The author references a New York Times investigative piece in which fifty-nine ethnic conflicts were reported in forty-eight locations in 1993. In "half these places Muslims were clashing with other Muslims or with non-Muslims"; in thirty-nine of the conflicts groups from different civilizations were engaged, and two-thirds of those were between "Muslims and others" (Huntington, 257).
Keeping in mind this book was published in 1996 -- and updated data employing Huntington's Muslim-violence theme is not immediately available -- it is worthy of note that of the twenty-nine wars (that involved 1,000 or more deaths in a year's time) in 1992, twelve were intercivilizational, and of those dozen, nine were between Muslims and non-Muslims (257). Huntington raised a lot of eyebrows -- and encountered a blistering serious of public criticisms -- for the following quote he published on page 258 of his book: "Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards." In a footnote to that quote, Huntington admits that he also used that quote in a Foreign Affairs article he published, and it "attracted more critical comment" than any other passage in his narrative. His response to the outrage by readers and scholars? "Quantitative evidence from every disinterested source conclusively demonstrates [the] validity" of that assertion, he insists (258).
Moreover, Huntington was far from finished with his shellacking of Islam; on page 258 the author claims that Muslim societies had "force ratios" that were "significantly higher" than other countries. The average force ratios and military effort ratios of Muslim countries (in the 1980s) were "…roughly twice those of Christian countries," Huntington goes on. "There is a connection between Islam and militarism," (the quote is from James Payne on page 258).
When it comes to international crises, Muslim states have employed violence to resolve 76 crises out of a total of 142 in which Muslims were involved (this is reportedly between the years 1928 and 1979), Huntington continues (258). And when they did resort to violence, Muslim states used "high-intensity violence, resorting to full-scale war in 41% of the cases," the author writes (258). Another tactic in Huntington uses in his arguments against Muslims is to compare Muslim vs. Christian dynamics. While Muslim societies were using violence in 53.5% of their conflicts (between 1928 and 1979), the United Kingdom only resorted to violence in 11.5 of their crises and the U.S. only resorted to violence in 17.9% of their international crises (Huntington, 258).
Challenging Huntington's Assumptions and Assertions
Did Huntington go out of his way to paint a picture of Muslims as violence-prone? Is he biased against Islam and digging up out-dated statistics to prove his points? If Muslim societies are as violence-prone and as hateful towards the West as Huntington's book indicates, the future will be blood-soaked and grim. But political science professor Kunihiko Imai believes first of all that Muslim nations don't despise and eschew democracy because democracy is related to Christianity. Imai reminds readers in the International Journal On World Peace that Islam and democracy are in some ways not compatible for the following reasons: a) the Islamic concept of the "absolute sovereignty of God" and hence God's law, the Shari'a, cannot be "altered by elected parliaments"; and b) the very concept of elected officials in parliaments creating laws for Muslims has been seen in many Islamic cultures as "blasphemous" since only Allah (God) can make laws (Imai, 2006, p. 11).
Secondly, Kunihiko believes that the "…empirical data does not render support for Huntington's apocalyptic view of the violent conflicts between the west and the Islamic-Confucian states" (26). Hence, rather than accept Huntington's policy recommendations ("maintain military superiority… [and] exploit differences and conflicts among & #8230;Islamic states") the West would be better off "promoting economic and political liberalization of developing countries" in order to make it a "more cooperative, if not completely peaceful, world" (Kunihiko, 26).
Meanwhile, professors Nanda Shrestha and Kenneth Gray -- also writing in the International Journal on World Peace -- posit that what Huntington is in fact advancing in his Foreign Affairs article and indeed in his book, is "not a hypothesis to be statistically tested" (Shrestha, et al., 2006, p. 34). Rather, the authors assert, Huntington is advancing "…an agenda, a worldview to be globally implemented by the U.S. against its invented enemies, all in the name of global domination" (34).
Shrestha goes on to insist that Huntington is actually creating a "new geography" in order...
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