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Why Did America Embrace The United Nations So Enthusiastically Yet Reject The League Of Nations  Term Paper

America, United Nations and the League of Nations All through its continuation, The National Interest of the United States of America has endeavored to recognize and assess the rational structures that motivate American Foreign-policy production. All efforts to devise a proper tactical political policy have constantly escorted, back to the invariable foundation: the recognition of national objectives, goals, and intents. Successive American administrations have believed that foreign policy is devoid of implication unless it points in the direction of the achievement of America's national objectives.

Therefore, the inevitable prerequisite to a balanced assessment of the usage of the United Nations and the League of Nations is to study the aims and intents of American foreign policy during that time. The paper has made an attempt to recognize the connection between the American National Interest and the utility of these two organizations.

America's Rejection to support the League of Nations

The Historical Background

The League of Nations was an international association established following the World War 1 with objectives of diminishing weapons, resolving arguments amid countries and sustaining living conditions of their people, however, the League showed that it had been incompetent of stopping violence by the Fascist nations. The United Nations successfully substituted it following the Second World War

(1). The League had been a success in managing minor disagreements all through the 1920's. On the other hand, it turned out to be useless in averting the bigger disasters of the 1930's, as well as, the Second World War. The League of Nations had officially suspended itself on April 18, 1946 and reassigned its mission and objective to the United Nations

The Fundamental Principals that Lead to the rejection of the League of Nations

In the United States of America the major disagreement on both the groundwork venture and the refined Covenant of the League of Nations had been on the base that the League would function as an intrusion with the sovereignty of America and with the Monroe principle, that it concerned desertion of the traditional American policy, which had not been in favor of entrapped coalitions, and that the government did not have the power, within its Constitution, to insert such an agreement

. Independence has revealed to be just so much freedom of action on the behalf of countries as is coherent with their responsibility, within international law and principles, to authorize the application of uniform independence or freedom of action by their sister countries. The League agreement had assured all States in their application of this sovereignty free from coercion by other Countries, and he who desires more is actually in search of the authorization thoughtlessly to ignore these commitments -- to refuse, for instance, the fair rulings of a properly established tribunal -- which is the German perception of independence

The Monroe Doctrine has revealed to have been reinforced, and not damaged, by the agreement. In its new structure the policy opposed any future colonization on the American continents by European administrations and all meddling by Europe with the free administrations of America. Afterwards, the United States, under the Polk and Taft governments, expressed its resistance to the turning over of American land by auction to any European or Asiatic administration. The new policy had been reinforced by the League agreement because it had been, for the first time, purposely identified by the countries, and had been stretched out to the world by the stipulations of Article X, which maintains "against exterior antagonism the regional and territorial integrity and political sovereignty of all associates of the League." America had definitely not been sanctioned or encouraged by that, nor, actually, by any other clause of the agreement, to get hold of land in Europe by occupation or acquirement, and likewise had not been encouraged by the fact that the European countries would be authorized by the agreement to do the same in their part of the world

America's Support for the United Nations

America supported the United Nations because the supreme national interest of America had been to obtain a world atmosphere in which the United States could grow its inner social values devoid of undue commotion or danger from the outside. From this sprang military strategy, economic strategy, and the constant job of working efficiently on the political situation

. From this concern four operational categories had been developed: Military Sanctuary, Political sanctuary, Steadiness and well-being, and World Order. These categories had not been equally restricted. All had clear repercussions for United States sanctuary. All of them had been pertinent to the East-West disagreement; many existed as objectives simply because of the incentive supplied by that conflict during that time. Furthermore, all of these categories had been connected...

Short-term objectives characterized goals of prevailing stress at that time, the accomplishment of which had been necessary to defend the existence of America itself. Mirroring the most fundamental national interest of all --continued existence-- the accomplishment of short-term objectives inevitably assumed topmost priority. America could not have afforded to delay until later to accomplish them, and certainly may forego a long-term opportunity if it had not given them their correct priority
The United Nations and American foreign policy rested in great part on the facts revealed above. Furthermore, collective action via the United Nations instead of unilateral action was considered politically viable on key political issues when the concerned common interest had been made apparent in stipulations not of its feature as an abstract good but of an exact national interest

. The correlation amid the two had been made when the national interest had been described in such a manner that strategies both in and out of the United Nations efficiently assisted America's major apprehensions

Using United Nations to achieve the goals of American Foreign Policy

American support of and dynamic contribution in the United Nations throughout and following the Second World War demonstrated a fundamental exit from its own history. Isolationism, if not deceased, had been disappearing speedily. The United States had to formulate a modified set of positions in the direction of the entire world; and it had to manage an understanding of its leading responsibility in the new association

Following is an effort to provide a precis list of national foreign policy objectives against which America looked to utilize and support the present and future of the United Nations as a device of diplomacy and an organization of political encounters during those times:

The overall objectives of America had been to obtain the type of world atmosphere in which America, in particular, and other countries, in general, can develop their social order devoid of unnecessary uncertainty and exterior threats of commotion.

The Fundamental Goal of Military Security:

The basic military goals had been to protect the regions of freedom and simultaneously to reduce the probability of an all-out conflict. Furthermore, America had the desire to dissuade purposeful Communist military imperil, by upholding a constantly steady power affiliation in relation to the Communist China and Soviet Union, so as to counteract Communist military ability of initiating a military assault, on the United States or its free world associates, and with the intention of dissuading the communist objectives to do so.

Furthermore, America wanted to get the weaponry race under management by fortified covenants, together with the utilization of outer space, before considerable nuclear abilities extend to additional states and before the functions of outer space technology turn out to be even more intimidating militarily; to reduce arms antagonism in the Near East, as well as, Latin America, and prevent it in Africa.

In addition, America's military strategy aimed to avert unintended or unplanned all-encompassing war from growing out of indigenous fighting either concerning the Soviet Union or inside the non-Communist countries by augmenting military, as well as, political methods of deterrence and localization of perilous state of affairs

The Fundamental Goal of Political Security:

America wanted to guarantee the endurance and success of its political and social principals in an age of long-drawn-out international misbalance. Furthermore, it wanted to curb the antagonistic feature of Sino-Soviet communism headed for the non-Communist countries

The Fundamental Goal of Stability and Welfare:

America had the desire to build superior steadiness and less resistance in international associations. It wanted to acquire ways of reducing alternatives to aggression as a method for resolving international disagreements. Furthermore, America aimed to attain ways of nonviolent transformation with the goal of averting dissatisfactions with the status quo from leading to an all-out war. To produce surroundings of economic steadiness, with the specific aim of acceptable and sturdy relationships with the third world countries, by nurturing economic and social development

The Fundamental Goal of World Order:

To construct a more dependable, conventional, and bearable world order founded on principles mirroring liberty and voluntarism instead of dictatorship and intimidation, and merging the principles of unity with the principles of individual self-respect and social and political variety. To alternate procedures of collaboration, order,…

Sources used in this document:
Nicholas H.G. The United Nations as a Political Institution. London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Taken from: Thomas G. Weiss. United Nations and Changing World Politics. Westview Press. 2004. Pg: 221

Wilcox Francis. Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956. Taken from: Thomas G. Weiss. United Nations and Changing World Politics. Westview Press. 2004. Pg: 222.

Wilcox Francis. Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956. Taken from: Thomas G. Weiss. United Nations and Changing World Politics. Westview Press. 2004. Pg: 223
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