the 21st century, long after they were written. Machiavelli is not as focused on the minutia of military formations on the battlefield as his predecessor Vegetius, but he is far more focused on the ways political leaders need to comport themselves in times of war and peace. Machiavelli is likewise concerned with the ramifications of political power and how leaders can retain and wield their power to achieve self-serving ends. Just…...

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Works Cited

Gilbert, Felix. "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War." In Makers of Modern Strategy. Oxford University Press, 1986.

Vegetius. Epitome of Military Science. Trans. N.P. Milner. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996.

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Trans. Col. J.J. Graham.

nature of war is noted to be persistent and widely remains the same over time; it is violent and leads to conflicts due to clashing political perspectives, claims casualties most of whom are innocent civilians and also disrupts the societal fabric at the end of the war. Clausewitz formulated a trinity in a bid to explain what war is hinged on and why conflicts often lead to war.
Clausewitz (2006) pointed out at Passion (people), Policy (government), and Probability (Army) as the three pillars upon which war is hinged. He calls these 'the paradoxical trinity' and that they are the three magnets on which war is hinged. His emphasis was more on the romance and stressed on how the different aspects of the paradoxical trinity interact with each other.

The trinity is an interactive set of three forces that drive wars in the actual world. According to Clausewitz (2006) the paradoxical…...

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References

Bassford, C. & Villacres, E.(2010). Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity. Retrieved march 16, 2013 from http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm

Gillie, M.(2009). Interpreting Clausewitz's Miraculous Trinity. Retrieved March 16,2013 from http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Gillie-ThesisAntithesisSynthesis.htm

Tziarras, Z.(2013). Clausewitz's Remarkable Trinity Today. Retrieved march 16,2013 from  http://thegwpost.com/2011/11/09/clausewitz%E2%80%99s-remarkable-trinity-today/ 

Carl Von Clausewitz, (2006). On War. (Indexed Edition) Michael Howard & Peter Paret (eds).

The author makes his most poignant statement when he concludes, "…Nothing has such a depressing influence on the soldier, as the sound of the enemy's cannon afresh as the moment when, after a forced march he seeks some rest…" and falls into the "…law of the enemy" (158).
Author John Nagl points out that the strategies promoted by Antoine-Henri Jomini -- another well-known and respected military theorist -- and Clausewitz have been confused. Jomini had a prescription for "…the annihilation of the opponent's force as the best route to victory," a strategy which has "often and mistakenly" been attributed to General Clausewitz (Nagl, 2002, p. 18). Clausewitz was more likely to suggest that a political objective should be sought than that "anything was always the best route to victory" (Nagl, 18). Nagl asserts that Jomini "personally disliked" Clausewitz and thought Clausewitz's strategies were "rubbish" (Nagl, 18). In fact, by the…...

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Works Cited

Clausewitz, Carl Von. 2009. On War (Reprint). Rockville, MD: Wildside Press LLC.

Elek, Deborah E. 1994. Unconventional Warfare and the Principles of War. Small Wars Journal,

Retrieved January 8, 2012, from  http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/elek.pdf .

Nagl, John A. 2002. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat

Winning the Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan
It has been a common belief among military strategists ever since the time of Clausewitz in the early 19th century that gaining the support of the people is necessary for the success of any military endeavor. (Clausewitz 1873) Modern strategists call this idea "winning the hearts and minds of the people," and generally perform this mission by providing aid to the local people in an effort to win approval for the presence of military troops to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, the recent military conflict in Afghanistan has called into question the validity of this assumption.

One common assertion among military strategists is that there three elements in conflicts: the people, the military, and the government. In order to gain the support for the military to conduct operations the government must gain the support of the people. Without winning the hearts and minds of the…...

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Reference List

Clausewitz, Carl. 1873. On War. Edited by James John Graham. London: N. Trubner.

Accessed 19 February 2014.

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm

"Winning the Hearts and Minds In Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in Coin Operations." Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022,

S. involvement in World War II.
Is it possible to have a general theory of war?

Perhaps the most well-known "theory" of war is articulated in Matthew 24:6: "You will hear of wars and rumors of wars. . . . Such things must happen" (New International Version 1984). Therefore, although it is possible to have a general theory of war, any such theory will be limited in its ability to explain the why's and how's of its occurrence. According to Gray (1999), in his seminal text, on War, Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, set forth a modern general theory of war, but Sun Tzu's Art of War also addressed this issue. Clausewitz, though, is cited time and again in the relevant literature as having propounded a general theory of war. For instance, eid (2004) reports that, "In particular, he seeks to explain the methods to establish a general theory of war. Clausewitz…...

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References

Clausewitz, C.V. (1976) on War. Princeton, NJ.

Gray, C.S. (1999) Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-. The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War. Parameters, 38(4): 14-9.

Lichbach, M.I. (1989) "An evaluation of 'does economic inequality breed political conflict?'

relationship exists between difference of religion and the occurrence of civil wars within societies. The relationship between religious groups to society can be defined against the backdrop of war. Powerful emotions surround both conflict and military conflict (Yinger, 1946). A direct relationship has been recognized for several year regarding religion and violence. Students of organized religion "have frequently pointed out the ease with which most church leaders shift, at the outbreak of war, from an explicit antiwar position to a vigorous pro-war policy" (Yinger, p. 176). However, despite the seemingly strong tie between religion and war, it is critical to also acknowledge that while religion seems a backdrop for many wars, many other factors have contributed as well. Political aspirations and agendas have had as much to do with war as religion. The complex intermingling of these many different factors will be explored in greater detail below.
ecent research suggests…...

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References

Allen, John L. (N.D.) "As Vatican Calls for Peace, diplomat plans defense of 'preventive war.' {Online} Available:  http://www.natcath.com/NCR/Online/archives/013103/013103j.htm 

Armstrong, K. (1991). "Peace in Palestine." Holy War. New York: Doubleday. p4.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. (1992). "What is War?" On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 75-89; excerpt reprinted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings. 205011. Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, July 1992.

Chandler, D.G. (1996). "The English Civil Wars, 'Islam vs. Christianity'." Atlas of Military Strategy. Boston: Sterline Publishing Company. Pp.30-33., 54-55