First, stock options have an asymmetric payoff (see Chapter 2) and second they do not pay any dividends. Stocks, in regards to actual ownership, do pay dividends. These two key distinctions can create risk-taking behavior on the part of management because the value of options increases with the overall risk on the firm. The price of options also decreases with a large dividend increase. The more stable a company is in regards to its performance, the less valuable the option will become. Therefore, performance oriented rewards provide incentive for the company to increase risk while also having a corresponding decrease in dividends. Currently, dividend overall have decreased substantially relative to earnings (Fama and French, 1999). This, to be fair, may be a response to overall risk within the market as a whole, rather than risk in one particular firm. Wayne Guay, in his Financial Times article states that firms with very high growth opportunities tend to increase the granting of stock options (Guay, 1999). In turn, these "owners" take more risks to increase the value of the stock options of the firm. This action, by virtue of the risk inherent in it, causes many smaller growth firms to become insolvent and eventually bankrupt.
Further compounding the issue of performance oriented rewards and their relevance to shareholders is the evidence regarding risk. Is risk taking on the part of management desirable or undesirable on the part of shareholders? Who is to say what is risky in a shareholder population of thousands of owners. Managers who shun risk for example, may be overly conservative with their management of the firm. Consequently, these individuals will take fewer risks than are desired by shareholders (Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991). This principal agent problem -- which is addressed in more detail in chapter 2 -- is compounded when managers have strong incentive not to take much risk. As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, management may not engage in growth activities due in part to their desire to remain in their position. In retrospect, there is research that provides strong incentive for and against risk taking through performance oriented rewards. As such, it is difficult to determine whether stock options encourage risky behavior on the part of management or not. Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain if these actions would be harmful or shareholders in the long run. Examples given above show two contrasting positions regarding performance oriented rewards and their subsequent benefit to shareholders.
1.3 Research Question
In this thesis I have chosen to examine the link between stock options, and how both correspond to the inherent risk of a company. Share options and risk, as alluded to above, are now becoming more of a concern as the economic recovery continues to mull along. Shareholders are now more cognizant of the vast wealth and subsequent risk taking on the part of executives. Many contend that the pay received by many top-level executives is not commensurate with that of the value creation they provide to the company (Touryalai, 2012).
Over the years, stock options have become an integral aspect of an executive's overall compensation. What once was simply an added bonus for executives has now become the standard by which they are compensated. It is through these stock options that the propensity to incur additional risk is exacerbated. This is particularly true for executives in industries deemed essential for the proper functioning of the economy. Executives in industries such as financial services, automotive, and energy are more apt to increase risk due particularly to the concept of moral hazard.
A moral hazard occurs when there is an incentive for a person to take high or unusual risks in an attempt to grab at a profit while it is still possible to do so, say for example, before a contract is settled. As executives in these critical industries incur additional risk, there is seemingly no incentive to protect against the adverse economic consequences of their behavior. Since their industries are needed for the overall economy to function, these executives assume that a third...
Stock Options Payment of stratospheric compensations to the corporate executives by the dot.com companies is the talk of the day. It is pertinent to note that these compensations are paid not only in terms of the cash compensations but also in terms of stock options. However, compensations plans in terms of stock options are not new and being used years together in order to attract the employees and retain with a
.....company would expense the 1000 share options at $15 (1000 x $15 = $15,000), as this was fair market value at the time of expense, based on Black-Scholes (Harper, 2017). In 2014, the expense would be $3 per share option (1000 x $3 = $3,000), because that is the amount of increase in the value of the options that derives from the change in the exercise price. The accounting for the
Executive Stock Option Plans "If the company does not do better than its competitors, but the stock market goes up, executives do very well from their stock options. This makes no sense." Discuss viewpoint. Can you think of alternatives to the usual executive option plan that take the viewpoint into account? Executive stock options are performance-based incentive plans that became popular in the 1950s and 1960s. They declined due to the stock
Risk Management in Hedge Funds A research of how dissimilar hedge fund managers identify and achieve risk The most vital lesson in expressions of Hedge Fund Management comes from the inadequate name of this kind of alternative investment that is an alternative: The notion that all methodical risks are differentiated away is not really applicable here, with the Hedge Fund returns, in realism, representing a mixture of superior administration of market
Since institutional investors typically hedge their risks by using asset liability management and derivatives instruments against market risk, it is estimated that institutional investors in a representative stock market such as the London Stock Exchange lost only 10% of the value of their assets in the 1987 crash. In the absence of such hedging the effect of the crash and the resultant liquidity crunch would have been far greater.
This was because they were seeing one of their primary competitors (Travelers) merging with Citicorp (which created a juggernaut of: insurance, banking and brokerage activities). At which point, executives at AIG felt that in order to: maintain their dominance in the industry and offer new products they should become involved in similar activities. The difference was that they would grow the company by expanding into areas that were considered
Our semester plans gives you unlimited, unrestricted access to our entire library of resources —writing tools, guides, example essays, tutorials, class notes, and more.
Get Started Now