¶ … United States military has helped in the attempt to establish self-sufficient countries. Its primary mission in this regard has been to defend the inhabitants of particular countries, such as Vietnam in the 1960s, and more recently Afghanistan. Conflicts between countries have usually focused on resources and politics.mmHowever, perceived disparities between the allocation of resources and political power has often inspitred insurgents. Examples of such occastions are the Vietnam War and the current war in Afghanistan. On both occasions U.S. forces have confronted insurgents. Counterinsurgency remains the number one priority in Afghanistan and in order to accomplish this mission, it is vitally important to maintain sight of lessons learned from the past, and particularly during the Vietnam War.
Similarities exist between various insurgencies. Certain facets of the Vietnam War are remarkably similar to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. For example, the counterinsurgency strategy in both conflicts demanded that military and political leaders understand the nature of the war being fought, and that effective governance sways undecided citizens.
II. Lessons from Vietnam for Afghanistan
One of the most important similarities between the war in Afghanistan and Vietnam is the widely divergent public opinion regarding the issues involved. Many American citizens and academics today for example question the validity and indeed possibility of creating a stable and prosperous democracy in Afghanistan. In order to substantiate their views, a significant tendency among this group is to invoke the American experience in Vietnam
. This group believes that the United States has done little more than "stumble" into a foreign environment where they do not belong, and where the political and military struggle are indecisive to the point where little progress is possible, even with the best of intentions. Furthermore, there is considerable danger to the United States itself, where great exepnditure in terms of lives and resources are expended to ultimately accomplish very little.
In contrast to this, the Iraq War also has its proponents, just like the Vietnam War did. In response to the former group's warning assertions regarding Vietnam, this group dismisses such warnings as invalid as a result of the vast amount of differences between the two wars, to the extent that these outweigh the similarities sufficiently to be dismissed. Instead, they use analogies such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as proof that there is indeed merit in the Iraq War and that this war can be successful in terms of the American objective to offer the gift of democracy and prosperity to Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Vietnam war exists in the American consciousness to a much more significant extent than any other war in history. Hence, the analogy remains inevitable, regardless of those who would argue for ist non-applicability. The main reason for this is that the Vietnam War was not only a defining foreign poicy event for political and miliatry leaders today; it was also the last significant counterinsurgency effort by the United States Arm and Marine Corps before the invasion of Iraq.
Hence, regardless of opponents, it is important to recognize that there may indeed be lessons from the past experience with Vietnam to apply to Afghanistan today. This does not however mean that some caution is not appropriate
. Indeed, Patraeusii holds that crises like 9/11 and the subsequent decision to make war in Iraq are particularly important in sparking a focus on the past as potentially providing a pathway for present action.
One important lesson is the public, political and policy-driven perceptions regarding the war. This appears to have certain similarities in both Vietnam and Afghanistan. In the Vietnam War, for example, there are divergent opinions regarding the nature of the war
. Three main views, for example, were that the war was an orthodox, limited-scale, small-size conflict. Secondly, it was seen as a revolutionary guerilla war to attempt and create fundamental social change. Thirdly, the war was seen as a new historical phenomenon, where divisions bewteen military and civilian, war and politics, and combatant and noncombatant were diminished significantly.
Another important factor in terms of learning from past experience and the public opinion is the role of the press. The Johnson administration at the beginning of the Vietnam War for example considered censorship, but abandoned the idea
. This decision was however based upon the assumption that the war would have a "quick, clean conclusion." The rather messy subsequent pathways the war took rather undermined the usefulness of the press in terms of politics....
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