The allied forces should be trained aptly for the terrain that is in Afghanistan, the training should as well cover the entire insurgents possible pockets. This however may prove difficult since the insurgents have their protected areas that they would not allow the allied forces to intrude into. The allied forces should as well try as much as required to penetrate the Taliban and know each plan they make, never to underestimate the Taliban however trivial or temporary their plan may be. It should be noted that the Islamic policy that the Taliban have is way more long-term focused that immediate action and stopping. The allied troops should have a long-range plan of dealing with the Taliban. A plan which will possibly stretch into the government of Afghanistan.

In order to achieve absolute access to the Taliban strong holds, the allied forces should as well cooperate with the government of Afghanistan, this will end the animosity that there is currently between them and the government of Afghanistan. With this appreciation of the Afghanistan government efforts in curbing the Taliban, the allied forces will not need to spend too much dollars in intelligence since they will be able to access information and secrets from inside Afghanistan, which is way easier and cheaper. It will also create commitment to fighting the insurgents within the Afghanistan government.

The allied forces must try by all means to keep the innocent populace safe. They should be able to use...

Once the citizens start viewing the allied forces as protection and not threat to their livelihood, they will show full cooperation with the allied forces. This will lead to them giving information on the Taliban making the counterinsurgency even easier. This will also help tame the rampant demonstrations against the allied forces.
The UN/NATO should also receive more protection. This can only be done by penetrating the Taliban network through the locals. It is worth noting that most of the casualties suffered by NATO/UN are ambushes, hence if there is good blood between the allied forces and the locals then such incidences can be minimized as information would be reaching the allied forces in time.

References

Gopal & Anand (2009 December 1).Karzai Aides, Tribal Leaders Say Surge is Wrong Strategy.

The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from online.wsj.com/article/SB125960550353170023.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsTop.

Robert G, (2009). Rethink Afghanistan. Retrieved April 1, 2010 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/movies/23gree.html.

Robert, (2008, August, 26). Taliban was "Underestimated." Retrieved April 2, 2010 from www.jihadwatch.org/2008/08/taliban-was-underestimated.html

Tom C, (2008). Taleban tax: allied supply convoys pay their enemies, London Times. Retrieved from www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5327683.ece