¶ … Ethical Leadership: A Case Study of Mikhail Gorbachev As the eighth and last leader of the former Soviet Union, Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1990) and best-selling author Mikhail Gorbachev was alternatively the Communist Party general secretary during the period 1985 through 1991, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1988 to 1991 as well as the first president of the Soviet Union during much of the last 2 years of its existence from 1990 to 1991. During this 6-year period, Mr. Gorbachev's role and leadership behaviors changed dramatically due to external circumstances that threatened the future of his glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring") reform policies as well as the future of the Soviet Union itself. To determine the facts, this paper reviews the relevant literature to describe how and why Mr. Gorbachev's leadership theories, styles, and power and influence changed from one role to the next. In addition, drawing on contingency theory, an evaluation of the effectiveness of Mr. Gorbachev's behaviors in each of these roles is provide within the context of tasks, follower characteristics and organizational goals. Finally, using specific examples, a recommendation concerning how Gorbachev could have behaved differently within each role to be more effective is followed by a summary of the research and important findings concerning this Soviet leader in the conclusion.

Description concerning how and why the leader's use of leadership theories, styles and power and influence changed from one role to the next

In 1985, Gorbachev was appointed general secretary of the Soviet Union at age 54 years following the successive deaths of three elderly leaders who represented the Old Guard, making him the youngest Soviet leader in history. At the time, many domestic and international observers expected the new general secretary to implement a series of progressive reforms in an effort to improve the Soviet economy and the country's international image. During the early phases of his leadership career, Gorbachev used a transformational leadership style that was clearly intended to "transform" the Soviet Union into a modern nation by replacing outdated political and economic systems with more democratic and progressive strategies modeled on the West. In this regard, MacKinnon (2008) reports that, "One could argue in the case of Gorbachev, 'transformational leader' best acknowledges his unmistakable contribution in changing the Soviet system, dismantling Marxist-Leninist ideology and one-party rule while introducing into it elements of civil freedom and democracy" (p. 69).

Indeed, some observers suggest that in Gorbachev's early years as Soviet general secretary, he was a classic textbook example of a progressive, transformational leader. For example, Jasper (2011) points out that, "Transformation [is] a well-worn word in Gorbachev's globalist lexicon, always signifying an urgent need to deconstruct the current political/economic system of sovereign, independent nation-states and the market-based economy and restructure (transform) it into a globalized, centralized, socialized new world order" (p. 18). For a time, Gorbachev's transformational leadership style was welcomed by the some liberal elements in the Soviet Union and the majority of the international community as a breath of fresh air in an otherwise stale and stodgy Soviet bureaucracy that was rife with corruption, mismanagement and waste. Press coverage of Gorbachev in the Western media was replete with glowing reports concerning the progressive reforms that the Soviet general secretary was making, and greeted each new initiative with even greater praise.

In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected as the Soviet Union's first president, an unsurprising outcome since he was the only candidate on the ballot. By this time, growing domestic unrest and pressure from the international community had combined to force him to revert in some instances to the same types of hard-line approaches in dealing with unrest and uprising in the Soviet republics that were used in the past in what can best be described as transactional leadership (Valenty & Feldman, 2002). As MacKinnon (2008) points out, "the term 'transformational' leader fails to account for Gorbachev's inability to retain political authority and to complete the process of transformation" (p. 71).

This shift in leadership styles during his last 2 years in office as president of the Soviet Union can be attributed in large part to the challenge represented by the up-and-coming Boris Yeltsin who sought the presidency and still rankled at being fired from his post in the Communist Party by Gorbachev years before. In this regard, Valenty and Feldman (2002) report that, "Gorbachev's problems in reforming the Soviet Union were compounded by Boris Yeltsin's inflammatory rhetoric and divisive policies" (p. 17). These challenges to his presidency...

For instance, in 1990, the so-called "Black January" took place wherein Gorbachev declared martial law and sent Soviet military forces to Azerbaijan to restore order (Stroilov, 2011). The outcome of this intervention, however, was far more severe than even Gorbachev likely expected, and more than 120 protestors were killed by Soviet troops and approximately 700 more protestors were injured (Stroilov, 2011). Although Gorbachev subsequently labeled his actions in Azerbaijan as a "mistake," the Azerbaijani government officially called the intervention an "action of aggression" and seriously considered placing Gorbachev on trial for crimes against humanity (Stroilov, 2011).
In addition, on January 13, 1991, Gorbachev dispatched Soviet troops to Lithuania and assumed control of their media outlets and other governmental buildings (Francis, 1991). Unfortunately, there was also bloodshed involved in this intervention as well. For example, according to Strollov (2011), "Soviet troops, sent by Gorbachev, fired on the crowd, killing 15 protestors and wounding hundreds. Gorbachev remained silent for about a week, then denied he was responsible and blamed the military" (p. 37). It is clear that Gorbachev took this drastic measure in an attempt to remain in power as Soviet president and general secretary, but the consequences of his actions were quick in coming and severe in nature. For instance, Francis reports that, "The European Community condemned Moscow's violent crackdown in Lithuania and warned that $1 billion in promised aid might be endangered" (1991, p. 8).

The election of Yeltsin as the Soviet president in June 1991 (this time with more than one candidate on the ballot) reduced Gorbachev's role to that of general secretary and by August 1991, the situation in the Soviet Union had deteriorated to point where Gorbachev's position was no longer tenable and the events that followed in a failed coup attempt spelled the death knell for his political career and the Soviet Union. According to the BBC, "In 1991 reactionary hard-liners in the Communist Party, fearing the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempted to remove Gorbachev" (Mikhail Gorbachev, 2017, para. 4).

Under house arrest in his Crimean dacha, Gorbachev was forced to listen to the events unfold on the radio as elements of the military sought to take over the Russian parliament. The combination of mass protests and the efforts by President Yeltsin served to quell the coup attempt, but Gorbachev saw the handwriting on the wall and realized that Yeltsin now possessed the real power in the Soviet Union, at least for a few more months before the country disintegrated into a series of independent republics (Stroilov, 2011). These outcomes may appear predictable in hindsight, but the dynamic nature of world events during Gorbachev's tenure as general secretary and president proved too much for his transformational or transactional leadership style. Because hindsight is 20-20, however, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of his behaviors in each of these political capacities by drawing on contingency theory which is discussed further below.

Evaluation, using contingency theory, concerning the effectiveness of the leader's behaviors in each role within the context of tasks, follower characteristics, and organizational goals

The main tenets of contingency theory are especially appropriate for evaluating Gorbachev's behaviors as general secretary from 1985 through 1991 and as president from March 1990 through June 1991. For instance, according to Swatos (1994), "The theoretical perspective of contingency theory provides an appropriate organizing framework. The contingency perspective is useful in this context for focusing attention on the importance of organizational environments" (p. 163). Moreover, contingency theory provides a particularly useful framework in which to evaluate Gorbachev's behaviors due to the hostile environment he faced throughout his tenure in these political positions. In this regard, Swatos adds that, "This focus is especially crucial when the environment is turbulent or hostile. In a rapidly changing environment, whatever accommodations may have been made with hostile elements in the environment that allowed the organization to survive are likely to be called into question" (1994, p. 137).

The context of tasks in which Gorbachev exercise his power as general secretary included his attempts to implement and sustain his glasnost and perestroika initiatives which were being rejected by many members of the Soviet Communist Party as representing threats to their own interests as well as the Soviet Union. In reality, these reactions were predictable enough given the well-entrenched…