The UAE-Israel Agreement in Comparison to Other Arab Countries

Introduction

The UAE is not the only state in the Arab world to have normalized relations with Israelbut its normalization is different from what other Arab countries have done. Egypt and Jordan established a peace with Israel decades ago, but it was not the kind of warm peace that the UAE has negotiated with Israel. Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan have normalized relations with Israel, but the motives prompting their agreements have been questioned by critics. When compared to these other countries, the UAE-Israel Agreement stands apart as unique. This paper will explain why that is and what it means for the rest of the Arab world.

Egypt and Jordan

Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, while Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The former was the result of the Camp David Accords, overseen by US President Carter. The latter was the result of two leaders in the Middle East coming together to cement an existing relationship on intelligence matters. Neither peace, however, was viewed with much warmth but rather an outcome of political pressures that necessitated these steps.

Egypt had just gotten a new leader in Anwar Sadat, who was determined to reverse the policies of his predecessor Nasser. Nasser had controlled a command economy in Egypt, which prevented the private sector from materializing. Sadat wanted the private sector to grow and he believed it was in Egypts best interests to shift from alliance with the Soviet Union to alliance with the US. Thus, he instituted the policy of Infitah, which was meant to open up Egypts economy, and to do this he had to make peace with Israel. Sadats intention was not only to transform the economy according to the free-market model, but also to correct the deficiencies of state control and achieve integration with the world economy (Ates, 2005, p. 134). By choosing peace with Israel, Sadat sought to show that Egypt was turning over a new life. Unfortunately, the economic reforms he intended did not materialize and Egypt failed to prosper from the new policy. The peace remained somewhat cold, in spite of the favorable press given it by the US during the Camp David Accords.

But since 2013, Egypt and Israel have worked more closely on security matters, as they have a common interest in containing Iranian influence in the region, particularly when it comes to Hamas (Mitchell, 2021). The two countries are also working more closely on energy matters; still, the Egyptian public largely opposes normalization of ties between the two countries so long as the Israel-Palestine conflict continues (Mitchell, 2021). Thus, even though the two states leaders share energy and security concerns, and diplomatic ties have never fallen off even in the face of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, the peace remains somewhat cold and lacks the warmth seen in relations between the UAE and Israel in the past year.

With Jordan, the peace has not been much different. It too spawned from geopolitical necessity. Jordans King Hussein had been working with Israels Mossad for years before the peace treaty was signed (Riedel, 2019). At the same time, Israel was having talks with the PLO, of which Hussein knew nothing about (Riedel, 2019). Initially, Hussein was upset by these secret talks, but then he viewed them as an opportunity, as Hussein realized the negotiation of a peace treaty with Israel would also open the way for a rapid restoration of ties with Washington (Riedel, 2019). Since the Kuwait-Iraq hostilities, Jordan had been lost in the shuffle of geopolitics. This was a chance to regain some leverage in the region. Since Hussein trusted Israels leader Yitzhak Rabin, the time for peace made sense.

Yet, 25 years later, the peace between Jordan and Israel remains cold. Ahren and Rasgon (2019) note that between the two states security cooperation is in good shape, but trade is declining, diplomatic relations are frosty, and the imminent retaking of Isle of Peace symbolizes ties under growing strain. Moreover, the 25th anniversary of the peace came and went without either side celebrating the important date (Ahren & Rasgon, 2019). In effect, the peace was merely a security peace, and did little to fully extend the relationship between the two countries. The UAE on the other hand is working closely with Israel on all frontstourism, energy, diplomacy, security, technology, and agriculture. It is establishing a very warm peace with Israel in hopes that this approach will increasingly warm the entire region.

Essentially, Egypt and Jordan sought to maintain a level of peace with Israel with their treatiesbut this peace was a cold one rather than one that actually elevated the countries and turned a page in the history books. Egypt and Jordan still have security ties with Israel, but the ingredients for growth are missing. Cooperation exists in some aspects, but overall the peace is viewed more as a maintenance project than as the solid foundation for real development.

Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan

The other Arab states that have normalized ties with Israel, aside from the UAE, are Bahrain, Morocco and Sudanand their motives are all different. Critics argue that Morocco agreed to normalize ties with Israel in order to obtain support from the Trump Administration for the Sahara conflict (BBC, 2020). Sudan is said to have normalized ties with Israel so as to get off the USs terror list (Gramer, 2020). Pressure on these states was placed on them by the US to some degree, and that is why they are said to have been part of the overall Abraham Accords. Yet, there is a significant difference between these states relations with Israel and the UAEs relations. One big difference is that all three have condemned the fighting between Israel and Hamas (Sherlock, 2021). The UAE has voiced concern, too, saying it was concerned over acts of violence committed by right-wing extremist groups in the occupied East Jerusalem (Sherlock, 2021). However, the UAE is also in a position of deference and warmth, whereas Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan stand on uncertain ground.

Bahrain

Starting with Bahrain, one reason uncertain ground exists for the state is that the country is somewhat divided in erms of how to view Israel. As Reuters (2020) reports, Bahraini opposition groups have said they reject a decision by the Gulf state to normalise relations with Israel. Moreover, the foreign minister of Bahrain has stated that the rights of Palestinians remained a priority for the kingdom (Reuters, 2020). And in April of 2020, the Parliament of Bahrain joined social media calls to stop Israeli business and government officials attending an international entrepreneurship conference (Reuters, 2020). None of this bodes well for the establishment of a warm peace.

Bahrains leaders are somewhat tied at the hip to Saudi Arabia, even though the majority of the Bahraini population aligns itself more closely with Palestine (Telci, 2020). This puts Bahrain on uncertain ground as well. If leaders push for too close of ties with Israel, as they might like to do, the population in Bahrain might revolt, seeing such a maneuver as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Bahrain is also seen as more of a puppet state by some criticsfor instance: Another interesting component of Bahraini foreign policy is its activities that seek to strengthen the image of the Emirati-Saudi axis globally. In this regard, Bahrain has been involved in various PR campaigns and think-tank funding activities. In one such incident, it was revealed that the person who was heading the Bahraini PR campaigns in Europe actually had fake academic credentials (Telci, 2020). Bahrain has also funded the British think-tank International Institute for Security Studies, which hosted the Manama Dialogue (Telci, 2020). The Dialogue...

…and has cooperated on security issues, specifically in the Sinai Peninsula where Egypt faces a growing insurgency involving the Islamic State and other violent extremists. A testament to the strength of the relationship is the fact that Israel easily approved the increased militarization of the Sinai so Egypt could fight its evolving insurgency (TeachMideast, 2020). However, the resentment of the people of Egypt for Israel does still present a problem for the state. It means it will be more difficult for Israelis and Egyptians to develop the kind of trust and fondness that the people of the UAE and Israel seem to be ready to have for each other. There is more openness and willingness to learn from and help one another among the UAE and Israeli populations. This same sense of openness is not really found in the other states, whether they are Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Sudan, or Morocco. Although all of them have established some kind of ties at the political or security levels, the relationships do not go very deep into the trenches of society.

So long as their societies remain aloof and continue to view Israel with an unfavorable eye, it will be difficult for the governments of these countries to do much in terms of warming relations with Israelno matter how hard the leaders try to make it happen. The UAE on the other hand has done much to guide the public and to prevent oppositional voices from having much influence on public opinion. The leaders of the UAE have firm control over the situation and they educate the public about the benefits of the deal with Israel. They have support from the public because they have done much to guide the public towards acceptance of the deal. Other countries, like Sudan, for instance, are struggling simply with stabilizing the country as the many different political groups vie for power in the transitional government. It is not a situation in Sudan where there is much foundation for developing the new ties with Israel, especially as no real groundwork has been laid in the public for accepting the deal.

Thus, the main differences between the UAE and the other Arab countries that have either formalized ties with Israel or signed peace treaties decades ago are that there is more good will coming from the UAE to Israel than the other countries; the UAE has much more to give Israel and is in a much better position to profit from the relationship than the other countries are; and the UAE has a solid foundation for benefiting from the deal because it has guided the public towards accepting it, which cannot be said for the other countries, where much of the public of those states still views Israel with animosity. The UAE is not hostile in its relationship with Israel and its public is open to developing alongside Israel as they collaborate for a better future. This is why the deal between the UAE and Israel is considered to be a warm relationship. It is why the other countries have much colder relationships with Israel.

Conclusion

The UAE stands to benefit from the Abraham Accords, as it is focused on establishing a win-win situation for itself and Israel. It is planning on building for the future and it has the stability to ensure success. The other countries that have either signed the accords or have signed peace treaties with Israel in the past may have done so more out of ulterior motives than out of any sense of planning for real development. Some of the countries are not even stable enough to benefit from such a deal, like Sudan. Others, like Egypt, have leaders who want to make the relationship work but they also have a public that is strongly opposed to any kind of relationship. There are major cultural barriers in most…