¶ … Strategy -- Rulers, States and War It is very difficult to look at the history of humanity and define a number of common, yet intangible philosophies of action that seem to be part of the overall human condition. One of these intangibles is the human capacity to produce both incredible beauty and horrific evil -- both of which occur during war. In fact, we may ask -- what is war? Every historical period from Ancient Mesopotamia to the present has added a new meaning to the word, but the very essence remains the same. War is a conflict between groups, a way to solve a political or social disagreement through force. Because war has been part of the human condition for millennia, however, we can look at it from both a theoretical and practical aspect of a way to use violence as a solution to problems. One of the most succinct definitions of war comes from an 1832 treatise by Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz who defined it as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 75). It is interesting, as well, to note that throughout history it has been the generals who, as they reflect late in life on their past, that seem to find the reasons for questioning the futility of war and find ways of looking at war as something that might be inevitable given the human condition but correct at the time (Keegan, 1994).

Regardless of the motivation, the time period and the combatants, war is almost always associated with terror, unhappiness and cruelty. However, human nature being what it is, there are times when it seems necessary to use whatever means necessary to limit evil, to stop unwarranted aggression, and to fight for the preservation of humanity and dignity. Such a theory was developed centuries ago in Ancient Greece and Rome, and then formalized with early Christian theorists August and Aquanis. This theory, called "just war," or Bellum iustum that holds the violent conflict is sometimes necessary but must meet philosophical, religious or political criteria (Orend, 2005). Looking at this issue using 17 case studies, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War asks the reader to step back from the typical historical process and look at the way war, diplomacy and foreign policy -- in other words the socio-political and economic development of society -- were more of a process than a series of great rulers, military leaders, or even battle plans. Instead, the individual authors focus more on a multidimensional approach to geographic, economic, technical, political and cultural forces that continue to evolve and transform states (Murray, W., et al., eds. 1996).

Since the book has 17 plus authors there is no single style, other than thematic treatments of various eras from experts in the field. The guiding paradigm, though, for all authors is the way that strategy and human nature evolved from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War and nuclear deterrence. Arguably, while the topics vary, the geography varies, and even the emphasis on politics, economics and culture varies; we find a tremendous amount of commonality between the authors and their focus on strategic design. One rather obvious commonality regarding warfare is the justification of the conflict. There has always been a great deal of political rhetoric surrounding war, and indeed some believe war is merely an expression of economic desires. Points-of-view, of course, different but societies tend to find a publicallyustifiable reason for warfare. In fact, one of the earliest theories about warfare surrounds the decline of the Mesopotamian city-states due to a series of internal wars over resources. The city-state structure left Mesopotamia vulnerable to outside conquest (much as Greece would later become) because as they were absorbed in internal conflict and rivalries rather than banding together to face off external enemies they used their resources to fight one another and allow outsiders to conquer city after city until the state itself was subsumed (Annanberg Foundation, 2013).

Sources vary by author and subject, but are all scholarly, many from primary source materials in the original language. Each essay set is well-researched, averages about 25 pages, and is formatted in a way that builds the idea of chronology on a global, rather than regional scale. For instance, Chapter 3 focuses on Rome and the Punic Wars against Carthage, which ultimately changed the "world" of the Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC; Chapter 4 moves to China between the 14 and...

However, it is interesting to note that most of the authors one of their sources was at least one General from one side or the other commenting, usually at the end of their lives, how philosophically futile warfare was from a humanistic stance, yet how necessary it seemed to be to the politicians who used it as a tool for statecraft and nation building. For instance, as the United States rose to power in the 19th century, fought a war with Britain, Libyan Pirates and a split in the nation, Generals reflected on the balance of the loss of life with economic gain and found the equation disappointing. Similar ideas occurred in Ancient Greece in which the futility of war combined with views on the futility of peace engendered cynicism on both sides -- a theme that echoed for centuries (See: Murray, et al., eds., p. 35, 48, 283).
The material, while being well-researched and cogently presented, is likely not for the novice or reader who has no familiarity with World History. The essays assume that the reader already has a grasp about the major timelines of history and the historical wars and battles that shaped Civilization. The authors also assume that the reader has more than a passing knowledge of statecraft and what would be 400-500 years of global empire building by the European powers and then the United States. Indeed, the focus of all of the articles is not necessarily with the major players within the warring states; but the mid-level and less than famous movers and shakers who created strategic design and power. This is perhaps one of the book's greatest strengths. The authors are experts in their individual fields and help to overturn many common assumptions from basic World History texts by moving the reader just below the surface to what is more likely a cogent, yet revisionistic, view of the conflicts. For instance, the essay on the Peloponnesian Conflict refutes the simplistic idea that Athens was defeated because they were too imperialistic in the Italian peninsula, rather that the eventual strategic victory was what Aristophanes called "the mortar and pestle of war," that the Athenians were tired of war and did not have a culture of war, whereas Sparta reveled in war but still made numerous peace offerings as an alternative to decades of attrition (p. 44-8).

In a similar rather revisionistic manner, the reader is reminded that warfare in the 20th century is quite synergistic. The authors are all at least one generation past the basic writing of history on these topics, some even past the post-revisionist stage into a more balanced approach. In the case of the late 19th and early 20th centuries there is more perspective than many other reviews of strategy or causation. Of course, as Chapters 9 to 17 point out, it is very difficult to find an actual quantitative sense of causality -- that x caused y. Instead, there are dozens, sometimes hundreds, or reasons for war -- most far more complicated that the political rhetoric of standard history (e.g. World War I was caused by the assassination of a Hapsburg Archduke; World War II by the German invasion of Poland; the Cold War by atomic diplomacy, etc.). Instead, what comfortably emerges is a set of overall generalizations from the mid- to late-19th century that show rising nationalism, an arms race between major powers, aggressive foreign policies, lack of strategic planning within the colonial nations, and a real failure to utilize a sound diplomatic strategy to prevent major conflicts. If this sounds like a generalized outline of every war since the Franco-Prussian War then the authors have all done a superb job of helping the reader understand that most conflicts must be placed in a contextual relationship between a continuum of events.

For instance, in Chapters 10-15, roughly covering the late 19th century until the end of World War II, several common themes arise that the authors point out had really no other end point than conflict. First, there was a power vacuum forming between the idea of royalty and democracy in Europe; the great powers began to militarize, plan for war, and spend more of their per capita income on military preparation. This was not just Germany, but all of the European powers.…